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Abstract
This thesis is a study of a number of matching problems that seek to match together pairs or groups
of agents subject to the preferences of some or all of the agents. We present a number of new
algorithmic results for five specific problem domains. Each of these results is derived with the aid
of some structural properties implicitly embedded in the problem.
We begin by describing an approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum stable
matching for an instance of the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete lists (MAX-
SMTI). Our polynomial time approximation algorithm provides a performance guarantee of 3/2
for the general version of MAX-SMTI, improving upon the previous best approximation algorithm,
which gave a performance guarantee of 5/3.
Next, we study the sex-equal stable marriage problem (SESM). We show that SESM is W [1]-hard,
even if the men’s and women’s preference lists are both of length at most three. This improves upon
the previously known hardness results. We contrast this with an exact, low-order exponential time
algorithm. This is the first non-trivial exponential time algorithm known for this problem, or indeed
for any hard stable matching problem.
Turning our attention to the hospitals / residents problem with couples (HRC), we show that HRC is
NP-complete, even if very severe restrictions are placed on the input. By contrast, we give a linear-
time algorithm to find a stable matching with couples (or report that none exists) when stability
is defined in terms of the classical Gale-Shapley concept. This result represents the most general
polynomial time solvable restriction of HRC that we are aware of.
We then explore the three dimensional stable matching problem (3DSM), in which we seek to find
stable matchings across three sets of agents, rather than two (as in the classical case). We show
that under two natural definitions of stability, finding a stable matching for a 3DSM instance is
NP-complete. These hardness results resolve some open questions in the literature.
Finally, we study the popular matching problem (POP-M) in the context of matching a set of appli-
cants to a set of posts. We provide a characterization of the set of popular matchings for an arbitrary
POP-M instance in terms of a new structure called the switching graph. We show that this structure
can be exploited to yield efficient algorithms for a range of associated problems, extending and
improving upon the previously best-known results for this problem.
i
Contents
1 Introduction and summary 1
2 Background 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Full preference information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Stable Marriage problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 Extensions of stable marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.3 The structure of stable matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.4 Exploiting the structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Minimum regret stable matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Fair stable matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.5 Indifference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Stability, size, and structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Weak stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.6 The Hospitals/Residents problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Structure of HR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
ii
Couples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.7 Stable Roommates problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Stable roommates with ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Almost stable roommates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Stable roommates and kidney exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.8 Three-dimensional stable matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Partial preference information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.1 Profile-based optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.2 Pareto optimal matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.3 Popular matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3 An improved approximation algorithm for MAX-SMTI 35
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.1 Kira´ly’s algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.2 Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 The approximation algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.1 Phase 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.2 Phase 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.3 Phase 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 The performance guarantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
iii
3.6 Tightness of the performance guarantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.7 Conclusion and open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 Sex-equal stable matchings 50
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2 Further structural results for SMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2.1 The number of men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2.2 Rotations, rotation posets, and SESM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
The rotation poset Π . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
The rotation digraph DΠ and the underlying graph GΠ . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Weighted rotations and weighted subsets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3 Series-parallel graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 Parameterized problems, FPT, and W[1]-hardness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5 (3, 3)-SESM is W [1]-hard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.5.1 Reduction idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5.2 The parameterized reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.6 Inapproximability results for SESM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.7 Polynomial-time algorithm for (2,∞)-SESM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.8 An exact algorithm for (l,∞)-SESM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.8.1 The structure of DΠ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Properties of DΠ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Dealing with small components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
iv
4.8.2 The algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Algorithm idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Formal description of the algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.9 Computing P ′ ∪Q′ in polynomial time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.9.1 Series nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.9.2 Parallel nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.10 Putting it all together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.11 Conclusions and open problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5 Keeping couples together 82
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.2 Formal definitions of HRS and HRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.3 NP-completeness of HRS and HRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3.1 The reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.4 HRCC under classical (Gale-Shapley) stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.4.1 Breakmarriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.4.2 The algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4.3 Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.5 HRS with hospital preference lists of length ≤ 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.6 Conclusion and open problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6 Three dimensional stable matching 107
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
v
6.2 Formal definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.3 The 9-Sun: a problematic subgraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.4 NP-completeness of 3DSMI under weak-stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.4.1 The reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Step 1: the proper part . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Step 2: the additional part (add 9-Suns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.5 NP-completeness of 3DSM under strong stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.5.1 The reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Step 1: the proper instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Step 2: the additional part (add 9-Suns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Step 3: pad the instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.6 Conclusion and open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.7 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7 Popular matchings: structure and algorithms 123
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.1.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.2 The structure of popular matchings – the switching graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3 Algorithms that exploit the structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.3.1 Counting popular matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.3.2 Random popular matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.3.3 Enumerating popular matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
vi
7.3.4 Popular pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.3.5 Optimal popular matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Improving the running time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.4 Conclusions and open problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.5 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8 Conclusions and Future Work 147
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.2 Approximation algorithms for MAX-SMTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.3 Sex-equal stable matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.4 Keeping couples together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.5 3D-stable matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.6 Popular matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Appendix 153
A NP-completeness of (3,3)-COM-SMTI 153
vii
List of Figures
2.1 An SM instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining. . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 An SMI instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining. . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 The Lattice and poset of an SMI instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 An SM instance with two stable matchings with greatly varying values of e(·). . . 16
2.5 An SM instance with two stable matchings with greatly varying values of |δ(·)|. . . 17
2.6 An SMTI instance with stable matchings of different sizes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 An HR instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining. . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.8 An HRC instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining. . . . . . . . . . 25
2.9 An SR instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining. . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.10 An instance of cyclic 3DSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.11 A comparison of rank-maximal and maximum matchings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.12 The difference in cardinality of different popular matchings. . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1 Kira´ly’s algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Phase 1 of the approximation algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Phases 2 and 3 of the approximation algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
viii
3.4 A P3 in M ⊕Mopt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5 Tightness example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1 A series-parallel graph and a corresponding SP tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 Algorithm to find a SESM for an (l,∞)-SMI instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1 An HRS instance for which no stable matching exists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2 Preference lists in the constructed instance of HRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3 An HRCC instance with a stable but not feasible matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4 Algorithm HRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.5 Algorithm (∞, 2)-HRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.1 The 9-Sun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.2 The given instance I of (3, 3)-COM-SMTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 The proper instance of I ′ resulting from Step 1 of the reduction . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.4 Step 2 illustrated on man m3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.5 The completion of the preference lists in Step 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.1 The postorder traversal of a tree component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.2 A popular matching instance I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.3 A reduced POP-M instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.4 The switching graph GM for popular matching M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.5 Applying a switching cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.6 Applying a switching path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
ix
A.1 Preference lists in the constructed instance of (3,3)-COM-SMTI . . . . . . . . . . 154
x
Declaration
This thesis is submitted in accordance with the rules for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
the University of Glasgow in the Faculty of Information and Mathematical Sciences. None of the
material contained herein has been submitted for any other degree, and all the results are claimed
as original.
Some of the work in this thesis is the product of collaboration with the members of my research
group. Chapters 4 and 7 were undertaken jointly with Rob Irving. In particular, the in depth analysis
of the profile-based algorithm described in Section 7.3.5 originated with Rob. The results of Chapter
5 and Chapter 6 represent a joint effort with David Manlove and Peter Biro´, respectively. The proof
of Theorem 4.6.1, in Chapter 4, is due to David Manlove.
Publications
The following publications contain some of the results presented in this thesis.
E. McDermid, A 3/2-approximation algorithm for general stable marriage. In Proceedings of the
36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2009), pages
689–700, 2009. (This paper is based on Chapter 3).
R. Irving and E. McDermid, Sex-equal stable matchings: improved complexity results and exact
algorithms. In submission. (This paper is based on Chapter 4).
E. McDermid and D. Manlove, Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospi-
tals/residents problem with couples. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 46(3):359–367, 2009.
(This paper is based on Chapter 5).
P. Biro´ and E. McDermid, Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences. To appear in Al-
gorithmica, 2010. (Preliminary version appeared in Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop
on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC 2008), pages 97–108, 2008) (This paper is based on
Chapter 6).
E. McDermid and R. Irving, Popular matchings: structure and algorithms. To appear in Journal
of Combinatorial Optimization, 2010. (Preliminary version appeared in Proceedings of the 15th
xi
Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics (COCOON 2009), pages 506–
515, 2009.) (This paper is based on Chapter 7).
xii
Acknowledgements
Oddly enough, the most difficult part of writing this thesis did not involve producing a proof of a
difficult theorem ‘from the book’. Rather, the hardest part was determining how I can thank my
colleagues, friends, and family in an appropriate way, without making this thesis twice as long as it
would otherwise be.
I will try to be brief. I will not succeed.
I am truly honored to have had Rob Irving as my primary supervisor – I could not have asked for
someone better. Rob read absolutely everything I wrote over these three years, providing me with
invaluable feedback that greatly increased the quality of the thesis, and other papers that I have
written. Collaborating with Rob felt like exploring research problems with a friend, rather than an
actual supervisor. His enthusiasm for our research area is infectious, and I often benefited from
his thorough knowledge of mathematics. The fact that he always took the time to patiently listen
to my ideas – even the ones that were, well, stupid – gave me the courage to try to accomplish
things I would not have otherwise attempted. So, thanks Rob, for playing the perfect combination
of advisor, colleague, and friend.
Thanks also to David Manlove, my second supervisor, for his general enthusiasm and encourage-
ment. I am also grateful for his impeccable proof-reading abilities, and uncanny skill to imme-
diately understand mathematical transformations. Most importantly, without David, I would not
understand the momentous significance of the phrase Hibs vs Hearts.
I greatly benefited from many helpful discussions and collaborations with my friend and officemate
Peter Biro´, who I also thank for often sharing his wife’s delicious cooking (thanks Marti!).
My studentship was funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council grant
EP/E011993/1, as a part of the Match-Up project. I hope they appreciate this return on their in-
vestment.
I thought for quite a while about how to acknowledge all of my friends without attempting to
actually name everyone. I have narrowed it down to this: if you (i) know the significance of the
phrase “Nice, come back, nice”, (ii) have been forced to fold during poker for not paying attention,
(iii) have watched “Errand of Mercy”, or (iv) have camped at Bailey’s Bluff, then, whether you
realize it or not, you played an important role in this thesis. Thanks, you guys.
xiii
Sean, thanks for making such an effort to keep in contact over the last few years, and also for
making it your mission to distract me as much as possible. I thought of a thousand things to write
here, but somehow this one word summarizes all of it: KHAAAAAAAAN!
Thank you Grandma and Grandpa McDermid, for your generosity and kindness to Megan and I
over the last three years. Thank you also for consistently feeding me the most wonderful food
imaginable when I visit you. You have made a significant impact on my life. Did I mention the
food? Thanks also to Grandma Lipinski for your encouragement and kindness, and for the steady
stream of cards and gifts sent to Megan and I. GO PACK GO!
I’m grateful to my sister Julie, for her generosity and encouragement over the years. Thanks for
being a great sister. The first theorem of this thesis is the following: my sister is better than yours.
Proof: she gave me a laptop. QED.
My parents are an inexhaustible source of encouragement and help, and are certainly the most
generous people I have ever known. Thank you so much, you two, for your help, advice, and
prayers. It’s funny how as I get older I find myself seeking out your advice and opinions more, not
less – who would have thought that people in their twenties didn’t know everything? I have heard
it said, that anyone who writes something, does so with someone particular in mind. In this case it
is indeed true – this thesis is written for you, because I knew it would make you proud.
Thank you, Megan, for coming with me to a strange land where it rains almost everyday, and things
like fritter rolls are considered lunch. It is so important to me that you know this: you and I achieved
this together. We came here with a goal, and we accomplished it. There is no way I could have
done it without you. At this point I could make a multitude of corny comments like ‘you’re my
stable marriage partner’ or ‘you’re my first choice on my preference list’ (I know what you’d say to
that one: “Who ELSE is on your preference list?!”). Let me instead simply say that I love you, and
am so thankful to have you as my wife.
I thank God for constantly providing for me, and making sense out of my life. Anything good I
have done or will do is because of Him. In Psalms it says, If I rise on the wings of the dawn, if I
settle on the far side of the sea, even there your hand will guide me, your right hand will hold me
fast. Trust me, it’s true. I tried it.
Finally, I thank the University of Glasgow for supplying me with the books How to Get a PhD,
xiv
How to Write a Thesis, and How to Survive your Viva. For three years, rain or shine, these three
books have done an absolutely amazing job of keeping our office window propped open to let the
breeze in.
I wonder if they are any good?
xv
Chapter 1
Introduction and summary
In a matching problem with preferences, we seek to match together pairs or groups of agents (such
as men and women, or applicants and posts) subject to their preference for one another. Such
matching problems incorporate either full or partial preference information in the following sense.
In a matching problem with full preference information, every agent has some form of preference
list that ranks some or all of the other agents. In the partial preference setting, however, only some
of the agents have preference lists – the rest of the agents being, for example, inanimate objects.
This thesis presents a number of new algorithmic results for five specific problem domains from the
realm of both full and partial preference information. We emphasize a structural approach to each
individual problem in the sense that each new algorithmic result presented relies crucially on some
structural property implicitly embedded in the problem.
We begin (in Chapter 2) with a selective survey of the results arising in the context of matching
problems with preferences. Naturally, special attention is paid to those results that are particularly
relevant in subsequent chapters of this thesis. Next, in Chapters 3 – 7, we present our primary
results, which are outlined briefly as follows.
The first problem we consider is a well-studied variant of the stable marriage problem in which
we seek to find stable matchings that are as large as possible. To be precise, when the men and
women of a stable marriage instance are permitted to have ties and incomplete preference lists,
stable matchings can have different sizes (in contrast to the classical case). It is known that finding
a maximum cardinality stable matching is NP-hard, even when very severe restrictions are placed
on the sizes and positions of the ties, and the lengths of the preference lists [74]. Accordingly, there
1
2has been much recent interest in finding polynomial time approximation algorithms with a constant
performance guarantee for both the general version of this problem, and for several special cases.
The first contribution of this thesis is to describe an approximation algorithm for the general version
of this problem with an improved performance guarantee. A key ingredient of our algorithm is a
classic structural result on matchings in bipartite graphs called the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition
theorem [70], which, roughly speaking, categorizes the vertices of a bipartite graph in terms of its
maximum matchings. Our approximation algorithm employs this structural theorem, along with
novel techniques, to obtain a performance guarantee of 3/2. The previously best known approxi-
mation algorithm for this problem gave a guarantee of 5/3 [64].
Moving away from the notion of ties in the preference lists, we next consider the sex-equal stable
marriage problem (SESM). The goal of this stable marriage variant is to find a stable matching that,
in a formal sense, is fair to both the men and the women. This problem is known to be strongly
NP-hard [58]. We focus our aim specifically on stable marriage instances in which the lengths of
the preference lists of the men and/or women are bounded in length by a constant. Our contribution
is to strengthen the known hardness results by proving that SESM is W [1]-hard, even if the lengths
of the men’s and women’s preference lists are both at most three. Additionally, we give an exact
low-order exponential-time algorithm for SESM in which the men’s preference lists are bounded in
length by a constant l, and the lengths of the women’s preference lists are unrestricted. The running
time of our algorithm is bounded by O?(1.0725n), O?(1.1503n), O?(1.2338n), . . . for l = 3, 4, 5,
. . .. On the other hand, we show that when l = 2, SESM is solvable in polynomial time.
These hardness results and algorithms rely heavily on the structural properties of the set of stable
matchings. In particular, we make use of some classical – and new – bounds concerning the ro-
tations of a stable marriage instance [36]. Our exact algorithm exploits these bounds, along with
a recent extremal result concerning the structure of graphs with bounded average degree [25], to
achieve the stated running time.
We next study the hospitals / residents problem (HR), a many-to-one generalization of the stable
marriage problem. Specifically, we consider the hospitals / residents problem with couples (HRC),
in which pairs of (for example, married) residents are allowed to form couples, who wish to be
matched to the same hospital, or to hospitals geographically nearby [76, 21, 88, 65, 66]. We consider
a natural restriction of HRC in which the members of a couple have individual preference lists over
hospitals, and the couples form joint preference lists that are, in a formal sense, consistent with these
3individual preference lists. We give an appropriate stability definition and show that the problem
of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if each resident’s preference list
has length at most three and each hospital has capacity at most two. In contrast to this result, we
give a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching (or report that none exists) when stability
is defined in terms of the classical Gale-Shapley concept. This algorithm makes no assumptions
about the preference lists or capacities of the hospitals. Finally, for an alternative formulation of
our restriction of HRC, which we call the hospitals / residents problem with sizes (HRS), we give a
linear-time algorithm that always finds a stable matching for the case that hospital preference lists
are of length at most two, and where hospital capacities can be arbitrary.
Our linear-time algorithm utilizes the structure of the set of solutions induced by Gale-Shapley
stability. In particular, the set of stable matchings that “keep couples together” adhere to a particular
dominance relation, which defines a partially ordered set. Our algorithm efficiently navigates a
path through the space of possible solutions by exploiting the attributes of this relation. This result
represents the most general polynomial time solvable restriction of HRC that we are aware of.
The next chapter explores the generalisation of the stable marriage problem to three dimensions, so
that we have a set of, say, men, women, and dogs. Donald Knuth initiated the study of this problem
in the mid-1970s by asking if the results surrounding the stable marriage problem extended to this
setting [69]. Over the years, a number of researchers have explored various three dimensional stable
matching problems in an effort to answer Knuth’s open question. One recurring open problem in
the literature is the cyclic three dimensional stable matching problem (3DSM), in which men care
about only the women, women care about only the dogs, and dogs care about only the men. Several
authors have asked, either explicitly or implicitly, if stable matchings always exist in this setting,
and, in any case, if there exists a polynomial time algorithm to either return a stable matching,
or report that none exists [26, 83, 11]. Our contribution is to examine 3DSM under two natural
definitions of stability, given previously in the literature, and show that under both definitions of
stability, 3DSM is NP-complete.
The cardinal ingredient in our constructions is a specially constructed instance of 3DSM we call a
9-Sun. When we view this instance in terms of its underlying graph, it is easy to see that the special
structural nature of this instance makes the creation of a stable matching impossible. We use the
9-Sun strategically as a subgraph in the derived instances of our reductions to attain our primary
hardness results.
4Finally, we consider a problem with partial preference information, in which we seek to match a set
of applicants to a set of posts. One notion of optimality in this setting is that of a popular matching
– a kind of matching that is derived democratically from the applicant’s preference lists. Being
somewhat formal, a matching M is popular if there is no majority of the applicants who would
agree to abandon M for a different matching M ′. The goal of the popular matching problem (POP-
M), therefore, is to find a popular matching if one exists. There is a known linear time algorithm
to determine whether a popular matching exists for a given POP-M instance [5], and if so, this
algorithm finds a largest such matching. A number of variants and extensions of POP-M have
recently been studied.
Our contribution is to provide a characterization of the set of popular matchings for an arbitrary
POP-M instance in terms of a new structure called the switching graph, a directed graph computable
in linear time from the preference lists. We show that this structure can be exploited to yield
efficient algorithms for a range of associated problems, including the counting and enumeration of
the set of popular matchings, generation of a popular matching uniformly at random, finding all
applicant-post pairs that can occur in a popular matching, and computing popular matchings that
satisfy various additional optimality criteria. Our algorithms for computing such optimal popular
matchings improve upon the best previous results for this problem [60].
Thus, each result in this thesis – whether positive or negative – relies heavily on some key underly-
ing structural observations. In some cases, we use the structure to force the problem to “bend to our
will”. The new results surrounding the switching graph described in Chapter 7, or the half-century
old Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem given in Chapter 3, for example, introduce sufficient
order and organization into the problem to give us the desired results. On the other hand, sometimes
the structural observations reveal the kind of chaos that can occur within a problem instance. This
gives invaluable insight into what makes certain problems computationally difficult. For example,
as we show in our hardness proofs in Chapter 6, the strategic placement of a few 9-Suns into a three
dimensional stable matching instance is enough to bring about complete disorder.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
Computer scientists almost invariably model combinatorial optimization problems by assigning
numerical values (costs, weights, etc.) to the various objects of the problem instance. The usual goal
is then to either maximize or minimize some objective function derived from these numerical values.
A researcher who studies graph algorithms, for example, is bound to have numerous references
within an arm’s reach that model various problems with graphs that have costs or weights on subsets
of the edges and/or subsets of the vertices. Even within the restricted realm of matchings in graphs,
entire books have been written to catalogue a number of classic polynomial-time algorithms for
finding maximum cardinality matchings, maximum weight matchings, minimum cost maximum
matchings, and so on.
With this in mind, suppose we are given an instance of the following stable marriage problem. The
instance consists of a set of n men and n women, each of whom provides a preference list ranking,
in strict order, the n people of the opposite set. This problem clearly gives rise to a bipartite graph,
whose two disjoint sets of vertices are the men and women, respectively. Armed with decades of
algorithmic machinery, we could attempt to assign costs and weights to the edges and vertices of
this graph in a way that somehow captures the preference lists of the men and women. Thus we
could perhaps try to find various optimal matchings (mincost, maximum cardinality, etc.) in this
weighted bipartite graph.
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Perhaps the most subtle contribution Gale and Shapley [30] made when they studied this problem
was to realize that all of the common or natural ways of doing so completely fail in one particular
regard. It will not, in general, be possible to guarantee that the matching will not unravel in the
following sense: there could be a man and a woman who both prefer each other to their respective
marriage partners , and therefore might leave those partners and instead run off together. This
exemplifies the fact that, since the vertices of our bipartite graph correspond to people, we need an
optimality criterion that is convincingly good on an individual level.
Gale and Shapley argued that an optimal matching should be one that avoids this unraveling situa-
tion – hence no one has motivation to be divorced or seek an arrangement outside of the matching
mechanism. Fittingly, they called such a matching a stable matching. In a single theorem, they
proved that at least one stable matching always exists, and that such a matching can be found in
polynomial time [30].
Now, decades later, this single publication has effectively spawned a whole host of research areas
with results arising from the fields of mathematics, computer science, and economics. Some of the
results are very rich and beautiful theoretical ideas, exploring, for example, structural relationships
between various stable matchings. Other results – often algorithmic – are instead motivated by prob-
lems arising from real-world applications. A few examples include the central assignment of grad-
uating medical students to their first job at a hospital [105, 106, 107], matching students to schools
in urban areas [12], and finding optimal kidney exchanges amongst incompatible (donor,patient)
pairs [108].
Whether the focus is on theoretical or practical results, all these various matching problems with
preferences have a common theme: given a set of agents, each of whom has some form of preference
over the set of possible outcomes, find a matching of the agents that is in some sense optimal with
respect to these preferences. Specifically, matching problems arising in this context involve a set
of agents (for example men and women), where some or all of the agents may have a preference
list over a subset of the other agents. Taking a broad view of roughly five decades of literature, one
could categorize matching problems with preferences as follows:
1. Full preference information – where every agent has some form of preference list (possibly
involving ties) ranking some or all of the other agents of the instance. This category can be
further refined into the following subcategories:
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(a) Bipartite matching problems – in which the agents can be partitioned into two disjoint
sets, and the task is to match the agents in one set to the agents in the other.
(b) Nonbipartite matching problems – where the agents form one homogeneous set with
each agent having preferences over a subset of the others.
(c) d-dimensional matching problems – where the agents can be partitioned into d ≥ 3
disjoint sets and the task is to match the agents into d-tuples.
2. Partial preference information – in which the agents of the instance can be partitioned into
two sets A and P , with the agents in A having preferences (possibly involving ties) over the
agents in P , but the agents in P do not have any form of preference lists.
It is impossible to completely review all of the results arising in the context of matching problems
with preferences. Instead, this introductory chapter offers a selective survey of various structural
and algorithmic results for matching problems with preferences according to the above classifica-
tion. Naturally, special attention is paid to those results that are particularly relevant in subsequent
chapters of this thesis.
2.2 Full preference information
2.2.1 Stable Marriage problem
An instance of the stable marriage problem (SM) consists of a set of n men and a set of n women.
Associated with each person is a preference list, defined to be a total ordering (hence no ties are
allowed) ranking all of the members of the opposite set. A preference list is interpreted in such a
way that a person a prefers b to c if and only if b precedes c on a’s preference list. A stable marriage
instance is typically said to have size or order n, as this is the number of people (henceforth, agents)
in each set. Observe that this is actually a slight misnomer, as the sum of the lengths of all of the
preference lists of the instance, and hence the actual input size for the instance, is Θ(n2).
A matching (or a marriage), is defined to be a one-one correspondence between the men and the
women. If a man m and a woman w are matched together in a matching M , then we say that they
are partners in M , and write m = M(w) and w = M(m). A man m and a woman w are said to be a
blocking pair for M if m prefers w to M(m) and w prefers m to M(w) – in English, m and w are
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m1 : w1 w3 w4 w2 w5 w1 : m1 m3 m5 m2 m4
m2 : w1 w2 w4 w3 w5 w2 : m5 m2 m1 m3 m4
m3 : w3 w4 w5 w1 w2 w3 : m5 m1 m2 m4 m3
m4 : w4 w1 w3 w2 w5 w4 : m5 m1 m4 m2 m3
m5 : w3 w1 w5 w4 w2 w5 : m1 m2 m3 m5 m4
Figure 2.1: An SM instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining.
a blocking pair if they would both rather be matched to each other than to their respective partners.
For brevity, we often say m and w are blocking for M or that m and w block M, and so forth, in a
way that should always be clear from the context.
If there is at least one blocking pair relative to a matching M , then M is said to be an unstable
matching, or unstable. Otherwise, if there are no blocking pairs, M is said to be a stable matching,
or simply stable. The goal of the stable marriage problem is to take an arbitrary stable marriage
instance and output a stable matching. Figure 2.1 shows a stable marriage instance with a stable
matching denoted by underlining.
The primary contribution of Gale and Shapley [30] was to show that a stable matching exists for ev-
ery stable marriage instance. They proved this result constructively by describing a polynomial-time
deferred acceptance algorithm, which is now instead widely known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm
. It has been observed that this algorithm can be implemented to run in O(n2) time [69], and is
therefore a linear-time algorithm relative to the size of the input. We remark that the stable match-
ing found by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not necessarily the only stable matching, as there can
be many stable matchings for a given instance. We comment further on this in Section 2.2.3.
Roughly speaking, the Gale-Shapley algorithm involves a sequence of iterative proposals from the
men to the women, in which the men of the instance essentially compete with one another for the
women. An interesting property of the resulting stable matching is that it is man-optimal, because
each man actually achieves the best partner he can possibly have in any stable matching. Hence if
we switch the roles of the men and women, so that the algorithm is woman-oriented, the resulting
stable matching will be woman-optimal . We will use the convention M0 and Mz to denote the man-
optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings, respectively, of a given stable marriage instance.
McVitie and Wilson [78] showed that the optimality of the men in M0 or the women in Mz always
comes at the price of the other set’s extreme suboptimality. In particular, they proved that M0 is
woman-pessimal – meaning every woman is actually matched to the worst man she can ever be
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matched to in any stable matching. Reversing the roles of the men and the women, we can deduce
that Mz is therefore man-pessimal, meaning every man is matched to the worst woman he can ever
be matched to in any stable matching.
In fact, the observations on the inter-relationships between man- and woman-optimal (man- and
woman-pessimal) matchings is just the tip of the iceberg. A deeper and broader understanding of the
rich structure of the set of all stable matchings would eventually emerge from these observations, but
before diving into these details, we move on to some of the natural extensions and generalizations
of the stable marriage problem.
2.2.2 Extensions of stable marriage
There are at least three obvious ways to relax the specification of the stable marriage problem.
1. We could allow the number of men and women of the instance to be unequal, so that some
agents will necessarily be unmatched .
2. We could allow the men and the women to deem some members of the opposite set to be
unacceptable, giving rise to incomplete preference lists, so that the men need only rank a
subset of the women on their preference list, and, similarly, the women need only rank a
subset of the men.
3. We could allow the agents to express some form of indifference in their preference lists, so
that the preference lists are no longer restricted to being totally ordered.
The numerous results surrounding stable marriage with ties are worthy of their own section and are
discussed separately in Section 2.2.5. In this section, we will just focus on the first two of the above
relaxations of the stable marriage problem.
The stable marriage problem with incomplete lists (SMI) captures relaxations (1) and (2) in the
following way. An instance of this problem consists of a set of n1 men and a set of n2 women
(possibly n1 6= n2). We let n = n1 + n2 denote the sum of the numbers of men and women.
The preference list associated with each agent is a total ordering of a subset of the members of the
opposite set.
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m1 : w1 w3 w4 w1 : m1 m2 m4
m2 : w1 w2 w2 : m5 m2 m4
m3 : w3 w4 w3 : m5 m4 m3 m1
m4 : w4 w1 w3 w2 w4 : m5 m1 m4 m3
m5 : w3 w2
Figure 2.2: An SMI instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining.
Hence SMI allows men (women) to implicitly declare some of the women (men) to be unaccept-
able in that they would rather be unmatched than matched to a person who is not present on their
preference list. If an agent a appears on agent b’s preference list, then we say that a is acceptable
to b. If the converse is also true, then a and b are said to be mutually acceptable. A matching M for
an SMI instance is defined to be a set of disjoint (man,woman) pairs (m,w) such that m and w are
mutually acceptable. We let m denote the sum of the lengths of the preference lists, hence the input
size of an SMI instance is O(m).
It is easy to see that it may not be possible to match every agent in an SMI instance. As a conse-
quence, we require an alternative notion of a blocking pair. A pair (m,w) is a blocking pair for a
matching M if:
(i) m and w are mutually acceptable, and
(ii) m is either unmatched in M , or prefers w to his partner in M , and
(iii) w is either unmatched in M , or prefers m to her partner in M .
Figure 2.2 gives an example of an SMI instance with a stable matching.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm can be easily extended to the SMI setting [36], proving that a stable
matching always exists for an SMI instance. The results concerning the man-optimal and woman-
optimal (man-pessimal and woman-pessimal) stable matchings also generalize in the obvious way.
Gale and Sotomayor [31] observed the remarkable result that, while there can still be many sta-
ble matching for an arbitrary SMI instance, all stable matchings match exactly the same subset of
the agents. Thus if an agent is unmatched (matched) in one stable matching, they are unmatched
(matched) in all of them. We can therefore think of the agents of an SMI instance as being par-
titioned into two sets – the matched set and the unmatched set. If we were to attempt to explore
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the set of stable matchings for an SMI instance, we need only turn our attention to the set of sta-
ble matchings for the matched set of agents. Because of this fact it is sometimes desirable to first
discard the unmatched agents from an SMI instance, deleting them from the preference lists of the
agents in the matched set. The set of stable matchings for the resulting instance is exactly the same
as the set of stable matchings in the original instance [36].
2.2.3 The structure of stable matchings
So far we have discussed the existence of the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings
(M0 and Mz) of an SMI instance, which are quite literally the most extreme stable matchings.
When dealing with an instance in which M0 = Mz , M0 must be the unique stable matching – this
is the only way that every man’s best partner could also be his worst partner. If instead M0 6= Mz ,
there may indeed be many additional stable matchings. In particular, Knuth [69] showed that the
maximum number of stable matchings for an SM instance grows exponentially with n. Irving and
Leather [46] reestablished this fact in a different way, and showed that for each n > 0, where n is
a power of two, there exists an instance of SM of size n with at least 2n−1 stable matchings.
In what follows we summarize the rich results concerning the structure of the set of all stable
matchings for an SMI instance. We also discuss the key compact representations of the set of stable
matchings, along with the algorithmic consequences of this structure.
Henceforth, we letM denote the set of all stable matchings of an arbitrary SMI instance. We define
the following partial order on M. Let M and M ′ be two (not necessarily distinct) stable matchings
in M. We say that M dominates M ′, denoted M  M ′, if, for each matched man m, M(m) =
M ′(m) or m prefers M(m) to M ′(m). Intuitively, M dominates M ′ if each man is at least as
happy with his partner in M as he is with his partner in M ′.
Knuth [69] attributes the following striking result concerning stable matchings to John Conway. Let
M and M ′ be two distinct stable matchings. If each man is matched to the more (less) preferred
of his two partners in M and M ′, then the result is a stable matching. One of the reasons why this
result is so surprising is that there is no a priori reason why this operation should even constitute
a matching, much less one that is stable. In light of Conway’s result, it can be seen that the pair
(M,) actually forms a distributive lattice, with the meet (join) of two stable matchings being
the operation of assigning each man to the better (worse) of his two partners in any two stable
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matchings. The maximum and minimum elements of this lattice are the man- and woman-optimal
stable matchings, respectively.
The lattice representation of the set of stable matchings is indeed quite interesting, but does not im-
mediately lend itself to any particularly efficient algorithms for, say, generating all stable matchings
or finding a stable matching with some special additional property. Since M can have exponential
size, any algorithm that explicitly generates this lattice is doomed to require exponential-time (and
possibly even exponential space). Irving and Leather [46] discovered a polynomial-space repre-
sentation of M, called the rotation poset, which essentially captures all the different ways one can
‘navigate’ the lattice of stable matchings by moving from one stable matching to another (we define
this structure formally below).
The key to making a transition from one stable matching to another is a rotation [46]. Let M
be a stable matching. For each man m, let sM(m) denote the first woman w on m’s preference
list succeeding M(m) such that w prefers m to M(w), if such a woman exists. Then, a rotation
ρ is defined to be an ordered sequence of pairs (m0, w0),. . .,(mr−1, wr−1), such that for each i
(0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1) (mi, wi) ∈M , and wi+1 = sM (mi) (all subscripts are taken modulo r). Such a
rotation is said to be exposed in M . To eliminate a rotation is to match each man mi to wi+1, where
i + 1 is taken modulo r, and leave all other agents matched as in M . The resulting matching is
denoted by M/ρ, and is in fact always stable [46]. Note that by eliminating a rotation ρ the men in
ρ become worse off and the women in ρ become better off, with everyone else not in ρ remaining
the same. Every stable matching except Mz has at least one exposed rotation [46].
Consider the set of rotations {ρ0, ρ1, . . . ρk} exposed in M0 (this set must be non-empty when M0
6= Mz). If we choose to eliminate a rotation, say ρ0, then ρ1, . . . , ρk remain exposed in M0/ρ0.
Also, the elimination of ρ0 may have exposed different rotations that were not exposed in M0.
Thus we may continue to eliminate rotations, arriving at different stable matchings. With each
new stable matching, some new rotations may become exposed. Let R denote the union of the
sets of exposed rotations taken over all stable matchings M . Irving and Leather showed that R
is uniquely determined by the instance, because any two rotations are either identical or disjoint.
For two rotations ρ1 and ρ2, we say that ρ1 precedes ρ2, denoted ρ1 ≺ ρ2, if ρ2 is never exposed
unless ρ1 has been eliminated. The rotation poset, which is uniquely determined by M, is the pair
Π = (R,≺). It is important to note that the number of elements of Π is O(m).
A closed subset R′ of the rotation poset Π = (R,≺) is a subset of R such that if ρ ∈ R′ and ρ′
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≺ ρ then ρ′ ∈ R′. The key contribution of Irving and Leather was not only to show that the ideas
surrounding rotations and the rotation poset allowed one to find different stable matchings, but was
to further show that eliminating rotations is, in a sense, the only way to arrive at different stable
matchings. Specifically, they showed that there exists a one-one correspondence between M and
the closed subsets of Π: let R′ be an arbitrary closed subset. If we compute M0, we can eliminate
the rotations in R′ in any order that adheres to ≺, and arrive at a stable matching. Furthermore,
every stable matching can be obtained by starting at M0 and eliminating a distinct closed subset of
Π. In this way, Π encodes M. A Hasse diagram representation (the transitive closure) of Π can be
computed in O(m) time and space [47, 36].
Example Before moving on to the next section, we provide an illustrative example of the concept
of the lattice of stable matchings, its rotations, and its rotation poset. Consider the SMI instance
given below:
m1 : w1 w3 w2 w1 : m5 m3 m2 m1
m2 : w2 w1 w3 w5 w4 w2 : m1 m2 m3 m4
m3 : w3 w1 w2 w5 w3 : m4 m2 m3 m1
m4 : w4 w2 w3 w4 : m2 m4 m5
m5 : w5 w4 w1 w5 : m3 m5 m2
This instance has a total of six stable matchings, where M1 is the man-optimal stable matching, and
M6 is the woman-optimal stable matching:
M1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3), (m4, w4), (m5, w5)}
M2 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, w4), (m5, w5)}
M3 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1), (m4, w4), (m5, w5)}
M4 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w4), (m3, w1), (m4, w3), (m5, w5)}
M5 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w5), (m4, w4), (m5, w1)}
M6 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w4), (m3, w5), (m4, w3), (m5, w1)}
The instance has a total of four rotations:
ρ1 = ((m1, w1), (m2, w2))
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Figure 2.3: The Lattice and poset of an SMI instance
ρ2 = ((m2, w1), (m3, w3))
ρ3 = ((m2, w3), (m4, w4))
ρ4 = ((m5, w5), (m3, w1))
The lattice structure and the Hasse diagram of the poset of this instance is given in Figure 2.3. The
correspondence between the elements of the lattice and the closed subsets of the rotation poset is as
follows: M1 and ∅, M2 and {ρ1}, M3 and {ρ1, ρ2}, M4 and {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3}, M5 and {ρ1, ρ2, ρ4}, M6
and {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4}.
2.2.4 Exploiting the structure
The algorithmic consequences of the rotation poset Π of an SMI instance are numerous. Of im-
mediate interest is the fact that the rotation poset allows for the efficient generation of all stable
matchings. Gusfield [34] showed that M can be enumerated in O(m + n|M|) time – hence there
is only a linear-time delay between the output of each stable matching. He further showed that the
set of all stable pairs – the set of (man,woman) pairs that appear in some stable matching – can be
computed in O(m) time. Later, Gent et al [33] gave a different approach to enumerating all stable
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matchings by using constraint programming. Their method uses arc consistent domains in order to
achieve failure-free enumeration of all stable matchings.
An interesting question that arises is whether there are stable matchings that are somehow fair
to both the men and women of the instance, as opposed to the extreme unfairness of the stable
matchings M0 and Mz . We next review several such problems, some of which are polynomial-time
solvable, thanks to the structural results of the rotation poset. Henceforth, for agents a and b, let
pa(b) denote the position of agent b on agent a’s preference list. If a finds b unacceptable, pa(b) is
undefined.
Minimum regret stable matchings
Given a stable matching M we define the regret of agent a to be pa(M(a)), i.e, the position of a’s
partner in M . The regret of an unmatched agent is undefined. The regret of a matching M is the
maximum regret taken over all agents in M . A minimum regret stable matching is a stable matching
with minimum possible regret.
For the stable marriage setting, Knuth [69] showed that the minimum regret stable matching prob-
lem can be solved in O(m2) time, attributing the result to Selkow. Gusfield [34] improved this to
an optimal O(m)-time solution.
Fair stable matchings
Suppose we wish to somehow treat the men and the women of an SMI instance equally. For a stable
matching M , define the egalitarian value e(M) to be
e(M) =
∑
(m,w)∈M
(pm(w) + pw(m)).
An egalitarian stable matching is a stable matching M that minimizes e(M ′) over all M ′ ∈ M.
The egalitarian egalitarian stable matching problem (ESM) is to find an egalitarian stable matching.
Intuitively, ESM captures the notion of finding a stable matching with the best “social welfare”.
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mn−1 : wn−1 w∗n . . . wn−1 : m∗n−2 . . . mn−1
mn : wn w
∗
1 . . . wn : m
∗
n−1 . . . mn
Figure 2.4: An SM instance with two stable matchings with greatly varying values of e(·).
Example The example given in Figure 2.4 shows how e(·) can greatly vary for different stable
matchings of a particular SMI instance. The example consists of an SM instance with two stable
matchings, one denoted by underlining, and the other by star. The ellipses in the preference lists
denote any arbitrary ordering of the remaining agents not explicitly mentioned. The egalitarian
value e(·) for the stable matching denoted by underlining is n2 + n, whereas e(·) for the matching
denoted by star is 3n.
Another notion of a fair stable matching arises by attempting to find a stable matching with the
property that the men’s and women’s overall happiness is as close as possible. To this end, the
sex-equality measure δ(M) of a stable matching is defined to be
δ(M) =
∑
(m,w)∈M
pm(w)−
∑
(m,w)∈M
pw(m).
A sex-equal stable matching is a stable matching M that minimizes |δ(M ′)| over all M ′ ∈M. The
sex-equal stable matching problem (SESM) is to find a sex-equal stable matching.
Example The example given in Figure 2.5 shows how |δ(·)| can also greatly vary for different stable
matchings of a particular SMI instance. The example consists of an SM instance with two stable
matchings, one denoted by underlining, and the other by star. The ellipses in the preference lists
denote any arbitrary ordering of the remaining agents not explicitly mentioned. The absolute value
of the sex-equality measure δ(·) for these two stable matchings is n2 − n and zero, respectively.
The elimination of a rotation can, in general, result in a stable matching with a different value
of e(·) and/or δ(·). For a rotation ρ = (m0, w0), (m1, w1),. . .,(mr−1, wr−1), we define v(ρ) and
w(ρ) [47, 56] to capture the change in egalitarian value and sex-equality measure, respectively, by
eliminating ρ:
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Figure 2.5: An SM instance with two stable matchings with greatly varying values of |δ(·)|.
v(ρ) =
r−1∑
i=0
(pmi(wi+1)− pmi(wi)) +
r−1∑
i=0
(pwi(mi−1)− pwi(mi)),
w(ρ) =
r−1∑
i=0
(pmi(wi+1)− pmi(wi))−
r−1∑
i=0
(pwi(mi−1)− pwi(mi)).
Irving, Leather, and Gusfield [47] showed that ESM can be solved in O(m2) time by assigning the
weight given by v(·) to each rotation in Π, and then finding a maximum weight closed subset of Π.
Later, Feder [28] gave an alternative approach that improves this running time to O(m1.5 log n).
At first one would probably suspect that a similar approach would work for the sex-equal stable
marriage problem. Indeed, on the surface, these two problems look almost identical: e(M) is a
sum of the ranks of the mens’ and womens’ partners, whereas δ(M) is the absolute difference. It
is perhaps surprising then, that the sex-equal stable matching problem is strongly NP-hard [58]. On
the positive side, Iwama et al [56] give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for the so-called
near-sex-equal stable marriage problem. Their algorithms involve assigning the weight w(ρ) to
each rotation in Π and then attempting to find an appropriate subset of rotations to eliminate. They
further study the problem of finding a minimum regret stable matching amongst the set of all near-
sex-equal stable matchings. This latter problem is NP-hard, but there is an approximation algorithm
with a performance guarantee better than two [56]. We shall study SESM more extensively in
Chapter 4.
As a final word on fair stable matchings, we mention the median stable matching problem. For
each (matched) man m in an SMI instance, sort the multiset of women m is matched to in M from
m’s most to least preferred. For example, if man m is matched to woman w in exactly ten stable
matchings in M, then w appears ten consecutive times in this sorted list. Let wi(m) denote the ith
woman in a man m’s sorted list, and Mi denote the assignment obtained by matching each man m′
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to wi(m′). Teo and Sethuraman [99] proved the surprising result that Mi is not only a matching,
but is also stable. The ith-median stable matching is defined to be the stable matching obtained by
matching every man to wi(m). Note that, in general, not every Mi so obtained is distinct, and not
every stable matching M is equal to some Mj for some j.
The definition of a median stable matching does not lend itself to any natural polynomial-time algo-
rithm – it appears as though we must explicitly enumerate M to construct a median stable match-
ing. Cheng [18] gave a new characterization of the so-called generalized median stable matchings,
showing that there is an intimate relationship between median stable matchings and the median el-
ements of the lattice of M. She went on to show that finding a median stable matching is NP-hard,
but is approximable in a formal sense, and even polynomial-time solvable for some special cases.
Very recently, Kijima and Nemoto [63] improved upon some of Cheng’s results.
2.2.5 Indifference
A natural generalization of SM and SMI is to allow the agents involved to express some form of
indifference in their preference lists. The most natural way for agents to express indifference is
in the form of ties in the preference list; a tie t on an agent a’s preference list is defined to be a
set of agents all of whom have the same position on a’s list. The notion of a tie is important in
the practical applications of SM and SMI – consider, for example a hospital that must attempt to
produce a genuinely strict ranking of hundreds of medical students [105, 106, 107]. We use SMT
(SMTI) to stand for the variant of SM (SMI) in which preference lists can contain ties.
Of course, with the inclusion of ties, the definition of a blocking pair must be reconsidered. It
stands to reason that a (man,woman) pair should still form a blocking pair if they both improve
by becoming matched to each other, but what if, for example, m is indifferent between his current
partner and w?
There are three particularly natural formulations of blocking pair, each with a corresponding notion
of stability. These three kinds of stability are defined as follows:
• weak-stability: a (man,woman) pair can block only by both becoming better off
• strong-stability: a (man,woman) pair can block if at least one of them becomes better off, and
the other no worse off
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• super-stability: a (man,woman) pair can block if neither of them becomes any worse off.
Notice that each form of stability above is increasingly more restrictive than the previous, so super-
stability implies strong-stability implies weak-stability. Irving [43] observed that while weakly-
stable matchings always exist for an SMT instance, strong- and super-stable matchings need not.
He further gave a polynomial-time algorithm for each of the three forms of stability that either
returns a stable matching or reports that none exists (in the case of weak-stability, the algorithm
always returns a weakly-stable matching). Manlove extended Irving’s results to the SMTI setting
[72].
Stability, size, and structure
There is an interesting interplay between the various forms of stability and the cardinality of stable
matchings. If a super-stable matching exists for an SMTI instance, then all stable matchings for the
instance have equal cardinality, regardless of the definition of stability. Otherwise, if a strongly-
stable matching exists, then all strongly-stable matchings have the same size. In general, weakly
stable matchings can have different cardinalities, but every strongly-stable matching is at least two-
thirds the size of an arbitrary weakly-stable matching [93].
Spieker [95] showed that the set of super-stable matchings for an SMTI instance forms a distribu-
tive lattice. Later, Manlove [73] gave an alternative, and perhaps more accessible proof showing
that both strong- and super-stable matchings have a distributive lattice structure. The elements of
the lattice structure described by Manlove are sets of “equivalent” stable matchings, rather than
individual stable matchings. The maximum and minimum elements of the lattice correspond to the
sets of man- and woman-optimal stable matchings. Scott [93] extended the notion of a rotation
to super-stability, and described polynomial-time algorithms for finding egalitarian and minimum-
regret stable matchings, along with algorithms for generating all super-stable matchings and finding
all super-stable pairs. Extending such results to the strong-stability case remains an open question,
but it seems likely that this can be done in light of the structural results of Manlove [73].
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Figure 2.6: An SMTI instance with stable matchings of different sizes.
Weak stability
Irving [43] showed that finding a weakly stable matching in an SMT/SMTI instance is particularly
easy: simply arbitrarily break the ties and find any stable matching in the resulting instance. In a
sense, this method is the only “easy” thing about weak stability – almost everything else seems to
be computationally difficult. In the SMT setting, minimum regret stable matchings and egalitarian
stable matchings are both not only NP-hard to find, but are not approximable within Ω(n) unless
P=NP [74]. It is also NP-hard even to determine if a given (man,woman) pair occurs in a stable
matching (i.e. is a stable pair). Identifying any structural relationship involving weakly stable
matchings is open, although one can construct SMT/SMTI instances that have neither man- nor
woman-optimal stable matchings [88]. Efficiently enumerating all weakly-stable matchings also
remains an open question.
We mentioned above, that, in general, the weakly-stable matchings of an SMTI instance can have
different cardinality. This fact is illustrated when one uses Irving’s tie-breaking algorithm: the ways
in which the ties are broken can have a significant impact on the cardinality of the stable matchings
obtained.
Example Figure 2.6 presents an SMTI instance with two different stable matchings of different
cardinality. The example shows two weakly stable matchings, one denoted by underlining, and the
other by star. The stable matching denoted by underlining is twice the size of the stable match-
ing denoted by star. These matchings can be arrived at by running the (extended) Gale/Shapley
algorithm on two of the different ways that the ties of the instance can be broken.
Manlove et al [74] first observed the fact that weakly stable matchings can have different sizes, and
further showed that an arbitrary weakly stable matching M can be as little as one-half the size of
a maximum cardinality stable matching. The obvious question then, is, can we find a maximum
cardinality weakly stable matching in polynomial-time? Manlove et al [74] showed that finding a
maximum cardinality weakly-stable matching is NP-hard, even in the highly restricted setting in
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which the preference lists on one side are strictly ordered, and the preference list of each member
of the opposite set is either strictly ordered or is a tie of length two (these conditions holding simul-
taneously). Henceforth, we let MAX-SMTI denote the problem of finding a maximum cardinality
weakly stable matching of an SMTI instance.
Motivated by the hardness results of Manlove et al [74], researchers have been interested in finding
polynomial-time approximation algorithms for MAX-SMTI. As a first step, we may observe that
simply computing an arbitrary stable matching is an easy 2-approximation algorithm, because an
arbitrary stable matching must be a maximal matching. A number of improvements have since
appeared in the recent literature.
For the general case of SMTI, Iwama et al [53] gave a 2− c lognn approximation algorithm, where c
is a positive constant. This algorithm was subsequently improved to yield a performance guarantee
of 2 − c′√
n
, where c′ is a positive constant which is at most 1/4
√
6 [55]. The first approximation
algorithm for general SMTI with a constant performance guarantee better than two was given by
Iwama et al [54], with a performance ratio of 15/8.
The approximability of several special cases of SMTI have also been studied. Halldo´rsson et al
[37] gave a (2/(1 + T−2)-approximation algorithm for the restricted case in which ties are only on
one side, and the length of the longest tie is T . This bound can be improved to 13/7 if the ties can
appear in both men’s and women’s preference lists, but are restricted to being size at most two [37].
These same authors later described a randomized algorithm with an expected guarantee of 10/7 for
this special case with the additional restriction that ties appear only on one side [39]. Motivated
by a restricted case of SMTI arising in practice [44, 107], Irving and Manlove [48] described a
5/3-approximation algorithm for MAX-SMTI instances in which the ties appear only on one side,
say, the women, and each woman may have at most one tie on her preference list, and this tie, if
any, appears at the end of her list.
A recent landmark paper of Kira´ly [64] gave two simple algorithms that effectively superseded all
previously known approximation algorithms for MAX-SMTI, (save only the randomized algorithm
for the very special case studied in [39]). Kira´ly’s first algorithm provides a 3/2-approximation for
the restricted case of MAX-SMTI in which ties are allowed to only appear on the women’s side
(this is the only restriction). The second algorithm provides a 5/3-approximation for the general
MAX-SMTI setting, in which no restrictions are placed on the problem input. In Chapter 3, we
describe Kira´ly’s approach in more detail, and give an approximation algorithm with an improved
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performance guarantee.
From an inapproximability point of view, it is known that MAX-SMTI is APX-complete [38] and
cannot be approximated within 21/19 (unless P = NP) [37]. Yanagisawa [103] improved this bound
to 33/29, and also showed that MAX-SMTI cannot be approximated within 4/3 under the assump-
tion that the minimum vertex cover problem cannot be approximated within a factor of 2 − .
We mention one final result regarding weakly stable matchings. Let (α, β)-SMTI denote an SMTI
instance in which the men’s (women’s) preference lists are of bounded maximum length α (β). De-
fine (α, β)-MAX-SMTI similarly. Irving et al [51] showed that (3, 3)-MAX-SMTI is NP-hard, but
(2,∞)-MAX-SMTI is polynomial-time solvable (the∞ here denotes preference lists of unbounded
length). They furthermore showed that there exists a constant δ0 such that (4, 3)-MAX-SMTI is not
approximable within δ0 unless P=NP. The inapproximability of (3, 3)-MAX-SMTI remains open.
2.2.6 The Hospitals/Residents problem
Moving away from the notion of indifference, we turn our attention to the many-one generalization
of SMI, the so-called hospitals/residents problem (HR)1 [30, 36]. The problem is so named because
of its widespread application to centralised automated matching schemes that allocate graduating
medical students (residents) to hospital posts, which we briefly mentioned in Section 2.1. The best
known scheme is the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [105] in the United States,
which annually allocates some 31,000 graduating medical students to their first job at a hospital.
Similar schemes exist in Canada [106] and Scotland [107]. In all of these applications, the medical
students produce preference lists ranking a subset of the hospitals, who in turns produce preference
lists ranking a subset of the available residents. All of these centralized schemes incorporate various
extensions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm to find stable matchings of medical students to hospitals.
Formally, an instance I of (HR) [30, 36] involves a set of residents r1, . . . , rn and a set of hospitals
h1, . . . , hm. Each hospital hj has a capacity cj ∈ Z+ indicating the maximum number of residents
who could be assigned to hj . Associated with each resident ri is a strictly ordered preference list
ranking a subset of the hospitals, his acceptable hospitals, and each hospital hj ranks, again in strict
order, those residents it finds acceptable. The definition of acceptable pair and mutually acceptable
1Gale and Shapley referred to this problem as the College Admissions problem, however this problem has now widely
become known as the hospitals/residents problem.
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r1 : h1 h2 h3 h1 : 2 : r1 r2 r3 r4
r2 : h2 h1 h2 : 1 : r4 r3 r2 r1
r3 : h2 h3 : 3 : r1 r5 r4 r2
r4 : h1 h3
r5 : h3
Figure 2.7: An HR instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining.
pair are defined in the obvious way.
An assignment M is a set of mutually acceptable (resident,hospital) pairs. A matching is an assign-
ment such that each resident is assigned at most one hospital, and each hospital hj is assigned at
most cj residents [36, 30]. For a matching M , we define M(r) to be the hospital resident r is as-
signed inM , and similarly we let M(hj) denote the set of residents assigned to hj in M . If |M(hj)|
< cj , hj is said to be undersubscribed. If instead hj is full to capacity, hj is fully subscribed.
A blocking pair of a matching M is a resident ri and hospital hj such that:
1. ri and hj are mutually acceptable; and
2. ri is unmatched, or ri prefers hj to M(ri); and
3. hj is undersubscribed in M , or is fully subscribed and prefers ri to its least-preferred assignee
in M .
A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair. Just as in the SMI setting, it is known that every
instance of HR admits a stable matching, and that such a matching can be found in linear time
using the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm [30];[36, Section 1.6]. Furthermore, the notion of man-
and woman-optimal matchings can be extended to resident-optimal and hospital-optimal stable
matchings [36, Section1.6]. Figure 2.7 shows an example of an HR instance, with the capacity of
each hospital denoted by the number written next to the hospital.
Structure of HR
One of the first observations on the structural nature of the set of stable matchings for an HR instance
is the so-called Rural Hospitals Theorem2, which generalizes the fact that, in the SMI setting, the
2Historically, the NRMP found it problematic to match interns to unpopular hospitals, which were often found in the
more rural areas of the United States. This theorem essentially explains why this happens, and shows that stability must
2.2 Full preference information 24
same number of agents are matched in all stable matchings. The theorem [91, 36] is described as
follows:
Theorem 2.2.1 (Rural Hospitals Theorem) [91, 36]. For a given hospitals/residents instance,
(i) exactly the same residents are assigned in all stable matchings, so, in particular, all stable
matchings have the same size;
(ii) each hospital is assigned the same number of residents in all stable matchings;
(iii) any hospital that is undersubscribed in one stable matching is matched with precisely the same
set of residents in all stable matchings.
The notion of dominance amongst the set M of all stable matchings of an HR instance also gener-
alizes from the SMI setting. Let M and M ′ be stable matchings for an HR instance. We say that
M dominates M ′ (denoted M M ′) if, for each assigned resident r, M(r) = M ′(r), or r prefers
M(r) to M ′(r). Hence each resident is at least as happy in M as in M ′. Analogously with the SMI
setting, (M,) forms a distributive lattice, with the maximum and minimum elements being the
resident- and hospital-optimal stable matchings.
Couples
By the early 1970s, proportionally fewer residents were voluntarily participating in the NRMP.
Checker [17] and later, Roth [88], attributed some of the decline to the existence of couples, i.e.,
pairs of (perhaps married) residents who wish to intern together or geographically close to one
another. Such couples would choose to negotiate directly with hospitals to arrange their residency
assignments rather than participate in the NRMP.
Today, the NRMP uses a modified algorithm to attempt to better accommodate couples. However,
it is known that stable matchings need not exist when couples are present [88], and, moreover, it is
NP-complete to decide if a stable matching exists [84]. On top of this, it has been shown that the
NRMP algorithm may be prone to strategic manipulation by couples pretending to be single [67].
necessarily be sacrificed for unpopular hospitals to become full to capacity. Hence the strange name of this theorem.
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r1 : h1 h2 h3 h1 : 2 : r1 r2 r3 r4
r2 : h2 h1 h2 : 1 : r4 r3 r2 r1
r3 : h2 h3 : 3 : r1 r5 r4 r2
(r4, r5) : (h1, h3) (h3, h3)
Figure 2.8: An HRC instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining.
This discussion on couples is formalized by defining an important variant of HR called the hospitals
/ residents problem with couples (HRC). An instance of HRC involves both single residents and
couples (pairs of residents) such that each resident belongs to at most one couple. Each couple
(ri, rj) has a preference list over pairs of hospitals (hk, hl), representing the assignment of ri to
hk and of rj to hl. Ronn [84] (see also [36, Section 1.6.6]) described a stability criterion for a
matching in HRC that is a natural generalisation of the analogous concept in the HR context. As
we mentioned above, it was Roth [88] who showed that an HRC instance need not admit a stable
matching, while Ronn proved that the problem of deciding whether an HRC instance admits a stable
matching is NP-complete, even if there are no single residents and each hospital has capacity one
[84].
Example The example in Figure 2.8 gives an HRC instance in which residents r1, r2 and r3 are
single, and residents r4 and r5 are a couple with a joint preference list. There is a stable matching
for this instance, denoted by underlining.
There has been much study devoted to HRC by economists in particular (see for example [88, 23,
13, 65, 66, 68], and references therein). From a computer science point of view, the problem is
not nearly as well-studied, but there are a couple of exceptions. Marx and Schlotter [76] studied
the parameterized complexity of HRC with the number of couples as a parameter. Dean et al
[21] studied the so-called Unsplittable Stable Marriage problem, which they described in terms of
assigning jobs with integral sizes (representing couples or groups of residents) to machines with
capacities (representing hospitals). They provide a polynomial-time integral variant of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm that finds a stable matching in which each machine is congested by at most the
processing time of the largest job. Put differently, their algorithm finds a stable matching in which
each hospital is oversubscribed by at most the size of the largest resident. In Chapter 5, we shall
revisit HRC and also the unsplittable stable marriage problem.
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r1 : r2 r3 r5 r4 r6
r2 : r6 r1 r5 r3 r4
r3 : r4 r1 r6 r2 r5
r4 : r6 r1 r2 r5 r3
r5 : r6 r1 r4 r3 r2
r6 : r2 r5 r3 r4 r1
Figure 2.9: An SR instance with a stable matching denoted by underlining.
2.2.7 Stable Roommates problem
The stable roommates problem (SR), first introduced by Gale and Shapley [30] is the nonbipartite
generalization of SM. The definition of the problem, along with the notion of matching and stability
generalize in the obvious ways, but for completeness, let us formally spell them out.
An instance of the stable roommates problem consists of one uniform set of agents R = {r1,
r2,. . . ,rn}. Each agent ri supplies a preference list that ranks the members of R − {ri} in strict
order of preference. A matching is a partition of the agents into disjoint pairs. A blocking pair rel-
ative to M is a pair (ri, rj) such that ri prefers rj to M(ri) and rj prefers ri to M(rj). A matching
is stable if it admits no blocking pair. The Stable Roommates problem with incomplete lists (SRI)
is the generalization of SR that allows incomplete preference lists, and an odd number of agents.
The notions of blocking pair and stability are defined according to the obvious generalization of the
SMI context. We again use m to denote the sum of the lengths of the preference lists of an SRI
instance. Figure 2.9 gives an example of an SR(I) instance and a stable matching.
Notice that SMI is just a special case of SRI. In contrast to SM or SMI, however, not every SR
or SRI instance admits a stable matching. The kind of obvious algorithms one would attempt to
construct to generalize the Gale/Shapley algorithm are not sufficient to determine if an SR/SRI
instance admits a stable matching. Knuth [69] asked if the roommates problem was polynomial-
time solvable, or if perhaps this problem was NP-complete. Irving [42] resolved this question by
presenting a O(m)-time algorithm that either returns a stable matching or reports that none exists.
Although he described his algorithm in the SR setting, it clearly generalizes to the SRI case as well.
We briefly remark that the set of stable matchings M of an SRI instance forms a meet semi-lattice
[35, 36]. There is also a similar notion of a rotation and rotation poset [35, 36], although these ideas
are more involved than that of the bipartite case.
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Stable roommates with ties
We can extend SR/SRI to allow for ties in the preference lists, (denoted by SRT and SRTI, respec-
tively) which again gives rise to the notion of weak-, strong-, and super-stability. Ronn [84] showed
that in contrast to the stable marriage setting, determining if an SRT instance admits any weakly
stable matching is NP-complete. For the case of super-stability, Irving and Manlove [49] described
an algorithm with running time O(m) that either returns a super-stable matching or reports that
none exists. In his PhD thesis, Scott [93] resolved the strong-stability case by giving a O(m2)-time
algorithm to either return a strongly-stable matching or report that none exists.
When the agents of an SRI instance are allowed to have a capacity, we obtain the so-called stable
fixtures problem (SF). Irving and Scott [52] generalized Irving’s algorithm [42] to this setting, ob-
taining a O(m) time algorithm. Scott [93] also showed that SF is polynomial-time solvable under
super-stability. The case of strong-stability for SF remains open.
Almost stable roommates
Since a stable matching for the roommates problem need not exist, it is natural to seek matchings
that are “as stable as possible” in some well-defined sense. Tan [97] introduced the notion of a
stable partition, which is a partitioning of the roommates instance into special cycles. These cycles
have the property that if each agent r could somehow be matched to both of the agents adjacent to
r in the given cycle, then there would be no blocking pairs. In so doing, Tan provided a method
for describing a succinct certificate for checking whether or not an SR instance admits a stable
matching without explicitly running Irving’s algorithm. In a later paper, Tan [98] gave a linear-time
algorithm for finding a so-called maximum stable matching, defined to be a largest possible set M
of disjoint pairs such that there are no blocking pairs within M .
Perhaps the most natural way of finding an “almost stable” matching is to find a matching that
admits the fewest blocking pairs. The decision version of this problem, then, is to determine whether
a matching exists that admits at most K blocking pairs. Abraham et al [3] proved this problem is
NP-complete, and is not approximable within n 12−. However, when K is a fixed constant, they
showed that the problem is solvable in polynomial time (with K being in the exponent).
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Stable roommates and kidney exchange
In recent years, a renewed interest has been found in the stable roommates problem because it
provides a way of modelling and solving problems related to real-world kidney-exchange programs,
which exist in several different countries including the US and the UK.
Living donation is the most effective treatment that is currently known for kidney failure. How-
ever, a patient who requires a transplant may have a willing donor who cannot donate to them for
immunological reasons. As a result, these incompatible patient-donor pairs may want to exchange
kidneys with other pairs. Kidney exchange programs have already been established in several coun-
tries such as the Netherlands [62], the USA [85] and the UK [100].
We can capture this kidney exchange problem by creating a graph with a vertex for each patient-
donor pair, and a directed arc (u, v) for every pair of vertices u, v such that the donor in the pair
corresponding to vertex u can donate a kidney to the patient in the pair corresponding to vertex v.
A set of disjoint cycles in this graph corresponds to a cyclic kidney exchange. In practice, however,
we cannot find arbitrarily long cyclic exchanges of kidneys, as all operations along a cycle have to
be carried out simultaneously. Hence the length of the exchanges are typically bounded to two or
three in practice.
In most of the current programs the goal is to maximise the number of patients that receive a suitable
kidney in the exchange [86, 87, 92, 2] by regarding only the feasibility of the grafts. Some more
sophisticated variants consider also the differences between suitable kidneys. When the value of
a kidney for a given patient can be quantified with a numerical value, the “total benefit” could be
maximised [94]. However, this is not always feasible and instead the differences between suitable
kidneys for a given patient give rise to a preference list. Hence stability could be the primary
objective of a kidney exchange [90, 14, 15, 9]. When the cyclic exchanges are limited to being of
length at most two, the underlying problem is precisely the stable roommates problem.
2.2.8 Three-dimensional stable matchings
Knuth [69] asked if the stable marriage problem could be generalized to three sets, so that the
instance contains not only men and women, but also a third set, which he called dogs. Let A, B, C
be disjoint sets of men, women, and dogs, respectively, and let |A| = |B| = |C| = n. In response
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m1 : w2 w3 w1 w4 w1 : d1 d2 d3 d4 d1 : m2 m3 m1 m4
m2 : w2 w1 w4 w3 w2 : d2 d3 d1 d4 d2 : m2 m4 m1 m3
m3 : w1 w3 w2 w4 w3 : d3 d4 d1 d2 d3 : m3 m1 m4 m2
m4 : w3 w1 w4 w2 w4 : d4 d3 d2 d1 d4 : m1 m4 m3 m2
Figure 2.10: An instance of cyclic 3DSM
to Knuth’s open question, several different variations of this problem have been considered. The
common goal of these variations is to find a matching M that is a set of triples from the set A ×
B × C . Similar to the SMI setting, the common notion of stability in the variants of this problem
involves the absence of any blocking triples (m,w, d) /∈M such that a subset of {m, w, d} would
somehow improve and all of them must be at least as happy if matched together instead of staying
with their current triples. The primary differences in the variations of this problem arise in the
definition of stability, and also the nature of the preference lists.
In the three-dimensional stable matching problem (3DM), each agent has a preference list ranking
all pairs of the other two sets. A matching is a set of disjoint triples, and a matching is stable if
there exists no blocking triple T = (m,w, d) /∈M such that every member of T prefers T over their
current triple.
Alkan [7] gave the first example of an instance of 3DM where no stable matching exists. Ng and
Hirschberg [83] proved that the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, given an
instance of 3DM, is NP-complete; later Subramanian [96] gave an alternative proof for this. Huang
[40] proved that the problem remains NP-complete even if the preference lists are consistent in a
formal sense.
As an open problem, Ng and Hirschberg [83] mentioned cyclic 3DSM, where men care about only
the women, women care about only the dogs and dogs about only the men. Boros et al. [11] showed
that if the number of agents n, is at most 3 in each set, then a stable matching always exists. Eriksson
et al. [26] proved that this also holds for n = 4 and conjectured that a stable matching exists for
every instance of cyclic 3DSM. The example in Figure 2.10 shows a cyclic 3DSM instance.
Danilov [20] provided a polynomial-time extension of the Gale/Shapley algorithm for a restricted
version of 3DSM in which the men care primarily about the women they are matched to, and women
care primarily about the men. More precisely, a strictly ordered preference list of the women can
be derived from a man’s preference list of (woman,dog) pairs, and such a strictly ordered list of the
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men can be derived from each woman’s preference list of (man,dog) pairs. The dog’s preference
list consists of unrestricted (man,woman) pairs. Danilov defined a reasonable notion of stability in
this setting and showed that a stable matching always exists. Moreover, his results generalize to five
sets of agents [20].
In Chapter 6, we revist the cyclic 3DSM problem.
2.3 Partial preference information
Matching problems with partial preference information often take the form of two disjoint sets of
agents, with one of the sets of agents expressing preferences over members of the other set. Such
problems are often described in terms of assigning applicants to houses or applicants to posts. We
will use the latter terminology.
In an instance I of the post allocation problem (PA) we are given a set of n1 applicants {a1,
a2,. . .,an1}, and a set of n2 posts {p1, p2, . . . pn2}. Associated with each applicant ai is a preference
list which ranks a subset of the posts. This subset comprises the acceptable posts of ai, and an
(applicant,post) pair (ai, pj) is an acceptable pair if and only if ai finds pj acceptable. We let m
denote the sum of the lengths of the preference lists of the instance, and n = n1 + n2 be the number
of applicants plus the number of posts. Notice the key difference between this problem and SMI
is that the posts of the instance do not express any form of preference. A matching M is a disjoint
subset of acceptable pairs of I . When ties are allowed in the preference lists, we obtain an instance
of the post allocation problem with ties (PAT) with the notion of acceptable post, acceptable pair,
and matching all generalizing in the obvious way.
Since the posts of a PA/PAT instance do not have preference lists, the notion of a “stable” matching
does not have any real meaning in this context. We need some different optimality criteria. Notice
that simply finding a maximum cardinality matching is not a satisfactory approach, as an arbitrary
maximum cardinality matching will not take into account the preferences of the applicants. In what
follows we will review two of the most fruitful approaches researchers have taken to find optimal
matchings for PA/PAT instances. The first thread involves finding matchings with good profiles
(which we define below). The second involves finding matchings that are pareto optimal, or even
popular – two terms we will define also below.
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a1 : p1 p
∗
4
a2 : p2 p
∗
5
a3 : p3 p6
∗
a4 : p3
∗
a5 : p3 p
∗
1
a6 : p3 p
∗
2
Figure 2.11: A comparison of rank-maximal and maximum matchings.
2.3.1 Profile-based optimality
Suppose I is an instance of PA. The profile of a matching M is the (n2+1)-tuple (x1, . . . , x(n2+1))
where, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + 1), xi is the number of applicants who are matched in M with
their ith-choice post. An applicant who is unmatched is considered to be matched to his (n2+1)th-
choice post, regardless of the length of his preference list. There are various ways we can quantify
the quality of a matching in terms of its profile.
Suppose that x = (x1, . . ., xn2) and y = (y1, . . ., yn2) are profiles. We say that x left-dominates y
(denoted x L y) if, for some j, xi = yi for 1 ≤ i < j and xj > yj . A rank-maximal matching
is a matching whose profile is maximal with respect to L. A rank-maximal matching need not be
unique, but, for a given instance, all must have the same size.
Example The example in Figure 2.11 demonstrates the difference between a rank-maximal match-
ing and a maximum cardinality matching. The example consists of a PA instance with a rank-
maximal matching denoted by underlining and a maximum cardinality matching denoted by star.
The rank-maximal matching is smaller than a maximum matching, but assigns more agents to their
first choice.
A rank-maximal matching can be computed by a reduction to an instance of the maximum weight
bipartite matching problem (MWBM). The resulting instance I ′ of MWBM has the property that
the weights on the edges are of the form nk−i for an edge representing an agent’s ith choice.
Using the algorithm of Gabow and Tarjan [29], and making the standard assumption that numbers
of magnitude O(n) can be handled in constant time and space, a rank-maximal matching can be
found in O(k2
√
nm log n) time. The space requirement is O(km). Irving et al [45] improved this
by describing a direct algorithm for finding a rank-maximal matching in O(min(n + C,C
√
n)m)
time, where C ≤ k is the maximum rank that appears in an optimal solution. Later, Michail [81]
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gave a different reduction to MWBM which achieves the same running time as that of Irving et al
[45].
A rank-maximal matching can in fact be significantly smaller than an arbitrary maximum matching,
so, typically, other definitions of profile optimality first require that the size of the matching must
be maximum, and then require that the profile is optimal in some sense. Define a profile x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn2) to be feasible if there is some matching with profile x. A feasible q-profile is a
feasible profile x with
∑
xi = q. A feasible q-profile x is q-left maximal if there is no other feasible
q-profile that left-dominates x. A matching M whose profile is q-left maximal is called a greedy
q-matching. When q is the size of a maximum matching, a greedy q-matching is called a greedy
maximum matching.
A different form of optimality arises when we seek a maximum cardinality matching that minimizes
the number of applicants who obtain their (n2 + 1)th choice (i.e., are unmatched), and subject to
that, minimizes the number of applicants who receive their n2th choice, and so on. To define this
formally, define a second total order ≺G on two feasible q-profiles so that x = (x1, . . . , xn2+1) ≺G
y = (y1, . . . , yn2+1) if, for some j, xi = yi for j < i ≤ n2 + 1 and xj < yj . A matching that is
maximal with respect to ≺G is a generous matching. When q is the size of an arbitrary maximum
matching, a generous q-matching is called a generous maximum matching.
One can also reduce greedy and generous matchings to MWBM, again by assigning suitably large
weights to the edges of the derived instance. The resulting time requirement is O(k2
√
nm log n),
although Mehlhorn and Michail [79] showed this can be reduced to O(k√nm log n) time. It re-
mains an open question to construct faster, direct algorithms that perhaps do not require the use of
MWBM for greedy and generous matchings.
2.3.2 Pareto optimal matchings
We move on to other kinds of non-profile based optimality. For an PA/PAT instance I , we say that
an applicant prefers a matching M to a matching M ′ if (i) a is matched in M and unmatched in
M ′, or (ii) a is matched in both M and M ′ and prefers M(a) to M ′(a) (where M(a) is again the
post applicant a is assigned in matching M ). For two matchings M and M ′, let α(M,M ′) denote
the number of applicants who prefer M to M ′. A matching M is said to be pareto optimal if there
is no matching M ′ with α(M ′,M)> 0 and α(M,M ′) = 0. Intuitively, M is pareto optimal if there
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is no subset of the applicants who can all improve while leaving everyone else no worse off.
For every PA instance, at least one pareto optimal matching always exists, and one can easily be
computed with the so-called serial-dictatorship mechanism (see, e.g., [1]). However, pareto optimal
matchings can have different sizes, and the matching obtained by the serial-dictatorship mechanism
will not, in general, return a maximum pareto optimal matching. Finding a maximum cardinality
pareto-optimal matching can be solved by a reduction to the assignment problem, but Abraham et
al [4] found a faster, more direct algorithm having O(√nm) time complexity. Since every PA/PAT
instance has a pareto optimal matching with the same cardinality as an arbitrary maximum matching
[4], any improvement in the running time of this algorithm would imply a faster algorithm for
finding a maximum matching in a bipartite graph.
2.3.3 Popular matchings
A matching M ′ is said to be more popular than a matching M if α(M ′,M) > α(M,M ′). A
matching M is popular if there is no matching M ′ with α(M ′,M) > α(M,M ′). A moment’s
reflection reveals that a popular matching is a stronger notion of optimality than pareto optimality,
as a popular matching must be pareto optimal. The concept of a popular matching is attributed
to Gardenfors [32] who studied the popular matchings in the SMI context. He showed that every
stable matching of an SMI instance is also popular; hence popular matchings always exist in the
SMI setting. In contrast, there exist PA/PAT instances which have no popular matching, and, if they
do exist, they can have different sizes. The goal of the popular matching problem (POP-M), then,
is to find a popular matching or report that none exists.
Example The example in Figure 2.12 denotes a POP-M instance with two popular matchings that
differ in cardinality. The example consists of a POP-M instance with two popular matchings, one
denoted by underlining, and the other by star. The popular matching denoted by star is twice the
size of the popular matching denoted by underlining.
Abraham et al [5] described an O(n+m) time algorithm which computes a largest possible popular
matching, or reports that no popular matching exists for a PA instance. In the case of PAT, they gave
an algorithm with O(
√
nm) time complexity.
The results of Abraham et al [5] led to a number of subsequent papers covering variants and ex-
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Figure 2.12: The difference in cardinality of different popular matchings.
tensions of the popular matching problem. Manlove and Sng [75] studied the capacitated popular
matching problem, C-POP-M in which each post has a capacity, defined to be the maximum number
of applicants that can be assigned to it. Manlove and Sng gave a O(
√
Cn1 + m) time algorithm
for C-POP-M, where C is the sum of the capacities of the posts. Mestre [80] gave a linear time
algorithm for a version of the problem in which each applicant has an associated weight; the goal is
to find a matching M with the property that there is no other matching M ′ preferred by a weighted
majority of agents. Mahdian [71] showed that popular matchings exist with high probability for
random instances of POP-M if the number of posts exceeds the number of applicants by a small
constant multiplicative factor. Abraham and Kavitha [6] studied a dynamic version of POP-M al-
lowing for applicants and posts to enter and leave the instance, and for applicants to arbitrarily
change their preference lists. They showed the existence of a so-called 2-step voting path to com-
pute a new popular matching after every such change, assuming that a popular matching exists.
McCutchen [77] focused on instances of POP-M for which no popular matching exists, defined two
notions of ‘near popularity’, and proved that for each of these it is NP-hard to find a matching that
is as near to popular as possible. Huang et al [41] built upon the work of McCutchen with a study
of approximation algorithms in the context of near popularity. Kavitha and Nasre [60] described
algorithms to determine an optimal popular matching for various interpretations of optimality; in
particular they gave aO(n2+m) time algorithm to find minimum cost, rank-maximal and fair popu-
lar matchings (a fair popular matching being a synonym for a generous popular matching). To cope
with POP-M instances which do not admit a popular matching, Kavitha et al [59] defined the notion
of a mixed popular matching, and showed that a mixed popular matching exists for every POP-M
instance. Very recently, Kavitha and Nasre explored popular matchings with variable job capacities
[61], a problem they show is NP-complete. We study popular matchings further in Chapter 7.
Chapter 3
An improved approximation algorithm
for MAX-SMTI
3.1 Introduction
A crucial objective of many centralised matching schemes is to find matchings that match as many
agents as possible – without sacrificing stability. As the reader may recall from Section 2.2.2,
finding a maximum stable matching in the SMI setting is straightforward, as all stable matchings
must have the same size. However, allowing agents to have ties in their preference lists changes
everything. As we mentioned in Section 2.2.5, weakly stable matchings for SMTI instances can
have different sizes, and the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable matching (MAX-SMTI)
is NP-hard [74].
We surveyed all of the relevant background for SMTI, and the long sequence of approximation
results for MAX-SMTI in Section 2.2.5. For our purposes in this chapter, we need only recall
that the most recent approximation algorithms for MAX-SMTI were due to Kira´ly, who gave a
3
2 -approximation algorithm for the restricted case of MAX-SMTI in which ties are not allowed to
appear in the men’s preference lists, and a 53 -approximation algorithm for the general MAX-SMTI
setting (meaning that there are no restrictions on the input). These results effectively superseded
all previously known approximation algorithms for MAX-SMTI, except for a very special case that
was studied by Halldo´rsson et al [39].
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Our contribution in this chapter is to provide a three phase 32 -approximation algorithm for MAX-
SMTI (no restrictions on the input), which improves upon Kira´ly’s general performance guarantee
of 53 . Our work builds from some ideas used in Kira´ly’s
3
2 -approximation algorithm (henceforth
Kira´ly’s algorithm) in the sense that one of the three phases of our algorithm uses a generalisation
of this algorithm.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Kira´ly’s algorithm
To make our presentation self-contained, we describe a version of Kira´ly’s algorithm using the
concept of promotion from a tie rather than that of extra score used by Kira´ly [64]. As input to
this algorithm, the men of the instance have strictly ordered preference lists and the women have no
restriction on the nature of the ties in their preference lists. The idea behind the algorithm is to allow
men to make proposals to the women on their preference lists, as in the Gale/Shapley algorithm,
but with an additional feature. The change is that a man m who is unmatched after proposing to
every woman on his preference list – we use the term exhausted to describe such a man – is given
one “second chance” in which m is promoted ahead of each tie in which he appears, and is then
allowed to propose to each woman on his list a second time.
At the start of the algorithm, each man is set to be unmatched, unpromoted, and unexhausted. The
main body of the algorithm is a while loop, which continues as long as there exists a man m who
is (i) unmatched and (ii) either unpromoted or unexhausted (or both). If m is exhausted, m is set
to be promoted. The operation of promoting m involves examining each woman w who finds m
acceptable, and, if m is in a tie of size at least 2 on w’s list, m is promoted immediately ahead of
this tie on w’s preference list. Furthermore, m is set to be unexhausted and is reactivated, meaning
he will now begin again making proposals to women starting from the beginning of his preference
list. The algorithm proceeds by m proposing to the next woman w on his preference list to whom
he has not yet proposed (or to whom he has proposed only once, if he has been reactivated). When
a man m proposes to a woman w, she rejects her current partner (if any) and accepts m if m is a
strict improvement for her, taking into account any promotions that may have occurred. Otherwise,
she retains her current partner and rejects m. On rejection, a man becomes (or remains) unmatched.
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set every man to be unmatched, unpromoted, and unexhausted
while ∃m such that m is unmatched and (m is unpromoted or m is unexhausted):
if m is exhausted:
promote m and set m to be unexhausted
reactivate m so that he begins proposing again from the start of his list
w← next woman on m’s preference list /* m proposes to w */
if w is unmatched:
M ←M ∪ {(m,w)} /* w accepts m */
else if w prefers m to her partner m′:
M ←M ∪ {(m,w)} − {(m′, w)} /* w rejects m′ and accepts m */
if w is the last woman on the list of m′:
set m′ to be exhausted
else: /* w rejects m */
if w is the last woman on his list:
set m to be exhausted
Figure 3.1: Kira´ly’s algorithm
When a man has been rejected by every woman on his list, he is set to be exhausted.
When Kira´ly’s algorithm terminates, each man is either (i) matched (possibly having been previ-
ously promoted as well), or (ii) promoted, exhausted, and unmatched. A pseudocode description of
Kira´ly’s algorithm is given in Figure 3.1.
3.2.2 Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem
Phase 2 of our approximation algorithm uses a classical result regarding bipartite matchings known
as the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem. In this section we review the parts of this theorem
that we will need in the forthcoming sections. To this end, let G = (U ∪ V,E) be a bipartite
graph and M a maximum cardinality matching of G. With respect to M , we partition the vertex
set of G in the following way. A vertex v is said to be odd (respectively, even) if there exists an
odd (respectively, even) length alternating path from some unmatched vertex to v. A vertex v is
said to be unreachable if there is no alternating path to v beginning at some unmatched vertex. The
following Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem provides an important characterisation of the set
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of maximum cardinality matchings of G with respect to this vertex partition [70, 45].
Theorem 3.2.1 (Gallai-Edmonds decomposition) Let G = (U ∪V,E) be a bipartite graph and M
be a maximum cardinality matching for G. Let E ,O, and U be the set of even, odd, and unreachable
vertices as defined above with respect to G and M . Then
1. E , O, and U are pairwise disjoint. Every maximum matching of G partitions the vertex set of
G into the same sets of even, odd, and unreachable vertices.
2. In any maximum-cardinality matching of G, every vertex in O is matched with some vertex
in E , and every vertex in U is matched with another vertex in U . The size of a maximum-
cardinality matching is |O|+ |U|/2.
3. There is no edge in G connecting a vertex in E with a vertex in U .
We note that the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of a bipartite graph can be obtained as a by-product
of a maximum cardinality matching algorithm.
3.3 The approximation algorithm
Our approximation algorithm consists of 3 phases. A pseudocode description is given in Figures
3.2 and 3.3. In general, multiple calls are made to phases 1 and 2, as phase 1 may pass control
to phase 2 and vice versa. Control is passed to phase 3 at most once. In the first phase, we use
an approach somewhat similar to the Kira´ly algorithm, adapted to take into account the ties in the
men’s preference lists. In this phase, men again may become promoted, exhausted, and matched,
but may also enter a different state in which they become stalled. The meaning of this state will
become clear in the description of phase 1 below. Prior to calling the phase 1 algorithm for the first
time, each man is set to be unmatched, unpromoted, unexhausted, and unstalled, and the matching
M is initialised to be empty.
3.3.1 Phase 1
For ease of exposition, we think of the entries on a man’s preference list as being a series of ties;
some ties may be of size exactly one. In the first phase of the algorithm, the men iteratively make
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M ← ∅
set all men to be unmatched, unpromoted, unexhausted, and unstalled
Phase 1:
while ∃m such that m is unmatched and unstalled and (m is unpromoted or m is unexhausted):
if m is exhausted:
promote m and set m to be unexhausted
reactivate m, set m’s current tie to be his first choice
t←m’s current tie
if |t| ≥ 2:
if t contains exactly one unmatched woman w:
promote w ahead of t
else if t contains no unmatched woman:
break t arbitrarily
else:
set m to be stalled
else:
w← only woman in t /* m proposes to w */
if w is unmatched:
M ←M ∪ (m,w) /* w accepts m */
unstall the appropriate men, if any
else if w prefers m to her partner m′:
M ←M ∪ {(m,w)} − {(m′, w)} /* w rejects m′ and accepts m */
if w is the last woman on his list:
set m′ to be exhausted
else: /* w rejects m */
if w is the last woman on his list:
set m to be exhausted
if the set S of stalled men is empty:
return M
else:
invoke phase 2
Figure 3.2: Phase 1 of the approximation algorithm.
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Phase 2:
Construct the phase-2 graph G = (U ∪ V,E)
N ← maximum cardinality matching in G
identify the sets E , O, and U
N ′ ← subset of N obtained by removing all pairs
(m,w) such that m ∈ O and w ∈ E
if N ′ = ∅:
invoke phase 3
else:
for (m,w) ∈ N ′:
promote w ahead of m’s current tie /* m proposes to w */
M ←M ∪ (m,w)
set m to be unstalled
unstall all men in U who are unmatched in N
invoke phase 1
Phase 3:
for (m,w) ∈ N /* m proposes to w */
M ←M ∪ (m,w)
return M
Figure 3.3: Phases 2 and 3 of the approximation algorithm.
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proposals to the women on their preference lists in a similar way to the Kira´ly algorithm. The main
body of this phase is again a while loop, which continues as long as there exists a man m who is
(i) unmatched and unstalled, and (ii) unpromoted or unexhausted (or both). In general, there may
be many men who satisfy the loop condition, in which case the choice of m is made arbitrarily. If
m is exhausted, he is promoted, set to be unexhausted, and is reactivated, precisely as described
in the Kira´ly algorithm. Next, we let t denote the first tie on m’s preference list containing a
woman w to whom m has not yet proposed (or to whom he has proposed only once, if he has been
reactivated) . We refer to t as m’s current tie. The algorithm then proceeds based on the following
cases concerning t. The first case (i) is if the size of t is at least 2. If t also contains exactly one
unmatched woman w, w is promoted ahead of t on m’s preference list. If instead t contains no
unmatched women, t is broken arbitrarily on m’s preference list, creating a total order of these
women to replace t on his list. Otherwise, t must contain at least 2 unmatched women, and m is set
to be stalled. The second case (ii) is if the size of t is exactly one. In this case m proposes to w, the
only woman in t. When a man m proposes to a woman w, she accepts if m is a strict improvement
for her, taking into account any promotions that have been made. Otherwise, she rejects m. When
an unmatched woman w becomes matched, the men who, as a result, have now just one unmatched
woman in their current tie are unstalled. As before, when a man has been rejected by every woman
on his preference list, he is set to be exhausted.
The primary task of phase 1 ends with the termination of this while loop. At this point in the
execution of the approximation algorithm every man m is in exactly one of three categories: (i)
m is matched to an acceptable woman (and possibly is promoted as well), or (ii) m is exhausted,
promoted and unmatched, having been rejected by every woman on his preference list despite his
promotion, or (iii) m is stalled.
If the set S of stalled men is empty, the algorithm returns the current matching and halts. Otherwise,
we proceed to phase 2.
3.3.2 Phase 2
The goal of the algorithm in this phase is to attempt to match a certain subset of the stalled men.
We construct a bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V,E) with U being the set of men in S and V being the
set of unmatched women appearing in the current tie of at least one man in S. We refer to these
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men and women and the vertices of G representing them interchangeably. The set of edges are
those (man,woman) pairs (m,w) such that w ∈ V appears in m’s current tie. We call this graph the
phase-2 graph. The algorithm then computes a maximum cardinality matching N in G.
We proceed by removing selected pairs from N in the following way. We identify the sets E , O,
and U of vertices as described according to the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem in Section
3.2.2. All pairs in N consisting of a man m ∈ O and a woman w ∈ E are removed from N ,
yielding a new matching N ′ ⊆ N . One of the crucial properties of N ′ (proved in Lemma 3.4.2) is
that, for each man m who is matched in N ′, if w1, w2, . . . wt are the unmatched (in M ) women in
m’s current tie, then w1, w2, . . . , wt are also matched in N ′. This important property of N ′ is key
to the establishment of the performance guarantee of the algorithm.
If N ′ is empty, we proceed to phase 3. Otherwise, for every pair (m,w) ∈ N ′, w is promoted ahead
of m’s current tie. Man m then proposes to w, who accepts because she is unmatched in M , and
this pair is added to M . All the men matched in N ′ are now set to be unstalled.
At this point in phase 2, the assignment of any man not in S has remained unchanged, as the
matching has changed only by matching previously unmatched women to men in S. However, the
situation of the men who were in S at the beginning of phase 2 has, of course, changed. We claim
(proved in Lemma 3.4.2) that those men m remaining in S fall into one of two categories: (i) m
was matched in N , is not matched in N ′, and still has at least 2 unmatched women in his current
tie, or (ii) m was unmatched in N and every woman in his current tie is now matched in M . The
men in (ii) are set to be unstalled, and the algorithm returns to phase 1.
3.3.3 Phase 3
Phase 3 takes as input the current matching M along with the matching N constructed in the
execution of phase 2 that passed control to phase 3. The algorithm arrives at phase 3 if and only
if the matching N ′ of phase 2 is empty. We will show (in Lemma 3.4.1) that this implies that N
matches every man in S. The algorithm terminates after the man in each pair in N proposes to
his partner in N – all of these women are single – and these pairs are added to M . The current
matching M is returned.
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3.4 Correctness
Let us establish a few key properties of the algorithm, and verify certain claims made in the de-
scription of the pseudocode.
Lemma 3.4.1 Let S denote the set of stalled men at the start of an arbitrary execution of phase
2 of the approximation algorithm. If the matching N ′ constructed in this call is empty, then the
corresponding maximum cardinality matching N matches every man in S.
Proof Suppose N ′ is empty, and that a man m is unmatched by N . Let w be an arbitrary neighbour
of m in G. Since m is not matched in N , m is even (i.e. m ∈ E), and therefore w is odd (w ∈ O).
Since N is maximal, w was matched to a man m′ in N , who therefore must also be even. But this
implies the pair (m′, w) could not have been removed from N , as it consists of an even man and an
odd woman. 2
Corollary 3.4.1 Phase 3 of the approximation algorithm finds a matching that matches every man
who was in S in the preceding execution of phase 2.
Proof By Lemma 3.4.1, when control of the algorithm reaches phase 3, every man in S is matched,
for control is passed to this point only if N ′ is empty. 2
Lemma 3.4.2 establishes the key properties of the matchings N and N ′ constructed in phase 2 of
the approximation algorithm.
Lemma 3.4.2 Let m be a stalled man in the set S with current tie t at the start of an arbitrary
execution of phase 2. Then, exactly one of the following is true of m when that execution of phase
2 ends (i.e., the instant before either invoke statement in phase 2 is executed).
1. m was matched in N ′, so m is now matched in M to a woman in t, and every woman in t is
matched in M .
2. m was matched in N but not in N ′, m’s current tie is still t, and there are at least two women
in t who are still unmatched in M .
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3. m was unmatched in N , m’s current tie is still t, and every woman in his current tie is now
matched in M .
Proof (1) Suppose m was matched in N ′. Then, m was an even or unreachable vertex with respect
to M . Therefore, all neighbours of m in G are either odd or unreachable, and could not have been
deleted from N , for only even women are removed from N . It follows that all of m’s neighbours
are in N ′, and therefore they all receive proposals in this execution of phase 2, and are matched in
M .
(2) If instead m is matched to a woman w in N but is unmatched in N ′, then m was removed from
N because he is an odd vertex. We establish the claim by showing there is another even woman
w′ 6= w who is adjacent to m and is unmatched in N ′ as well. To see this, consider the path of odd
length that makes m an odd vertex. This path cannot reach him via his partner in the matching, for
alternate edges in that path would have to be edges in the matching. Hence the first edge in the path
would be in the matching (since the last edge is), contradicting the fact that the starting vertex in
the path must be unmatched. Therefore this path must reach him from another neighbouring vertex
w′, which must be even. This woman is unmatched in N ′, for she can only be matched to an odd
man in N or unmatched in N .
(3) Finally, if m is unmatched by N he is an even vertex. All women in his current tie are therefore
odd vertices, are matched in N because N is maximal, and could not have been removed from N .
Therefore, these women are all matched in N ′ and all receive proposals in this execution of phase
2, and hence are matched in M .
Having considered every possibility of the outcome of m’s participation in phase 2, the lemma is
established. 2
Lemma 3.4.3 On termination of the approximation algorithm, any man who remains unmatched
has been promoted, and has been rejected by every woman on his list even after becoming promoted.
Proof The execution of the algorithm can only halt in one of two places. The first place is at the
end of phase 1, on the condition that there are no stalled men. This implies that every unmatched
man is promoted and has still been rejected by every woman on his list. The other point at which
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the algorithm may terminate is in phase 3. Now, control reaches phase 3 only if, in phase 2, it is
discovered that N ′ is empty, implying that N matches every man in S by Corollary 3.4.1. Notice
that when this happens nothing is done in phase 2 to modify the assignment of any agent, rather
phase 2 simply passes control to phase 3, which matches every man in S. Hence, the unmatched
men are those who were unmatched after the final call to phase 1, and, as described above, they
must have become exhausted while promoted. 2
Lemmas 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 establish the stability of the matching output by the approximation algo-
rithm.
Lemma 3.4.4 Suppose a woman w becomes matched to a man m at some point in the execution of
the approximation algorithm. Then w only rejects m if she accepts a proposal from a man ranked
at least as highly as m on w’s (original) preference list.
Proof Matched women can only change their partner in one place in the approximation algorithm,
and that is when receiving a proposal in phase 1 from a man they strictly prefer, possibly after
promotions, to their current partner. This new suitor must be ranked at least as highly as w’s current
partner on w’s original preference list. 2
Lemma 3.4.5 The matching M returned at the end of the approximation algorithm is a stable
matching.
Proof Suppose that (m,w) blocks M . The essence of the approximation algorithm from a man’s
point of view is a left-to-right sweep of his preference list in which, if necessary, he becomes
promoted and again makes another left-to-right sweep of his preference list. Hence, for m to prefer
w, he must have proposed to her at least once, whether it be in phase 1 or phase 2 (he cannot have
proposed to her in phase 3, for otherwise they would be matched in M ). The fact that w has rejected
m along with Lemma 3.4.4 implies that w does not prefer m to her current partner in M , and hence
(m,w) does not block M . 2
Lemma 3.4.6 The approximation algorithm runs in O(n3/2m) time, where n is the sum of the
numbers of the men and women and m is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists.
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Proof The algorithm essentially constitutes one or two partial or complete left to right sweeps of
the men’s preference lists, interleaved with calls to phase 2. The total number of calls to phase 2
is bounded by the number of men, as each call to phase 2 either strictly increases the size of M
or passes control to phase 3, in which phase the algorithm terminates. Let |V | and |E| denote the
numbers of vertices and edges, respectively, in the phase-two graph. Any one execution of phase
2 requires a total of O(
√|V ||E|) = O(√nm) time, as the construction of N is the dominant step
of phase 2. In the worst case, Ω(n) calls could be made to phase 2, each of which computes a
matching N of size Ω(n) but a matching N ′ of size O(1). These successive calls to phase 2 would
clearly dominate the complexity, yielding a bound of O(n3/2m). 2
3.5 The performance guarantee
For a given instance of MAX-SMTI, let M be the stable matching returned by the approximation
algorithm and let Mopt denote an optimal stable matching for a given instance of MAX-SMTI.
Consider the symmetric difference M ⊕ Mopt of these two matchings. The components of the
underlying graph of M ⊕Mopt consist of alternating cycles and paths. Each cycle component in
M⊕Mopt is of even length, so the ratio of M -edges to Mopt-edges in these components is one. For
an alternating path component, the ratio of Mopt-edges to M -edges is always at most 3/2 except for
a component that is a path of length 3 with its endpoints in Mopt. Therefore, if we can establish
that M ⊕Mopt contains no such path, we will have shown that the ratio of Mopt-edges to M -edges
in each component is at most 3/2, establishing that the algorithm is a 32 -approximation algorithm.
Lemma 3.5.1 is the missing piece of the puzzle to establish the performance guarantee.
Lemma 3.5.1 Let P3 = w′ −m− w −m′ be an alternating path in M ⊕Mopt with (m,w) ∈M
and (m,w′), (m′, w) ∈Mopt (as described in Figure 3.4). Then, the following facts hold.
(i) The man m′ in P3 must be exhausted and promoted.
(ii) The man m in P3 was never promoted by the approximation algorithm.
(iii) Woman w in P3 strictly prefers m to m′ in her original preference list.
(iv) Man m in P3 is indifferent between w and w′ in his original preference list.
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Figure 3.4: A P3 in M ⊕Mopt. Dashed edges belong to Mopt, the undashed edge to M .
(v) Man m′ proposed to woman w prior to the end of the final execution of phase 1 and was
rejected by her. Hence, w is matched prior to any potential call to phase 3.
Proof (i) This follows from Lemma 3.4.3 and the fact that m′ is unmatched in M . (ii) Since m
has an unmatched woman w′ on his preference list, he could never have become exhausted, for w′
cannot have received a proposal. (iii) If w strictly prefers m′ to m, then (m′, w) is a blocking pair
for M , a contradiction. If, instead, she were indifferent between these two men, she could not have
rejected m′, who, by Lemma 3.4.3, must have proposed to w at some point after being promoted.
But at that moment w was matched to m or someone ranked lower, and m was never promoted.
(iv) If m strictly prefers w′ to w, then (m,w′) blocks M . But by (iii), m forms a blocking pair
with w in Mopt if he strictly prefers w to w′. (v) Every man who participates in phase 3 becomes
matched, hence m′ did not participate in phase 3, and since no matched man becomes unmatched
during phase 3 or phase 2, man m′ was unmatched at the end of the final call to phase 1. By Lemma
3.4.3, m′ proposed to w even after becoming promoted, but since he is single in M , she must have
rejected him. Hence, w is matched to someone ranked at least as highly as m at the final call to
phase 1. 2
Now, we arrive at the contradiction. Consider again the path P3 as shown in Figure 3.4. Since
matched women never become unmatched, man m always had woman w′ unmatched on his pref-
erence list, and by Lemma 3.5.1 (iv) she is tied with w. In what phase of the algorithm can m have
become matched to w? It cannot have been in phase 1, for the phase 1 algorithm does not allow
him to propose to w, regardless of whether or not w is matched, because of w′ being tied with w
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m1 : w2 w3
m2 : (w1, w2)
m3 : w1
w1 : m2 m3
w2 : (m1,m2)
w3 : m1
Figure 3.5: An instance of SMTI that yields a performance ratio of 3/2.
and unmatched. But m cannot become matched to w in some call to phase 2 either, for the fact
that w′ is unmatched at the end of the algorithm implies she could never be in N ′ at any call to
phase 2. By Lemma 3.4.2, this implies that the pair (m,w) would have to be deleted in the creation
of N ′ as well. Thus, we conclude that m became matched to w in phase 3. However, men only
become matched to unmatched women in phase 3, implying that w is single at the start of phase 3,
a contradiction of Lemma 3.5.1 (v).
We are forced to conclude that P3 cannot exist in M ⊕Mopt.
Theorem 3.5.1 The polynomial-time approximation algorithm outputs a stable matching at least
2
3 the size of an optimal stable matching.
3.6 Tightness of the performance guarantee
We give an example to show that this is the tightest bound possible for our approximation algorithm.
Yanagisawa [104] first observed that 3/2 was the tightest possible bound, later, Chebolu [16] gave
a different example to establish the tightness of the performance guarantee. We have chosen to
present the example of Chebolu because the particularly symmetric nature of the preference lists
make it very easy to understand. Consider the SMTI instance given in Figure 3.5; note that we use
parentheses to denote a tie in a preference list. One possible execution of the algorithm begins by
m1 proposing to w2, followed by a proposal from m2 to w1. Man m3 could then propose to w1,
and, although he will become promoted, and propose again, he will still remain unmatched. The
algorithm stops with a matching containing the pairs (m1, w2) and (m2, w1). An optimal solution,
however, is the perfect stable matching given by the pairs (m1, w3),(m2, w2), and (m3, w1). Notice
that because of the symmetry of the instance, this example still applies if the roles of the men and
women are reversed.
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3.7 Conclusion and open questions
We have presented a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for general MAX-SMTI with a
performance guarantee of 3/2, improving the previously best known algorithm for this problem. An
obvious open problem is to find a further improved approximation algorithm or to further tighten
the inapproximability bound for MAX-SMTI.
Finally, we note that our approximation algorithm also extends to the Hospitals/Residents with ties
setting (HRT), by a technique involving “cloning” [48], with the same performance guarantee of
3/2.
Chapter 4
Sex-equal stable matchings
4.1 Introduction
How can we find stable matchings that are somehow fair to both the men and the women of an SMI
instance? Of course, this begs the question, what does it mean to treat the men and the women
fairly? A natural definition of fairness could arise from the following intuition. Suppose we could
somehow quantify the overall “happiness” of the men, and the overall “happiness” of the women.
Then, a stable matching could be considered fair if the happiness of the men is equal, or as close as
possible, to the happiness of the women.
This is precisely the goal of the sex-equal stable marriage problem (SESM) we discussed in Section
2.2.4. Let us recall the definition of this problem. Let I be an arbitrary SMI instance, and let n
denote the number of agents of I , i.e., the number of men plus the number of women. For agents a
and b, let pa(b) denote the position of agent b on agent a’s preference list.
Define the sex-equality measure δ(·) for a stable matching M ∈ M as follows.
δ(M) =
∑
(m,w)∈M
pm(w)−
∑
(m,w)∈M
pw(m).
The goal of the sex-equal stable marriage problem (SESM) is to find a stable matching M ∈ M
that minimizes |δ(M)|, where M is the set of all stable matchings. SESM is NP-hard [58], and
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the only positive results known for this problem are due to Iwama et al [56], as reviewed in Section
2.2.4.
This chapter explores SESM for SMI instances in which the lengths of the preference lists of the
men and/or women are bounded in length by a constant. We use the notation (α, β)-SESM to
denote the problem of finding a sex-equal stable matching of an SMI instance in which the men’s
(women’s) preference lists have length at most α (β). We use ∞ for the case when α or β can
be arbitrarily large, so, for example, (l,∞)-SESM means the men’s lists are bounded by l but the
women’s lists can be arbitrarily long.
This chapter specifically explores (α, β)-SESM from the viewpoint of exact exponential-time al-
gorithms and parameterized (FPT) complexity (a review of FPT and parameterized complexity is
given in Section 4.4). There has been much recent interest in exact exponential-time algorithms for
computationally hard problems. We refer the reader to the surveys of Woeginger [101, 102].
Our results are summarized as follows. On the negative side, we show that (3, 3)-SESM is W [1]-
hard. This strengthens the NP-hardness results of Kato [58]. Furthermore, we show that our hard-
ness result is “tight” by giving a polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm for (2,∞)-
SESM and (∞, 2)-SESM. On the positive side, we give a low-order exponential-time algorithm for
(l,∞)-SESM. To be precise, we give an algorithm with running time1 bounded by O?(1.0725n),
O?(1.1503n), O?(1.2338n), . . . for l = 3, 4, 5, . . .. By reversing the roles of the men and the
women, this algorithm applies to (∞, l)-SESM as well.
Our algorithm is built on a number of new observations regarding the rotation poset and the rotation
digraph (Hasse diagram) of an (l,∞)-SESM instance (see Section 2.2.3 for a review of the struc-
tural results for SMI). We show that, in a formal sense, when the number of rotations in the rotation
poset Π is at most a certain threshold, then a brute-force algorithm that enumerates all closed sub-
sets of the rotations of Π suffices to find a SESM. Otherwise, if the number of rotations exceeds this
threshold, then we show that the rotation digraph DΠ must be sparse. We then use existing results
concerning sparse graphs to design an exponential-time algorithm with a running time as described
above.
We reviewed the structural results for SMI in Section 2.2.3, and we shall rely on these results quite
heavily in this chapter. In the next section, we review these results and also cover some of the finer
1We use the standard O? notation that suppresses polynomial factors in any terms to analyze the running time of an
exponential-time algorithm.
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structural details omitted from Section 2.2.3 that we specifically require only in this chapter.
4.2 Further structural results for SMI
4.2.1 The number of men
As we discussed in Section 2.2.2, Gale and Sotomayor [31] showed all stable matchings of an
SMI instance match exactly the same subset of the agents. Hence, we may assume without loss
of generality that those agents who are never matched in a stable matching are discarded from the
instance. These agents can never affect the sex-equality measure of a stable matching, and thus can
be ignored. A consequence of this is that the number of remaining men must equal the number of
remaining women. Henceforth we let n denote the number of men plus the number of women of
this remaining instance in which all unmatched agents have already been discarded.
4.2.2 Rotations, rotation posets, and SESM
The rotation poset Π
For an arbitrary SMI instance I , we let M0 and Mz denote the man- and woman-optimal stable
matchings of I , respectively, and Π = (R,) the rotation poset of I . For a subset of rotations
R′ ⊆ R, we denote by Π[R′] the partially ordered set induced by R′. The canonical reference for
the following details regarding rotations is the monograph of Gusfield and Irving [36, Chapter 3].
Let ρ = ((m0, w0), . . . , (mr−1, wr−1)) be a rotation. We say that ρ moves mi down from wi to
wi+1 and moves wi up from mi to mi−1. If w is either wi or is strictly between wi and wi+1 in mi’s
list, then ρ moves mi below w. Similarly, ρ moves wi above mi if m is mi or is strictly between mi
and mi−1 in wi’s list.
Fact 4.2.1 (Gusfield and Irving [36]) Let Π be the rotation poset of an arbitrary SMI instance.
Then,
1. For any man m and woman w, there is at most one rotation that moves m down to w, and w
up to m. Furthermore, there is at most one rotation that moves m from w.
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2. For any man m and woman w, there is at most one rotation that moves w to a man strictly
above m in w’s preference list.
The rotation digraph DΠ and the underlying graph GΠ
We let DΠ denote the rotation digraph of Π (recall that this is the directed Hasse diagram of Π).
There is a key characterisation of the arcs of DΠ that is given by the fact below.
Fact 4.2.2 (Gusfield and Irving [36]) Let DΠ denote the rotation digraph of an arbitrary SMI
instance.
1. If (m,w) ∈ ρ, and ρ′ is the (unique) rotation that moves m to w, then (ρ′, ρ) is a directed
edge in DΠ. In this case, ρ′ is called a type-1 predecessor of ρ.
2. If ρ moves m below w, and ρ′ 6= ρ is the (unique) rotation that moves w above m, then (ρ′, ρ)
is a directed edge in DΠ. In this case, ρ′ is called a type-2 predecessor of ρ.
3. Every arc (ρ′, ρ) ∈DΠ satisfies either (1) or (2) (or both) for some m, w.
When referring to DΠ we will sometimes find it useful to consider the arcs of DΠ as being undi-
rected. So, we let GΠ denote the undirected graph obtained by replacing every directed arc of DΠ
with an undirected edge. We also take a moment to remark that we refer to the rotations of Π and
the vertices of GΠ and DΠ as both rotations and vertices interchangeably. The meaning should
always be clear from the context.
Weighted rotations and weighted subsets
Recall the goal of SESM is to find a stable matching MS minimizing the absolute value of
δ(M) =
∑
(m,w)∈M
pm(w)−
∑
(m,w)∈M
pw(m).
We sometimes use the δ notation for a closed subset of rotations S, so that δ(S) provides a shorthand
for δ(MS), where MS is the stable matching obtained by eliminating the rotations in S.
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For a rotation ρ = (m0, w0), (m1, w1), . . . , (mr−1, wr−1), Iwama et al [56] define the following
weight w(ρ), which captures the change in sex-equality measure resulting from the elimination of
ρ:
w(ρ) =
r−1∑
i=0
(pmi(wi+1)− pmi(wi))−
r−1∑
i=0
(pwi(mi−1)− pwi(mi))
For a set of rotations R′, we let w(R′) denote the sum of the weights of the rotations in R′. An
understanding of the following facts is necessary for the methods used in the forthcoming sections.
Fact 4.2.3 (Iwama et al [56]) Let I be an arbitrary SMI instance. Then
1. w(ρ) > 0 ∀ρ ∈ R.
2. δ(M/ρ) = δ(M) + w(ρ) for any stable matching M and rotation ρ exposed in M .
3. For a closed subset R′, δ(R′) = δ(M0) +
∑
ρ∈R′ w(ρ) = δ(M0) + w(R
′).
Notice that in light of Fact 4.2.3 (1), if δ(M0) > 0, then M0 must necessarily be the unique sex-
equal stable matching, as the elimination of any rotations will only worsen the sex-equality measure
of the stable matching. We also briefly remark on the important difference between w(S) and δ(S).
The notation w(S) refers to the sum of the weights of a (not necessarily closed) set of rotations
while δ(S) is the sex-equality measure of the stable matching obtained by eliminating a (closed)
subset S.
4.3 Series-parallel graphs
Our exact algorithm in Section 4.8 relies heavily on the properties of so-called series-parallel
graphs. In this section we briefly review the necessary definitions and properties of series-parallel
graphs.
A two-terminal labelled graph (G, s, t) consists of an undirected graph G with two distinct marked
vertices s, t ∈ V , where s is called the source and t is called the sink. The series composition of two-
terminal labelled graphs (G1, s1, t1) and (G2, s2, t2), where s1 and s2 (t1 and t2) are the sources
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Figure 4.1: A series-parallel graph and a corresponding SP tree
(sinks) of G1 and G2, respectively, is the two-terminal labelled graph obtained by identifying t1
with s2. The parallel composition of two-terminal labelled graphs (G1, s1, t1) and (G2, s2, t2) is
the two-terminal labelled graph obtained by identifying s1 with s2 and t1 with t2. A graph is a
series-parallel graph if and only if it can be created from single two-terminal edges by a sequence
of series and/or parallel compositions.
An interesting side-effect of the definition of series-parallel graphs is that the way in which the
series-parallel graph is constructed implicitly describes a binary tree, called an SP tree. The leaves
of the SP tree T are the edges of G, and every internal node of G is labelled either S or P to denote
whether a series or parallel operation was used to join the two series-parallel graphs described by
its children. See Figure 4.1 for an example of a series-parallel graph and a corresponding SP tree.
4.4 Parameterized problems, FPT, and W[1]-hardness
Before presenting the primary W [1]-hardness result of this chapter, we give a very basic review of
the necessary definitions and background of parameterized problems and parameterized complex-
ity. We refer the reader to the texts of Neidermeier [82] and Downey and Fellows [22] for a more
thorough treatment. We begin our basic tutorial with the formal definition of a parameterized prob-
lem. The key point of interest in the definition of a parameterized problem is that it is a decision
problem that asks for a solution of size exactly k, as opposed to saying, for example, at most k or
at least k. The formal definition is given as follows.
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Definition 4.4.1 (Neidermeier [82]) A parameterized problem L over an alphabet Σ is a set of
pairs (x, k) with x ∈ Σ∗ and k a non-negative integer such that there is no x with (x, k) ∈ L and
(x, k′) ∈ L for some k′ 6= k.
By way of example of a parameterized problem, consider the parameterized versions of Clique and
(l,∞)-SESM given below.
Clique
Input: A graph G = (V,E) and a non-negative integer k.
Question: Does G contain a complete subgraph C ⊆ V with exactly k vertices?
(l,∞)-SESM
Input: An (l,∞)-SMI instance I and a non-negative integer k.
Question: Is there a stable matching M for I such that δ(M) is exactly k?
We continue our brief tutorial with the definition of fixed-parameter tractability.
Definition 4.4.2 (Neidermeier [82]) A parameterized problem L over an alphabet Σ is fixed-parameter
tractable if it can be determined in f(k)nO(1) time whether or not (x, k) ∈ L, where f is a com-
putable function depending only on k. The corresponding complexity class is called FPT.
The class FPT contains the complexity class P. In addition, many NP-hard problems are known to
lie within FPT, including, for example, the well-known minimum vertex cover problem. However,
this is not true of all NP-hard problems.
As is commonly known, proving that a combinatorial problem is NP-complete provides a proof
that the problem cannot be solved in polynomial-time unless P = NP. In what follows we explain
the notion of so-called W[1]-hardness, an idea analogous to NP-hardness, which provides the the-
oretical background for formally establishing some notion of fixed-parameter intractability of a
problem. We first define the concept of a parameterized reduction, followed by the definition of the
complexity class W[1].
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Definition 4.4.3 (Neidermeier [82]) Let L,L′ ⊆ Σ∗ × N , where N denotes the positive integers,
be two parameterized problems. We say that L reduces to L′ by a standard parameterized reduction
if there are functions f(k) → k′ and g(k) → k′′ from N to N and a function h(x, k) → x′ from
Σ∗ ×N to Σ∗ such that:
1. h(x, k)→ x′ is computable in k′′|(x, k)|c time for a constant c and
2. h(x, k) ∈ L if and only if (x′, k′) ∈ L′.
Consider the following examples that distinguish the difference between a ‘classical’ polynomial
time reduction and a parameterized reduction. It is easily seen that a graph G has a vertex cover
of size k if and only if it has an independent set of size n − k. Therefore, vertex cover reduces
to independent set in polynomial time. This is not a parameterized reduction, because the derived
instance of independent set has the parameter value n − k, which does not exclusively depend on
k but also on n. On the other hand, it is easy to see that a graph G has an independent set of size
k if and only if its complement graph G′ has a clique of size k. This constitutes a parameterized
reduction.
The Weighted 2-CNF-Satisfiability problem, which plays a key role in defining the complexity class
W [1] (given in Definition 4.4.4 below) is defined as follows.
Weighted 2-CNF-Satisfiability
Input: A boolean formula F in conjunctive normal form, in which every clause of F has at most
two literals, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Is there a satisfying truth assignment for F that has exactly k variables set to true?
Now we may present the definition of the class W [1].
Definition 4.4.4 (Neidermeier [82])
1. The class W [1] contains all problems that can be reduced to Weighted 2-CNF-Satisfiability
by a parameterized reduction.
2. A parameterized problem is said to be W[1]-hard if the parameterized problem Weighted
2-CNF-Satisfiability can be reduced to it by a parameterized reduction.
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3. A problem in W [1] that is W [1]-hard is said to be W[1]-complete.
It is known that FPT ⊆ W [1], and, if any W [1]-complete problem were shown to be in FPT,
the result would imply a collapse of complexity classes FPT and W [1], which is thought to be
unlikely. Quite a few well-studied problems are known to be W [1]-hard, including dominating set
and independent set. For our purposes, we need only the following result, which concludes this
section.
Theorem 4.4.1 (Neidermeier [82, Corollary 13.5]) Clique is W [1]-hard.
4.5 (3, 3)-SESM is W [1]-hard
We next describe a parameterized reduction from the W [1]-hard problem Clique to (l,∞)-SESM.
In fact, our reduction will prove W[1]-hardness even for the special case of (3, 3)-SESM. The
reduction is inspired by a construction of Johnson and Niemi [57] who reduce an instance of Clique
to an instance of the partially ordered knapsack problem, defined below.
Partially ordered knapsack
Input: Directed acyclic graph G = (V,A), a weight w(v) ∈ Z+ and a value p(v) ∈ Z+ for each
vertex v ∈ V , a knapsack capacity B ∈ Z+, and a bound C ∈ Z+.
Question: Is there a subset V ′ ⊆ V , closed under predecessor, such that w(V ′) ≤ B and
p(V ′) ≥ C?
To make the description of our transformation more easily understood, we review the construction
of Johnson and Neimi. Given an instance I = (G = (V,E),K) of the Clique problem, they create
an instance I ′ = (G′ = (V ′, A′), B′, C ′) of the partially ordered knapsack problem as follows.
V ′ = V ∪ E,
A′ = {(v, e) : v ∈ V, e ∈ E, v is an endpoint of e }
w(v) = p(v) = |E|+ 1 for all v ∈ V ,
w(e) = p(e) = 1, for all e ∈ E,
B′ = C ′ = K(|E|+ 1) + (K2 ).
4.5 (3, 3)-SESM is W [1]-hard 59
Hence G′ is a bipartite acyclic graph in which each arc is directed from an element of V to an
element of E. Each element of E necessarily has exactly two predecessors, and each element of V
has the same number of successors in G′ as it has edges incident to it in G. Suppose now that G has
a clique (VK , EK) of size K. Then the set of vertices VK ∪ EK is a closed subset of G′ of weight
and value K(|E| + 1) + (K2 ). Suppose instead that G′ has a closed subset S′ of weight and value
K(|E| + 1) + (K2 ). Notice that the choice of weights and values for I ′ are such that each element
of V weighs more than the sum of all elements of E, which have weight and value one. A closed
subset of G′ that has exactly a weight and value of K(|E| + 1) + (K2 ) must consist of K vertices
from V and
(
K
2
)
vertices from E. Since S′ is closed, S′ corresponds to K vertices from V with(K
2
)
edges between them in G, i.e. a clique of size K in G.
4.5.1 Reduction idea
Our reduction to SESM will use the transformation of Johnson and Niemi in the following way.
The idea is to reduce an instance I of Clique to an instance I ′ of SESM such that the rotation poset
of I ′ has precisely the same structure as that constructed for the derived partially ordered knapsack
instance above. Our reduction will map every v ∈ V to a rotation v with weight w(v) = 8|E| + 2,
and every edge e = {vi, vj} of E to a rotation e with predecessors vi and vj and w(e) = 8. We will
construct our derived instance in such a way that the man-optimal stable matching M0 for I ′ will
have the property that δ(M0) = −[K(8|E|+ 2) + 8
(
K
2
)
]. Hence a closed subset of weight exactly
K(8|E| + 2) + 8(K2 ) corresponds to a stable matching MS having δ(MS) = 0. Since the rotation
poset of our derived instance will have the same structure as that of the reduction of Johnson and
Niemi, such a closed subset must correspond to a clique of size exactly K in G. We next describe
this reduction formally.
4.5.2 The parameterized reduction
Step 1: the vertex gadget
For each vertex vi ∈ V , we create 4|E| + 1 men {m0i , m1i ,. . .,m4|E|i } and 4|E| + 1 women {w0i ,
w1i ,. . .,w
4|E|
i }. Each of these men will have at most three entries on his preference lists while each
of these women will have exactly three entries on her preference list. However, in this step, we only
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define two entries for each man and woman. The first two entries on the preference list of a man
mji are w
j
i and w
j+1
i , respectively, where j + 1 is taken modulo 4|E| + 1. The second and third
man on a woman wji ’s preference list are m
j−1
i and m
j
i , respectively, where j − 1 is taken modulo
4|E| + 1. The third entry of a man mji and the first entry of a woman wji will be defined below at
a later step. The preference lists created by this step are described below; an underlined star in a
preference list indicates an entry that has not yet been created.
m0i : w
0
i w
1
i *
m1i : w
1
i w
2
i *
.
.
.
m
4|E|
i : w
4|E|
i w
0
i *
w0i : * m
4|E|
i m
0
i
w1i : * m
0
i m
1
i
.
.
.
w
4|E|
i : * m
4|E|−1
i w
4|E|
i
Step 2: the edge gadget
For each edge e = {vr, vs} ∈ E, we create two men {m1r,s,m2r,s} and two women {w1r,s, w2r,s}.
These men and women will each have two agents on their preference lists. The preference lists for
these agents are shown below, where again the blanks denote entries not yet specified.
m1r,s : w
1
r,s *
m2r,s : w
2
r,s *
w1r,s : * m
1
r,s
w2r,s : * m
2
r,s
Step 3: complete the preference lists
For each edge e = {vr, vs} ∈ E, with r < s, we choose two men created in correspondence to ver-
tices vr and vs by selecting the first manmpr (respectively, mqs) from the sorted listm1r,m2r , . . . ,m4|E|r
(respectively, m1s, m2s,. . .,m4|E|s ) whose third choice has not yet been specified. We complete the
preference lists of agents mpr , mqs, wp+1r , wq+1s , m1r,s, m2r,s, w1r,s, and w2r,s as described in the figure
below. The underlining is in place to illustrate which entries are completed by this step.
mpr : w
p
r w
p+1
r w1r,s
mqs : w
q
s w
q+1
s w2r,s
m1r,s : w
1
r,s w
q+1
r
m2r,s : w
2
r,s w
p+1
s
wp+1r : m2r,s m
p−1
r m
p
r
wq+1s : m1r,s m
q−1
r m
q
r
w1r,s : m
p
r m1r,s
w2r,s : m
q
s m2r,s
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After the above step has been performed for every edge, every agent created in step 2 has had their
preference list completed. However, there will still be a set of women wji created in step 1 who still
have an unspecified first choice. For each of these women, we create a dummy man and a dummy
woman who rank each other first, and place wji last on the dummy man’s list and place the dummy
man first on wji ’s list. Note there will also be a set of men created in step 1 with an unspecified third
choice on their preference lists; these men only require a total of two women on their lists. This
completes the construction of the agents created in steps 1 and 2 and their preference lists.
Step 4: pad the instance
The final step of the reduction is to pad the instance to appropriately ‘offset’ δ(M0), where M0 is
the man-optimal stable matching of the derived instance. To this end, let t = 8|V ||E| + 2|V | +
2|E| − [K(8|E|+2) + 8(K2 )] (this expression is intentionally left unsimplified). We create 2t men
{x10, x11, . . . , xt0, xt1} and 2t women {y10 , y11, . . . , yt0, yt1}. The preference lists of men xi0, xi1, yi0, and
yi1 for (1 ≤ i ≤ t) are shown below.
xi0 : y
i
1 y
i
0
xi1 : y
i
1
yi0 : x
i
0
yi1 : x
i
1 x
i
0
The final step of the reduction maps the parameter K to K ′ = 0. Thus we have reduced an instance
I of Clique to an instance I ′ of SESM. We now prove that I has a clique of size exactly K if and
only if I ′ has a stable matching MS with δ(MS) = K ′ = 0. Our first concern are the properties
of the man-optimal stable matching of I ′. The first lemma follows immediately from the reduction
and requires no proof.
Lemma 4.5.1 The man-optimal stable matching M0 for the derived instance I ′ of SESM matches
every man created in step 1 and step 2 to his first choice. Equivalently, every woman created in step
1 and step 2 is matched to her last choice in M0.
Lemma 4.5.2 Let M0 denote the man-optimal stable matching for the derived instance I ′. Then,
δ(M0) = −[K(8|E| + 2) + 8
(K
2
)
].
Proof As stated in Lemma 1, M0 matches every man created in step 1 and step 2 to his first choice
and every woman created in step 1 and step 2 to her last choice. Hence the difference in happiness
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of these men and women is |V |(4|E| + 1) + 2|E| − [|V |(12|E| + 3) + 4|E|], which simplifies to
−8|V ||E| − 2|V | − 2|E|. Every dummy man created in step three is matched to his first choice
and his partner in M0 is matched to her first choice, so these agents contribute the same sum to
the men’s and women’s happiness, respectively, and can be ignored. What remains are the agents
created in step 4. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ 2t), the pairs (xi0, yi0) and (xi1, yi1) must always be matched
together in any stable matching. Therefore, in any stable matching M ′ for I ′, each such group of
four agents contributes a sum of one to δ(M ′). Since there are t such groups of four, the difference
in the men’s and women’s happiness amongst those agents created in step 4 is t = 8|V ||E| + 2|V | +
2|E| - [K(8|E| + 2) + 8(K2 )]. Therefore δ(M0) = −[K(8|E|+ 2) + 8(K2 )]. 2
Corollary 4.5.1 I ′ has a stable matching M with δ(M) = K ′ = 0 if and only if there is a closed
subset of the rotation poset of I ′ weight exactly −[K(8|E|+ 2) + 8(K2 )]
The next three lemmas establish the structure and nature of the rotations and rotation poset of the
derived instance of SESM.
Lemma 4.5.3 For each vertex vi ∈ I , there exists a rotation ρi = (m0i , w0i ), (m1i , w1i ), . . .
(m
4|E|
i , w
4|E|
i ) exposed in M0 with weight 8|E| + 2.
Proof Since M0 matches every man to his first choice, it is easy to verify that the successor woman
of any man mji in M0 is w
j+1
i , where j+1 is taken modulo 4|E|+1, implying ρi is indeed exposed
in M0. The elimination of ρi moves every man down one place to his second choice, decreasing the
sum of the positions of the men’s partners by 4|E| + 1, and moves every woman up one place to
her second choice, increasing the sum of the positions of the women’s partners by 4|E|+1. Hence
ρi has weight 8|E|+ 2. 2
Lemma 4.5.4 Let {vr, vs} ∈ E be an edge in I where r < s. Then, the elimination of both ρr =
(m0r , w
0
r), (m
1
r , w
1
r), . . . (m
4|E|
r , w
4|E|
r ) and ρs = (m0s, w0s), (m1s, w1s), . . . (m
4|E|
s , w
4|E|
s ) exposes a
rotation σr,s = (m1r,s, w1r,s), (m
q
r, w
q+1
r ), (m2r,s, w
2
r,s), (m
p
s, w
p+1
s ) for some p, q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4|E|}
with weight 8.
Proof Suppose (vr, vs) with r < s is an edge of I . In step 3 of the reduction, two men, say mpr and
mqs, whose third choice had not yet been defined, were selected and the preference lists of mpr , mqs,
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wq+1s , w
p+1
r , m1r,s, m
2
r,s, w
1
r,s, and w2r,s were completed. After the elimination of rotations ρr and
ρs, the men mpr and mqs are matched to the women wp+1r and wq+1s , respectively. Therefore after the
elimination of both of these rotations the successor women of men mpr and mqs are w1r,s and w2r,s,
respectively. Furthermore, the successor women of m1r,s and m2r,s are w
p+1
r and wq+1s , respectively.
It follows that σr,s = (m1r,s, w1r,s), (m
q
r, w
q+1
r ), (m2r,s, w
2
r,s), (m
p
s, w
p+1
s ) is a rotation whose set of
predecessors is precisely {ρr, ρs}. The elimination of σr,s moves every man down one place on his
list, and every woman up one place on her list, hence the weight of σr,s is 8. 2
Lemma 4.5.5 The rotation poset for I ′ contains exactly one rotation ρi for every vi ∈ I , and one
rotation σr,s for every edge {vr, vs} such that r < s in I . The predecessors of σr,s are exactly ρr
and ρs, and the rotations ρi have no predecessors.
Proof By the previous lemmas, it is clear that the rotation poset for I ′ contains ρi for every vi ∈
I , and σr,s for every edge {vr, vs}, such that r < s, with the predecessors of σr,s being exactly
{ρr, ρs}. To see that these are precisely the rotations of the rotation poset of the derived instance,
notice that the elimination of all rotations ρi and σr,s assigns every man created in step 1 and step
2 to his last choice. Every dummy agent created in step 3 must always be matched to his/her first
choice in any stable matching, and the same is true of the 2t men created in step 4. Hence no other
rotations can exist. 2
Lemma 4.5.6 The given instance I has a clique of size exactly K if and only if I ′ has a stable
matching MS with δ(MS) =K ′ = 0.
Proof
The first direction of the proof is almost immediate. Let (VK , EK) be a clique of size exactly K in
I . Then, the rotations created in correspondence to (VK , EK) from a closed subset of the rotation
poset of I ′ with weight precisely K(8|E|+ 2) + 8(K2 ), which, by Corollary 4.5.1 must correspond
to a stable matching of cost exactly K ′ = 0.
Now suppose that I ′ has a SESM of cost exactly K ′ = 0. Then, again by Corollary 4.5.1, the
closed subset of rotations S eliminated to obtain such a stable matching has cost exactly K(8|E|+
2) + 8
(
K
2
)
. Since the rotation poset of I ′ was constructed in a correspondence to the reduction
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of Johnson and Niemi [57], S must contain K rotations ρi and
(
K
2
)
rotations σr,s, but as in the
construction of Johnson and Niemi, such a choice must correspond to a clique of size K in G. 2
Theorem 4.5.1 The sex-equal stable matching problem is W [1]-hard, even if both the men’s and
women’s preference lists are of length at most three.
Proof It is clear that the men and the women have preference lists of length at most 3. Let us
be thorough in verifying the reduction satisfies the requirements of a many-one parameterized re-
duction. Clearly, for a given instance (x, k) of Clique, our derived instance x′ can be computed
easily in |(x, k)|3 time, without any attempt at optimization. Our mappings from the parameter k
are therefore such that k → k′′ = 1 and k → k′ = 0. Finally, we have established in Lemma 4.5.6
that (x, k) is a ‘yes’ instance if and only if (x′, k′) is as well. 2
4.6 Inapproximability results for SESM
Recall that, for an arbitrary SESM instance, it could be that an optimal solution Mopt has |δ(Mopt|
= 0. In order to reason about approximability results for this problem, let us define a new optimality
measure f(·) of a stable matching M to be f(M) = |δ(M)| + 1. Hence the value of f(·) is always
greater than zero.
Since the W [1]-hardness of a problem implies NP-hardness as well, a corollary of Lemma 4.5.6 and
Theorem 4.5.1 is that it is NP-complete to decide whether a stable matching instance admits a stable
matching M such that f(M) = 1. The following theorem shows that there is no polynomial-time
approximation algorithm with a performance guarantee (measured according to f(·)) less than two.
Theorem 4.6.1 The sex-equal stable matching problem is NP-hard to approximate (relative to the
measure f(·)) within a factor less than two, even if the men’s and women’s preference lists are of
length at most three.
Proof
For a contradiction, let I be an arbitrary stable matching instance, and A a c-approximation algo-
rithm with c < 2 for SESM. Consider a stable matching M returned by an execution of algorithm
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A on the instance I . If I admits a stable matching M ′ with f(M ′) = 1, then M satisfies f(M) <
2, i.e. f(M ′) = 1, since f(M ′) must be integral. On the other hand, if I does not admit a stable
matching M with f(M) = 1, then M ′ must satisfy f(M ′) >= 2.
Hence, A decides an NP-complete problem in polynomial-time, a contradiction, unless P = NP. 2
4.7 Polynomial-time algorithm for (2,∞)-SESM
The polynomial-time solvability of (2,∞)-SESM follows almost immediately from the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.7.1 Let I be a (2,∞)-SESM instance, and Π = (R,) its rotation poset. Then, the
relation  is the empty set. In other words, DΠ has no edges.
Proof Suppose for a contradiction that there are rotations ρ′, ρ ∈ R with ρ′ ≺ ρ. By Fact 4.2.2,
ρ′ is either a type-1 or a type-2 predecessor of ρ (or both). Suppose that ρ′ is a type-1 predecessor
of ρ. By definition, there exists (m,w) ∈ ρ, such that ρ′ is the unique rotation that moves m to w.
This implies that w is m’s second (and therefore last) choice on his preference list. Thus ρ does not
exist.
Suppose instead that ρ′ is a type-2 predecessor. By definition there is (i) a man m and a woman w
such that ρ moves m below w, and (ii) ρ′ moves w above m. Since m’s preference list has length
at most two, (i) forces us to conclude that (m,w) ∈ ρ and w is m’s first choice. But (ii) forces us to
conclude that ρ′ matches m to w. This cannot be the case if w is m’s first choice. 2
Now we describe the algorithm. Let R = ρ1,. . .,ρk be the set of all rotations for I , all of which
must be exposed in the man-optimal stable matching by Lemma 4.7.1. Let W = w(ρ1) + w(ρ2)
+ . . . + w(ρk). Using the standard dynamic programming algorithm for the subset-sum problem,
we can determine if Π has a (closed) subset of weight k, for each k ∈ {0, 1,. . .,W} in O(nW )
time. Since the weight of each rotation is O(n), W is polynomially bounded. Hence a closed
subset S minimizing δ(S) can be computed in polynomial-time. Clearly, this algorithm works for
(∞, 2)-SESM instances by reversing the roles of the men and the women.
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Theorem 4.7.1 Let I be a (2,∞)-SESM (or (∞, 2)-SESM) instance. Then, a sex-equal stable
matching for I can be found in polynomial-time.
4.8 An exact algorithm for (l,∞)-SESM
4.8.1 The structure of DΠ
Properties of DΠ
In this section we describe an exact exponential-time algorithm for SESM when the men’s pref-
erence lists are bounded in length by a constant l ≥ 3 (if l ≤ 2 then we can solve the problem in
polynomial time). Our method hinges on the observation that when the number of rotations in the
rotation digraph DΠ is at most (5−
√
24)(l−2)n (the reason for this particular factor of n becomes
apparent later on), a brute-force algorithm that enumerates all subsets of the vertices of DΠ suffices
to find a SESM. Otherwise, if the number of rotations exceeds that factor of n, we prove that GΠ
must have bounded average degree. This allows us to use existing results concerning graphs with
bounded average degree to design a moderately exponential time algorithm. In particular, we will
apply the following theorem, which is due to Edwards and Farr [25], to GΠ.
Theorem 4.8.1 (Edwards and Farr [25]). Let G be an undirected graph with n vertices and m
edges of average degree d ≥ 4, or a connected graph of average degree d ≥ 2. Then, in O(nm)
time, a series-parallel induced subgraph P of G can be found such that |P | ≥ 3n/(d+ 1). Hence,
if N = G− P , then |N | ≤ (d− 2)n/(d + 1).
To see how this theorem may be used we will establish several key properties regarding DΠ. We
establish a few bounds on the number of vertices and edges in GΠ in terms of the number n of
agents of the instance, the lengths l of the men’s preference lists, and the number r of rotations in
DΠ. We begin by bounding from above the number of rotations, i.e. the number of vertices in DΠ,
and the number of edges in DΠ.
Lemma 4.8.1 Let I be an (l,∞)-SMI instance, and DΠ its rotation digraph. Then, DΠ contains
at most (l − 1)n/4 rotations (vertices).
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Proof Any mutually acceptable (man,woman) pair can appear as a pair in at most one rotation in
DΠ, except for a pair (m,w) such that w is ranked last on m’s preference list, which cannot appear
in any rotation. A rotation must always have at least two (man,woman) pairs. It follows that each
rotation accounts for at least two distinct (man,woman) pairs, and the woman in such a pair may
not be last on the man’s preference list. Since there are n/2 men, (l − 1)n/4 is an upper bound on
the number of rotations. 2
Lemma 4.8.2 Let I be an (l,∞)-SMI instance, and DΠ its rotation digraph. Then, the number of
edges of DΠ is at most (l − 2)n/2.
Proof Consider any edge e = (ρ′, ρ) ∈ DΠ. If ρ′ is a type-1 predecessor of ρ (and possibly also a
type-2 predecessor), then by definition there exists a pair (mi, wi) in ρ such that the elimination of
ρ′ matches mi to wi. Notice that wi can neither be mi’s first or last choice. If instead ρ′ is a type-2
predecessor of ρ, then there is a pair (mi, wi) in ρ such that ρ moves mi below a woman w 6= wi
and ρ′ is the unique rotation that moves w above mi. Notice in this case as well, w cannot be the
first or last choice of m′.
Therefore, for every edge of DΠ we are able to identify a distinct (man,woman) pair (m,w) such
that w is neither m’s first nor last choice. Hence the number of edges of DΠ is bounded above by
(l − 2)n/2. 2
Recall that our ultimate goal is to apply Theorem 4.8.1 to GΠ in a particular way as a part of
the algorithm of this section. But, notice that Theorem 4.8.1 does not apply to graphs that are
disconnected and have average degree less than 4. We will find it useful later on to know that we
can connect GΠ as described in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8.3 Let G be a graph with c components and m > 0 edges. Then by adding a single
vertex and c+ 1 edges to G a new connected graph G′ may be formed with average degree ≥ 2.
Proof Suppose that G has r vertices, so that m ≥ r − c. Add a new vertex v together with an
edge connecting v to a vertex in each component of G, and a second edge connecting v to a second
vertex in one particular component. (Since m > 0 some component has more than one vertex.)
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Then the new graph G′ is connected, has r′ = r + 1 vertices, m′ = m+ c+ 1 edges, and average
degree
d′ =
2m′
r′
=
2(m+ c+ 1)
r + 1
≥ 2(r + 1)
r + 1
≥ 2.
2
Dealing with small components
The algorithm we describe in the forthcoming sections will rely on the fact that GΠ has no compo-
nents with c vertices or fewer, where c is a fixed constant independent of the size of the input. In
what follows we will show that we can use dynamic programming to preprocess the constant-sized
components of GΠ in polynomial-time, allowing to make the assumption that no such components
are present in GΠ.
Let Q = Q1, . . . Qt be the components of GΠ with at most c0 vertices, where c0 is an arbitrary
constant. For each Qi, construct a binary vector Xi, whose jth component is 1 if and only if
there exists a closed subset of Π[Ci] with weight exactly j (recall Π[Ci] is the partially ordered set
induced by Ci). The length of this vector is polynomially bounded (for example, the sum of the
weights of all of the rotations in Π suffices). Since Qi has constant size, computing this vector takes
polynomial-time.
The next step is to compute a sequence of combined binary vectors Yk such that the jth component
of Yk is 1 if and only if there exists a closed subset of Q1 ∪ . . . ∪ Qk with weight exactly j. To
begin, set Y1 = X1. Suppose now that Yi is known for some i (1 ≤ i < t). We compute the jth
entry of Yi+1 (denoted Y ji+1) by the following formula:
Y ji+1 = Y
j
i ∨
j∨
l=0
(Y li ∧Xj−li+1).
Hence the non-zero components of Yt are exactly the weights attainable by the closed subsets of Q.
The set Q may now be discarded from GΠ, giving a new graph G′Π.
This procedure is invoked in the step labeled by (1) in the pseudocode description of the algorithm
in Figure 4.2. The vector Yt is stored and used later (specifically, in Section 4.9) when a closed
subset corresponding to a sex-equal stable matching for the (original) instance is computed.
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4.8.2 The algorithm
Algorithm idea
The general idea of the algorithm is the following. If Π contains sufficiently few rotations, the
algorithm finds a sex-equal stable matching by brute force. Otherwise, we use Theorem 4.8.1 to
partition GΠ into two parts, N and P , where P is a series-parallel graph (defined in Section 4.3) and
the size of N is bounded. The algorithm then decides which rotations from N should be eliminated
by explicitly trying all subsets N ′ of N . Notice of course that at least one such subset is a maximal
subset of N that is contained in an optimal closed subset of Π. For a fixed subset of N ′, it may be
that there exists ρ ∈ N − N ′ such that, in DΠ, ρ precedes some ρ′ ∈ N ′, in which case we may
immediately reject N ′. Otherwise, if N ′ is valid in this sense, then some rotations from P , namely
those that precede a rotation in N ′, are forced also to be eliminated. Other rotations, namely those
with a predecessor in N −N ′ cannot be eliminated and are forbidden for this choice of N ′. Notice
that since N ′ is valid, the sets of forced and forbidden rotations are disjoint. All other rotations in P
are neither forced nor forbidden. Our goal is to find a subset P ′ ∪Q′ such that P ′ ⊆ P and Q′ ⊆ Q
(recall Q is the set of components of size at most c0) such that P ′ ∪Q′ extends N ′ optimally in the
following way:
(i) N ′∪P ′∪Q′ is a closed subset of Π. Note that this is equivalent to saying that P ′ includes every
forced rotation and no forbidden rotations, and Q′ is a closed subset of Q.
(ii) N ′ ∪ P ′ ∪ Q′ is an optimal extension of N ′ i.e. P ′ ∪ Q′ minimizes δ(N ′ ∪ P ′ ∪ Q′) over all
choices of P ′ and Q′ that satisfy (i).
In Section 4.9 we will show that a choice of P ′ ∪ Q′ that satisfies the above criteria can be found
in polynomial time. Hence the running time of the algorithm will be within a polynomial factor of
2|N |. We next describe the algorithm in detail.
Formal description of the algorithm
The algorithm, which is outlined in Figure 4.2, takes as input an (l,∞)-SMI instance. It consists of
two phases, the first is the preprocessing phase, which sets the stage for the second phase, which is
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the main loop of the algorithm.
The preprocessing phase starts by computing the man-optimal stable matching M0. If δ(M0) ≥ 0,
we are done, and simply output M0. Next, in polynomial time we find Π, DΠ, and GΠ and assign
each rotation the appropriate weight. If Π contains fewer than kn rotations, where n is the number
of agents and k is (5 − √24)(l − 2), find a sex-equal stable matching by enumerating all closed
subsets of Π. The justification for this choice of k becomes clear in the time complexity analysis
of the algorithm. Otherwise, Π has at least kn rotations. In that case, we next preprocess the
components of GΠ containing at most c0 vertices as described in Section 4.8.1, computing the
vector Yt, and remove these components from GΠ, giving a new graph G′Π.
If G′Π is disconnected with average degree less than four, then connect G′Π, so that it has average
degree at least two as described in Lemma 4.8.3. Give the artificial vertex created in this process a
weight of zero. LetG′′Π denote the resulting graph. Apply the Edwards and Farr algorithm described
in Theorem 4.8.1 to G′′Π and find the sets N and P of the vertex partition. After the partition is
found, we may discard the additional vertex if it lies in N , along with any edges incident to it. It is
kept if it lies in P .
The main body of the algorithm then begins in the form of a loop, which iteratively considers every
valid subset N ′ of N . For a given valid subset N ′, we identify the forced and forbidden vertices
of P , and colour them black and red respectively. All other vertices of P are coloured white. The
final step of the loop is to compute an optimal extension P ′ ∪Q′ for N ′. The closed subset S =N ′
∪ P ′ ∪ Q′ found in this loop minimizing δ(S) is kept and returned.
The next section is devoted to showing how step (2) in the pseudocode description of the algorithm
may be accomplished in polynomial time.
4.9 Computing P ′ ∪Q′ in polynomial time
We assume that P is a connected graph, for, if it is not, we can always connect two series-parallel
components (P1, s1, t1) and (P2, s2, t2) of P in series by creating a dummy vertex v with weight 0,
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Preprocessing phase
compute M0
if δ(M0) ≥ 0:
return M0
compute Π, DΠ, and GΠ, and assign the rotations the appropriate weights
k ← (5−√24)(l − 2)
if Π has fewer than kn rotations:
return a SESM using complete enumeration of the closed subsets of rotations of Π
Compute the vector Yt described in Section 4.8.1 (1)
G′Π ← graph resulting from preprocessing step described in Section 4.8.1
G′′Π ← G′Π
if G′Π is not connected and has average degree < 4:
G′′Π ← graph resulting by connecting G′Π as described in Lemma 4.8.3
assign the new vertex the weight zero
N,P ← vertex partition of G′′Π (and Π) found by the Edwards and Farr algorithm
remove any artificial vertex from N along with any edges incident to it
Main loop
keep the closed subset S of Π minimising δ(S) found in the following loop
for each valid choice of N ′ ⊆ N :
P ′ ∪Q′← optimal extension forN ′ (2)
S← N ′ ∪ P ′ ∪Q′
Figure 4.2: Algorithm to find a SESM for an (l,∞)-SMI instance
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and adding the edges (t1, v) and (s2, v) to P . In terms of Π[P ], v is added as a maximal element of
P . Since our algorithm for finding P ′ ∪Q′ is polynomial in n and m, this transformation will not
influence the overall running time of the algorithm, as this step is performed after N and P have
been computed. It is also irrelevant if the inclusion of additional edges changes the average degree
of GΠ, again because N and P have already been found.
The plan is to use dynamic programming on an SP tree T for P to allow us to compute the choice
of P ′. Henceforth let H i denote the series-parallel graph rooted at node i of T , and si and ti denote
the two terminals of H i. We will use the terminology feasible closed subset to denote a closed
subset of H i that contains every black vertex in H i and none of the red vertices of H i. Our goal,
then, is to compute four binary vectors AAi, ABi, BAi, and BBi, the jth element of each of those
being defined as follows:
AAij = 1 if and only if there exists a feasible closed subset C of Π[H i] of weight exactly j such that
s ∈ C and t ∈ C .
ABij = 1 if and only if there exists a feasible closed subset C of Π[H i] of weight exactly j such that
s ∈ C and t /∈ C .
BAij = 1 if and only if there exists a feasible closed subset C of Π[H i] of weight exactly j such that
s /∈ C and t ∈ C .
BBij = 1 if and only if there exists a feasible closed subset C of Π[H i] of weight exactly j such that
s /∈ C and t /∈ C .
The length of each vector is bounded by K =
∑
ρ∈P (w(ρ)), which is polynomially bounded. For
a leaf node i of T corresponding to an edge e = (s, t) the four values are simple to compute. The
first step is to initialize every component of each vector to be 0. The vectors are then potentially
changed according to the following rules.
AAi : If neither s nor t is red, then change AAiw(s)+w(t) to be 1.
ABi : If s ≺ t, s is not red, and t is not black, change ABiw(s) to be 1.
BAi : If t ≺ s, t is not red, and s is not black, change BAiw(t) to be 1.
BBi : If neither s nor t is black, set BBi0 to 1.
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Lemma 4.9.1 Let i be an internal node of T with a child node i1. Let C be a feasible closed subset
of Π[H i], and Ci1 = C ∩Π[H i1 ]. Then, Ci1 is a feasible closed subset of Π[H i1 ].
Proof Let c ∈ Ci1 . If some predecessor b ∈ Π[H i1 ] of c is not also in C , then clearly C is
not a closed subset of Π[H i]. Therefore b is in C and hence also in Ci1 . It follows that every
predecessor of c in Π[H i1 ] is in Ci1 , implying that Ci1 is a closed subset of Π[H i1 ]. If c, or any
of c’s predecessors were red, then C could not be feasible. Similarly, if Ci1 did not contain every
black vertex in i1, C could not be feasible. So, Ci1 is also feasible. 2
We therefore derive the following lemma, whose proof is immediate in light of Lemma 4.9.1.
Lemma 4.9.2 Every feasible closed subset C of Π[H i] consists of the union of two feasible closed
subsets Ci1 and Ci2 of Π[H i1 ] and Π[H i2 ], respectively, where i1 and i2 are the children of node i.
4.9.1 Series nodes
The following lemma is necessary to understand how to compute the vectors associated with a series
node i of T .
Lemma 4.9.3 Let i be a series node of T with child nodes i1 and i2, and let r denote the single
vertex in H i1 ∩ H i2 . Suppose Ci1 and Ci2 are feasible closed subsets of Π[H i1 ], Π[H i2 ], respec-
tively. If either (i) r /∈ Ci1 ∧ r /∈ Ci2 or (ii) r ∈ Ci1 ∧ r ∈ Ci2 , then C = Ci1 ∪ Ci2 is a feasible
closed subset of Π[H i].
Proof
(Feasibility). Since Ci1 and Ci2 are both feasible, they contain no red vertices and every black
vertex in Π[H i1 ] and Π[H i2 ], respectively, so C must be feasible.
(Closure). Suppose for a contradiction that C is not a closed subset of Π[H i]. Then, ∃x ∈ C with
a predecessor y /∈ C . Suppose, without loss of generality, that x ∈ Π[H i1 ]. If y ∈ Π[H i1 ] as well
(note that possibly y = r), then y /∈ Ci1 , implying Ci1 is not closed for Π[H i1 ], a contradiction. So,
suppose that y ∈ Π[H i2 ], and that y 6= r. Then, there exists a sequence of immediate successors
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of y = y0 ≺ . . . ≺ yz = x in Π[H i], and since r is the unique vertex in H i1 ∩H i2 , we must have
y ≺ r ≺ x. If case (i) from the statement of the lemma holds, then we have that r ≺ x, but r /∈ Ci1 ,
so Ci1 is not closed for Π[H i1 ]. If case (ii) holds, then y ≺ r, but r ∈ Ci2 , implying Ci2 is not
closed for Π[H i2 ]. 2
Lemma 4.9.3 essentially established a sufficiency condition to create a feasible closed subset C
from the union of two feasible closed subsets Ci1 and Ci2 . Lemma 4.9.4 will, in a sense, establish
necessity in that feasible closed subsets Ci1 and Ci2 satisfying either case (i) or (ii) of the previous
lemma always exist for a given C .
Lemma 4.9.4 Let i be a series node of T with child nodes i1 and i2, and let r denote the single
node in H i1 ∩ H i2 . Let C be a feasible closed subset of Π[H i]. Then, there exist feasible closed
subsets Ci1 and Ci2 of Π[H i1 ] and Π[H i2 ], respectively, such that Ci1 ∪ Ci2 = C , and either (i)
r /∈ Ci1 ∧ r /∈ Ci2 or (ii) r ∈ Ci1 ∧ r ∈ Ci2 .
Proof Lemma 4.9.2 establishes the existence of feasible closed subsets Ci1 and Ci2 of Π[H i1 ] and
Π[H i2 ], respectively, such that Ci1 ∪Ci2 = C . We will establish the claim by showing that if r ∈ C
then Ci1 ∪ {r} and Ci2 ∪ {r} remain closed. This is easy to see – since Ci1 ∪ Ci2 = C is closed,
every predecessor of r in Π[H i1 ] (respectively, Π[H i2 ]) is also in Ci1 (respectively, Ci2). 2
The following theorem follows from Lemmas 4.9.3 and 4.9.4, and is the key to describing the
dynamic programming procedure for processing a series node i of T .
Theorem 4.9.1 Let i be a series node of T with child nodes i1 and i2, and let r denote the single
node in H i1 ∩ H i2 . A feasible closed subset of Π[H i] of weight exactly j exists if and only if
there exist feasible closed subsets Ci1 , Ci2 of Π[H i1 ], Π[H i2 ], respectively, such that (i) r /∈ Ci1
∧ r /∈ Ci2 , with w(Ci1) = l and w(Ci2) = j − l or (ii) r ∈ Ci1 ∧ r ∈ Ci2 with w(Ci1) = l and
w(Ci2) = j − l + w(r).
We are now in a position to describe the construction of the four binary vectors associated with a
series node. Let i be a series node of T with children i1 and i2 and terminal nodes si and ti. Let
r denote the unique vertex in both H i1 and H i2 . Suppose we wish to compute AAij , and that there
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exists a feasible closed subset C of H i. There are two cases to consider. If r ∈ C , then by Theorem
4.9.1 there exists a value l such that (AAi1l ∧AAi2j−l+w(r)) = 1. If instead r /∈ C , then there exists
a value l such that (ABi1l ∧BAi2j−l) = 1. This leads to the formula,
AAij = (
j∨
l=w(r)
AAi1l ∧AAi2j−l+w(r)) ∨ (
j∨
l=0
ABi1l ∧BAi2j−l).
The reasoning behind the next 3 formulae is similar, we present only the final formulae below.
ABij = (
∨j
l=w(r)
AAi1l ∧ABi2j−l+w(r)) ∨ (
∨j
l=0AB
i1
l ∧BBi2j−l).
BAij = (
∨j
l=w(r))BA
i1
l ∧AAi2j−l+w(r)) ∨ (
∨j
l=0BB
i1
l ∧BAi2j−l).
BBij = (
∨j
l=w(r)BA
i1
l ∧ABi2j−l+w(r)) ∨ (
∨j
l=0BB
i1
l ∧BBi2j−l).
4.9.2 Parallel nodes
Our approach for parallel nodes is similar to that for series nodes. Our first goal is to establish an
analogous claim for parallel nodes to that made in Theorem 4.9.1. The first step is the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.9.5 Let i be a parallel node of T with child nodes i1 and i2, and {s, t} the two nodes in
H i1∩H i2 . LetCi1 ,Ci2 be feasible closed subsets of Π[H i1 ] and Π[H i2 ], respectively. IfCi1∩{s, t}
= Ci2 ∩ {s, t}, then Ci1 ∪Ci2 is a feasible closed subset of Π[H i].
Proof (Feasibility). By definition, Ci1 and Ci2 contain all black vertices in Π[H i1 ] and Π[H i2 ],
respectively, and neither can contain any red vertices. Hence Ci1 ∪ Ci2 contains all black vertices
in Π[H i] and contains no red vertices.
(Closure). Suppose C = Ci1 ∪ Ci2 is not closed for Π[H i]. Then, ∃ x ∈ C such that x has a
predecessor y 6= x and y /∈ C . Suppose without loss of generality that x ∈ Π[H i1 ], implying
x ∈ Ci1 . If y ∈ Π[H i1 ], (note that possibly y ∈ {s, t}) then Ci1 is not closed, a contradiction.
4.9 Computing P ′ ∪Q′ in polynomial time 76
So, suppose y ∈ Π[H i2 ] and y /∈ {s, t}. Since y ≺ x, there exists a sequence of successors y = y0
≺ . . . ≺ yz = x in Π[H i]. The only nodes in H i1 ∩H i2 are s and t, so either y ≺ s ≺ x or y ≺ t ≺
x (or both). We continue the proof based on the following four cases.
(i) s, t /∈ Ci1 and s, t /∈ Ci2 . Since we have either s ≺ x or t ≺ x (or both), Ci1 cannot be closed,
a contradiction. (ii) s, t ∈ Ci1 and s, t ∈ Ci2 . Since y /∈ Ci2 and either y ≺ s or y ≺ t, Ci2 is not
closed, a contradiction. (iii) s ∈ Ci1 , t /∈ Ci1 and s ∈ Ci2 , t /∈ Ci2 . If y ≺ s ≺ x, then Ci2 is not
closed, a contradiction. If instead y ≺ t ≺ x, then Ci1 is not closed, as t ≺ x and x ∈ Ci1 . (iv)
s /∈ Ci1 , t ∈ Ci1 and s /∈ Ci2 , t ∈ Ci2 . This case is analogous to case (iii).
2
The next lemma is analogous to Lemma 4.9.4 for series nodes.
Lemma 4.9.6 Let i be a parallel node of T with child nodes i1 and i2, and {s, t} the two nodes in
H i1 ∩H i2 . Suppose that C is a feasible closed subset of Π[H i]. Then, there exist feasible closed
subsets Ci1 and Ci2 of Π[H i1 ] and Π[H i2 ], respectively, such that Ci1 ∩ {s, t} = Ci2 ∩ {s, t} =
C ∩ {s, t}.
Proof Lemma 4.9.2 establishes the existence of feasible closed subsets Ci1 and Ci2 of Π[H i1 ] and
Π[H i2 ], respectively, such that Ci1 ∪ Ci2 = C . Let B = C ∩ {s, t}. We will establish the claim
by showing that Ci1 ∪ B and Ci2 ∪ B remain closed. This is easy to see – since Ci1 ∪ Ci2 = C
is closed, every predecessor of an element b ∈ B from Π[H i1 ] (respectively Π[H i2 ]) is also in Ci1
(respectively Ci2). 2
Now we state the main theorem for describing the dynamic programming procedure for processing
a parallel node i of T .
Theorem 4.9.2 Let i be a parallel node of T with child nodes i1 and i2, and {s, t} the two nodes
in H i1 ∩H i2 . A feasible closed subset of Π[H i] of weight exactly j exists if and only if there exist
feasible closed subsets Ci1 and Ci2 of Π[H i1 ] and Π[H i2 ], respectively, such that
1. s, t /∈ Ci1 and s, t /∈ Ci2 , w(Ci1) = l, and w(Ci2) = j − l; or
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2. s ∈ Ci1 , t /∈ Ci1 and s ∈ Ci2 , t /∈ Ci2 , w(Ci1) = l, and w(Ci2) = j − l + w(s); or
3. s /∈ Ci1 , t ∈ Ci1 and s /∈ Ci2 , t ∈ Ci2 , w(Ci1) = l, and w(Ci2) = j − l + w(t); or
4. s, t ∈ Ci1 and s, t ∈ Ci2 , w(Ci1) = l, and w(Ci2) = j − l +w(s) + w(t).
This leads to the following four formulae.
AAij = (
∨j
l=w(s)+w(t)AA
i1
l ∧AAi2j−l+w(s)+w(t)).
ABij = (
∨j
l=w(s)AB
i1
l ∧ABi2j−l+w(s)).
BAij = (
∨j
l=w(t)BA
i1
l ∧BAi2j−l+w(t)).
BBij = (
∨j
l=0BB
i1
l ∧BBi2j−l).
Suppose now that the four binary vectors have been computed for the root node root of T . Recall
that we also have computed the so-called combined vector Yt as described in Section 4.8.1. We
choose a position j of AAroot, ABroot, BAroot, or BBroot with a non-zero entry along with a
position k of Yt with a nonzero entry that together minimizes δ(M0) + w(N ′) + j + k. The actual
feasible closed subset P ′∪Q′ of P can be found by simple modifications and the standard traceback
technique through the dynamic programming tables. Thus we have computed an optimal extension
for N ′ in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.9.3 Let N ′ be a valid subset in an arbitrary iteration of the main loop of the algorithm
described in Figure 4.2. An optimal extension P ′ ∪Q′ for N ′ can be computed in polynomial-time.
4.10 Putting it all together
We have established the correctness of the algorithm described in the preceding sections. All that
remains is to provide an upper bound on the time complexity. The following theorem establishes
the running time.
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Theorem 4.10.1 Let I be an (l,∞)-SMI instance. Then, a sex-equal stable matching for I can be
computed in O?(2αn) time, where α = (5−√24)(l− 2). Hence the running time is O?(1.0725n),
O?(1.1503n), O?(1.2338n), . . . for l = 3, 4, 5, . . ..
Proof
Let GΠ denote the input graph, with r vertices (rotations), m edges, and average degree d. If the
algorithm terminates because the number of rotations is at most αn, the theorem is obviously true,
as we can enumerate every subset of Π to compute a sex-equal stable matching in O?(2αn) steps.
Suppose instead that Π has tn rotations for some constant t, which, by Lemma 4.8.1 is at most
((l − 1)/4).
We consider two cases. In the first case we suppose that after preprocessing the constant-sized
components of GΠ, the resulting graph G′Π satisfies Theorem 4.8.1, so that step (1) in Figure 4.2 is
not performed. Clearly the time complexity of the algorithm is O?(2(d′−2)r′/(d′+1)), where d is the
average degree of G′Π. This is defined to be 2m′/r′, where m′ and r′ are the number of edges and
vertices, respectively, of G′Π. Since m′ ≤ m, and, by Lemma 4.8.2 we have that m ≤ (l − 2)n/2,
we can provide the following upper bound on d′:
d′ =
2m′
r′
≤ 2m
r′
≤ (l − 2)n
r′
.
Consider the exponent e(x) of the expression 2
(d′−2)r′
d′+1 , namely,
e(x) =
(l − 2)nr′ − 2r′2
(l − 2)n + r′ =
kx− 2x2
k + x
.
where x = r′ and k = (l − 2)n.
Let us use differentiation to compute the maximum value of e(x):
e′(x) =
(k + x)(k − 4x)− (kx− 2x2)
(k + x)2
.
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e′(x) = 0⇔ 2x2 + 4kx− k2 = 0.
e′(x) = 0⇔ x = (
√
3
2
− 1)k.
Substituting into (1) shows that the maximum value of e(x) is (5 − √24)(l − 2)n, precisely the
expression in the claim of the theorem.
The second case of the proof is if, after preprocessing the constant-sized components of GΠ, the
resulting graph G′Π withm′ edges, r′ vertices, and average degree d′ does not satisfy Theorem 4.8.1,
so that step (1) in the pseudocode description is performed. Denote the graph resulting from this
step (1) in the pseudocode by GΠ′′ , with m′′ edges, r′′ vertices, and average degree d′′ = 2m′′/r′′.
We have the following facts.
1. r′′ = r′ + 1.
2. m′′ = m′ + c′ + 1, where c′ is the number of components in G′.
3. r′ ≥ c′/(c0 + 1), since each component of G′ has at least c0 + 1 vertices.
4. d′ < 4, as G′Π does not satisfy the requirement of Theorem 4.8.1.
This allows us to establish an upper bound on d′′:
d′′ =
2m′′
r′′
=
2(m′ + c′ + 1)
r′′
<
2m′
r′
+
2c′
r′
+
2
r′′
< d′ + 2 + 1 = 7.
We next derive an upper bound for r′′ by rewriting the expression m′′ = m′ + c′ + 1 as below:
r′′d′′
2
=
r′d′
2
+ c′ + 1 ⇒ r
′′d′′
2
<
r′′d′
2
+ c′ + 1
giving
r′′ <
2(c′ + 1)
d′′ − d′ .
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Now, consider the exponent e(r′′) = (d
′′−2)r′′
d′′+1 of the expression 2
(d′′−2)r′′
d′′+1
. Since d′′ < 7 and
r′′ < 2(c
′+1)
d′′−d′ , we have that
e(r′′) ≤ 5
8
2(c′ + 1)
d′′ − d′ .
By fact (3) above, this gives
e(r′′) ≤ 5
4
r′ + c0 + 1
(d′′ − d′)(c0 + 1) ≤
5
4
(l−1)n
4 + c0 + 1
(d′′ − d′)(c0 + 1) .
Therefore, by choosing c0 to be sufficiently large, e(r′′) can be made strictly less than (5−
√
24)(l−
2)n. Hence the theorem.
2
4.11 Conclusions and open problems
We have given a complete characterisation of the parameterized complexity of (α, β)-SESM. When
the preference lists on one side are of length at most two, the problem is solvable in polynomial
time, but, if the preference lists on either side are allowed instead to be of length three or greater,
the problem is W[1]-hard.
As far as we know, our exponential-time algorithm is the first ‘moderately’ exponential-time al-
gorithm for any computationally hard stable marriage variant. Perhaps further research could be
devoted to finding reasonably fast exponential-time algorithms for other SMI-based problems. As
a next step, one could consider searching for an exact algorithm for SESM with no bound on the
lengths of the preference lists.
In his PhD thesis, Feder [27] describes the so-called balanced stable matching problem, namely to
find a stable matching M that minimizes
max
{ ∑
(mi,wj)∈M
pmi(wj),
∑
(mi,wj)∈M
pwj(mi)
}
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over all M ∈ M. Intuitively, a balanced stable matching minimizes the unhappiness of the most
unhappy group of people (the men or the women). Feder [27] proved that this problem is NP-hard.
Is the balanced stable matching problem solvable by similar techniques to that presented in this
chapter?
An immediate corollary to our dynamic programming algorithm presented in Section 4.9 is that
whenever the underlying graph GΠ of the rotation poset Π of an arbitrary SESM instance is series-
parallel, a sex-equal stable matching can be computed in polynomial time. We conjecture that
SESM can be solved in polynomial time whenever GΠ has bounded treewidth (see, for example,
one of the many surveys by Bodlaender [10] for the relevant background on treewidth). Specifically,
whenever GΠ has treewidth bounded by a value k, we conjecture a sex-equal stable matching can
be found in time O(nO(1)f(k)), where f(k) is a (probably exponential) function dependent only
on k. For example, the running time could be O(nO(1)2k).
This leads to further questions about treewidth and hard stable marriage problems. Are there
other hard stable marriage problems that can be solved in polynomial time when GΠ has bounded
treewidth? A particularly interesting problem could be the median stable matching problem (dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.4). Is this efficiently solvable when GΠ has bounded treewidth?
Finally, we remark that very recently an improvement in the Edwards and Farr theorem has been
made [24]. This probably implies an improvement in the upper bound of the running time described
in Theorem 4.10.1.
Chapter 5
Keeping couples together
5.1 Introduction
It is something of a folklore theorem that when the residents of an HR instance are not only in-
terested in their own assignment, but are also interested in someone else’s assignment, then stable
matchings may not exist and they may be computationally difficult to find when they do exist. It
is perhaps not surprising, then, that determining how a centralized matching algorithm should deal
with couples (pairs of residents) is a significant computational challenge.
In Section 2.2.6, we reviewed the relevant literature and background regarding the Hospitals / Res-
idents problem with couples (HRC). In the present chapter, we continue the search for algorithmic
results in the HRC setting. Specifically, we consider a natural restriction of HRC in which each
member of a given couple (ri, rj) has an individual preference list over a subset of hospitals, and
the joint preference list of the couple is consistent with the individual preferences of ri and rj in a
precise sense. Specifically, (ri, rj) ranks distinct pairs of hospitals in order of preference, such that
if (hp, hq) precedes (hr, hs) on this list then (i) either ri prefers hp to hr or hp = hr, and (ii) either
rj prefers hq to hs, or hq = hs. We refer to this restriction of HRC as the Hospitals / Residents
problem with Consistent Couples (HRCC).
Thus HRCC models a situation in which the members of each couple can agree to construct a joint
preference list from their individual preferences consistently, in the sense that if a couple jointly
prefers (hp, hq) to (hr, hs), then when comparing hp to hr , ri would be no worse off, and similarly
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when comparing hq to hs, rj would be no worse off. This includes the case where both members of
a given couple have identical individual preference lists, with the intended outcome being that they
are either matched to the same hospital or not matched at all.
HRCC does not seem to have been studied previously in the literature from an algorithmic point of
view. In this chapter we show that an instance I of HRCC need not admit a stable matching, and
that the problem of deciding whether I admits a stable matching is NP-complete. This result holds
even if the length of each resident’s individual list and the length of each couple’s joint list is at
most three, and the capacity of each hospital is at most two, thus providing another highly restricted
version of HRC that remains NP-complete, in addition to the case considered by Ronn [84]. This
restriction is important from a practical viewpoint, because in many applications the preference lists
on one side tend to be short (for example in the context of SFAS, residents are asked to rank up to
ten hospitals in order of preference).
By contrast, we also give a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching or report that none exists,
for the case that stability is defined in terms of the classical Gale-Shapley stability (that is, each
member of a couple can form a blocking pair with a hospital without regard to the other member
of the couple). This version of stability can be motivated in the HRCC context as follows. Suppose
that a given couple (ri, rj) is given the joint assignment (hr, hs) by a matching algorithm. Now
suppose that ri prefers some hospital hp to hr , whilst the joint assignment (hp, hs) is not acceptable
to the couple for whatever reason (perhaps geographical separation). The previous agreement of
the couple to supply a joint (consistent) preference list could be overridden in practice if ri has an
overarching desire to be allocated to hp as opposed to hr . In reality this could mean that either
rj moves with ri to remain geographically close, and attempts to make an arrangement with hp
(or a hospital nearby) outside of the matching scheme, or rj changes career, or indeed the couple
even split up. In the spirit of “keeping couples together”, this is a situation that we seek to avoid,
thus motivating this stronger form of stability in the context of HRCC. Hence we obtain a natural
restriction of HRC that, unlike the general problem, is solvable in polynomial time. Our algorithm
does not make any assumptions regarding the lengths of the preference lists or regarding the hospital
capacities.
We remark that a matching that satisfies classical stability in the context of HRCC is stable with
respect to the criteria defined earlier by Roth and Ronn [89, 84] for HRC (see Section 5.2 for a
formal definition of this stability criterion). The converse, however, is not true in general. Our
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algorithm for HRCC under classical stability helps to narrow the search for the boundary between
polynomial time solvable and NP-complete variants of HRC. In particular, HRCC under classical
stability is the most general restriction of HRC that we are aware of that is solvable in polynomial
time.
Hospitals / Residents problem with Sizes
A special case of HRCC arises when each couple (ri, rj) is such that that the individual preference
lists of ri and rj are identical, and the joint preference list of (ri, rj) satisfies the property that
hp = hq for any element (hp, hq) on this list. Thus ri and rj wish to be either assigned to the same
hospital, or both be unassigned. We refer to this restriction of HRCC as the Hospitals / Residents
problem with Inseparable Couples (HRIC).
Let I be an instance of HRIC and let (ri, rj) be a couple in I . Given the structure of (ri, rj)’s
preference list, it is natural to replace (ri, rj) by a single entity Ci,j whose preference list is obtained
from that of (ri, rj) by replacing each occurrence of (hk, hk) by hk. Thus each single resident
occupies one post at a given hospital, whilst each couple occupies two posts. This suggests a natural
generalisation of HRIC to the case where each resident ri ∈ R has a size si ∈ Z+, indicating the
number of posts that ri occupies at any hospital. Hospitals will now rank residents of any size
(including couples) as a single entity. We refer to this variant of HRC as the Hospitals / Residents
problem with Sizes (HRS).
A formal definition of HRS is given in Section 5.2, in which we formulate an appropriate notion of
stability for this context. With this stability definition we later prove that, given an HRS instance
where the size of each resident is at most two and the capacity of each hospital is at most two, the
problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if the length of each
preference list is at most three. We also show that the restriction of HRS in which each resident
has size at most two is reducible to HRCC (essentially each resident of size two becomes a couple),
thus implying the aforementioned NP-completeness result for HRCC.
However, by contrast, we also prove that, given an instance of HRS in which the length of each
hospital’s preference list is at most two, a stable matching always exists and can be found in linear
time. The result holds for arbitrary resident sizes and hospital capacities. This result therefore
indicates a boundary between the polynomial-time solvability and NP-completeness of HRS with
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respect to the length of a hospital’s preference list.
5.2 Formal definitions of HRS and HRCC
We firstly give a formal definition of the Hospitals / Residents problem with Sizes (HRS). An
instance I of this problem is defined in the same way as an instance of HR (as defined in Section
5.1) except that each resident ri ∈ R has a size si ∈ Z+. An assignment M in I is a set of
(resident,hospital) pairs such that (ri, hj) ∈ M only if ri and hj find each other acceptable. For
ri ∈ R we denote the set {hj ∈ H : (ri, hj) ∈ M} by M(ri), for hj ∈ H we denote {ri ∈ R :
(ri, hj) ∈ M} by M(hj), and for hj ∈ H we denote
∑{si : ri ∈ M(hj)} by OMj and refer to
this as the occupancy of hj in M . We say that hj is undersubscribed if OMj < cj , where cj is the
capacity of hospital hj .
A matching is an assignment M such that |M(ri)| ≤ 1 for each ri ∈ R and OMj ≤ cj for each
hj ∈ H . In other words, in a matching, each resident is assigned to at most one hospital, and
the sum of the sizes of the residents assigned to a hospital does not exceed its capacity. Given a
matching M in which a resident ri is matched to a hospital hj , with a slight abuse of notation we
let M(ri) denote hj . A pair (ri, hj) ∈ R×H blocks a matching M , or is a blocking pair for M , if
1. ri is unmatched, or ri prefers hj to M(ri), and
2. OMj + si ≤ cj , or hj prefers ri to residents rk1 , . . . rkt ∈M(hj) such that
OMj + si −
t∑
p=1
skp ≤ cj .
The definition implies that hj could participate in a blocking pair with ri if (i) either hj currently
has room for ri, or (ii) hj can make room for ri by rejecting a set of residents it ranks lower than
ri. A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair.
We assume without loss of generality that, for each ri ∈ R and for each hospital hj on ri’s prefer-
ence list, si ≤ cj , for otherwise (ri, hj) could never belong to a stable matching, nor could (ri, hj)
form a blocking pair.
We firstly observe that HR is clearly the special case of HRS in which si = 1 for each ri ∈ R. The
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1 : r1 : h2 h1
1 : r2 : h1 h2
2 : r3 : h1
2 : h1 : r1 r3 r2
1 : h2 : r2 r1
Figure 5.1: An HRS instance for which no stable matching exists
blocking pair definition for HR, which is given in Section 2.2.6, can then be deduced from that for
HRS by interpreting Condition (2) as follows: either hj is undersubscribed or prefers ri to some
resident in M(hj).
We next observe that, in contrast to HR, an HRS instance may not admit a stable matching. An
example instance I that illustrates this is shown in Figure 5.1 (in this figure, and throughout the
chapter, sizes and capacities are written next to the residents and hospitals, respectively). Suppose
for a contradiction that I admits a stable matching M . If (r3, h1) ∈ M , then (r1, h2) ∈ M or else
(r1, h1) blocks M . Hence (r2, h2) blocks M , a contradiction. Suppose instead that (r3, h1) /∈ M .
Then (r2, h1) ∈M , or else (r2, h1) blocks M (since h1 has capacity two). Hence (r1, h2) ∈M or
else (r1, h2) blocks M . This implies that (r3, h1) blocks M , a contradiction.
Our third observation is that the restriction of HRS where each resident has size at most two is
reducible to the Hospitals / Residents problem with Consistent Couples (HRCC), which is a special
case of the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC). We demonstrate this in Lemma
5.2.1, but first we give a formal definition of each of HRC and HRCC.
An instance I of HRC involves a set R = {r1, . . . , rn} of residents, a set H = {h1, . . . , hm} of
hospitals, and a set C of couples, i.e., ordered pairs of residents such that each resident appears in
at most one pair. As in the HR case, each hospital hj ∈ H has a capacity cj ∈ Z+.
Each single resident ri ∈ R (i.e., a resident who does not belong to a couple) submits a strict pref-
erence list of acceptable hospitals. Each couple (ri, rj) submits a joint (strict) preference list over
pairs of acceptable hospitals. Each entry in this list is an ordered pair (hk, hl) of (not necessarily
distinct) hospitals representing the assignment of ri to hk and of rj to hl. Finally, each hospital
hj ∈ H ranks those residents (whether single or a member of a couple) who find hj acceptable in
strict order of preference.
In this context, the definition of a matching M is the same as in the classical HR setting (see
Section 2.2.6), with the additional requirement that, for each couple (ri, rj), if (ri, hk) ∈ M and
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(rj , hl) ∈ M then the pair (hk, hl) must appear on the joint preference list of that couple. A
matching M is unstable if at least one of the following holds:
1. The matching is blocked by a hospital hj and a single resident ri, as in the classical HR
problem (defined in Section 2.2.6).
2. The matching is blocked by a hospital hk and a resident ri who is coupled, say with rj ; that
is, (ri, rj) prefers (hk,M(rj)) to (M(ri),M(rj)), and hk is either undersubscribed in M or
prefers ri to some member of M(hk)\{rj}.
3. The matching is blocked by a couple (ri, rj) and (not necessarily distinct) hospitals hk 6=
M(ri), hl 6=M(rj); that is, (ri, rj) prefers the joint assignment (hk, hl) to (M(ri),M(rj)),
and either
(a) hk 6= hl, and hk (respectively hl) is either undersubscribed in M or prefers ri (respec-
tively rj) to at least one of its assigned residents in M ; or
(b) hk = hl, and hk has at least two free posts in M , i.e., ck − |M(hk)| ≥ 2; or
(c) hk = hl, and hk has one free post in M , i.e., ck − |M(hk)| = 1, and hk prefers at least
one of ri, rj to some member of M(hk); or
(d) hk = hl, hk is full in M , hk prefers ri to some rs ∈M(hk), and hk prefers rj to some
rt ∈M(hk)\{rs}.
The above stability definition for HRC extends that given in [36, Section 1.6.6], in order to deal
with the case that hk = hl, given a couple (ri, rj) who prefer (hk, hl) to (M(ri),M(rj)). As far as
we are aware, this possibility does not appear to have been covered adequately by previous stability
definitions for HRC in the literature [88, 36, 84, 23, 13, 65, 66, 68].
HRCC is the special case of HRC in which each resident (whether single or a member of a couple)
ranks a subset of H in strict order of preference. Each couple (ri, rj) ranks a subset of H ×H in
strict order, subject to the constraint that this joint preference list be consistent with the individual
preference lists of ri and rj . That is, (ri, rj) prefers (hp, hq) to (hr, hs) only if (i) either ri prefers
hp to hr or hp = hr, and (ii) either rj prefers hq to hs or hq = hs.
We now show that the restriction of HRS in which each resident has size at most two is polynomially
reducible to HRCC.
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Lemma 5.2.1 The restriction of HRS in which each resident has size at most two can be reduced
in polynomial time to HRCC.
Proof Given an instance I of HRS, construct an instance I ′ of HRCC in the following way. For
each resident ri of size two, create a couple (ri,1, ri,2) in I ′. Suppose the preference list of ri in I
is h1, h2, . . . ht. Assign to each of ri,1 and ri,2 an individual list equal to that of ri. Let the joint
preference list of (ri,1, ri,2) in I ′ be (h1, h1), (h2, h2), . . . , (ht, ht) – this is clearly consistent with
the lists of ri,1 and ri,2.
For each hospital hj that finds ri acceptable in I , replace the entry ri on hj’s preference list in I ′
with ri,1 and ri,2 in arbitrary order. Leave all residents of size one the same in I ′ as in I . This ends
the transformation. We claim that a stable matching exists for I ′ if and only if one exists for I .
Suppose a stable matching M exists for I . Then, construct a matching M ′ for I ′ in the following
way. If (ri, hj) is in M , place (ri, hj) into M ′ if ri has size one, else place (ri,1, hj) and (ri,2, hj)
into M ′. Notice that the capacities of the hospitals are preserved in the reduction, and also that
if a hospital hj has an occupancy of t in M , then hj is assigned t residents in M ′. Suppose a
blocking pair exists for M ′ in I ′. Then, the blocking pair must be of Type 1 or 3 above, as Type 2 is
impossible by the special nature of the couple’s preference lists. If there is a blocking pair (ri, hj)
by Type 1, M surely also had the same blocking pair in I . If instead M ′ is blocked by a pair of Type
3, then it must be because a couple (ri,1, ri,2) block with the pair (hj , hj) in I ′. But then resident
ri of size two in I must also block with hospital hj in M .
Conversely suppose a stable matching M ′ exists for I ′. Then, construct a stable matching M for
I in the following way. If (ri, hj) is in M ′, place (ri, hj) into M , if ri has size one in I , else
if (ri,1, hj) and (ri,2, hj) are in M ′, place (ri, hj) into M . By the nature of the preference lists,
ri,1 and ri,2 are always assigned the same hospital. Suppose (ri, hj) blocks M in I . Then, by an
argument similar to the above, (ri, hj) must have blocked M ′ in I ′ if ri has size one, otherwise the
pair (ri,1, ri,2) must have blocked M ′ in I ′ with (hj , hj). 2
It follows immediately from the example of Figure 5.1 and Lemma 5.2.1 that an HRCC instance
need not admit a stable matching.
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5.3 NP-completeness of HRS and HRCC
This section describes a polynomial-time reduction that establishes NP-completeness for the prob-
lem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, given an HRS instance where the size and capacity
of each resident and each hospital, respectively, is at most two, and the length of each preference
list is at most three. This reduction is from a restricted variant of MAX-SMTI (see Section 2.2.5
and Chapter 3 for background and definitions). Define (3, 3)-COM-SMTI to be the problem of de-
ciding whether a complete stable matching exists (i.e., a stable matching that matches every agent),
given an instance of SMTI in which each preference list is of length at most three, every woman’s
preference list is strictly ordered, and each man’s preference list is either strictly ordered or is a tie
of length two (all of these conditions holding simultaneously).
The proof that (3, 3)-COM-SMTI is NP-complete is somewhat peripheral to the results of this
chapter, moreover, we use the hardness of this problem again in Chapter 6. For this reason, the
proof of the following theorem is presented in the Appendix.
Theorem 5.3.1 (3, 3)-COM-SMTI is NP-complete.
5.3.1 The reduction
Given an instance I of (3, 3)-COM-SMTI with n men m1,m2,. . .,mn and n women w1, w2,. . .,wn,
we create an instance I ′ of HRS, whose residents and hospitals are constructed as follows. Firstly,
a hospital ht is created for each woman wt in I .
Next, for each man mi in I with a preference list consisting of a two-way tie (wk, wl) where k < l,
create eight residents {ri,1, ri,2, ri,3, ri,4, riα,1 , riα,2 , riβ,1 , riβ,2 } and six hospitals {hi,1, hi,2,
hiα,1 , hiα,2 , hiβ,1 , hiβ,2 }. The preference lists, sizes and capacities of these eight residents and
six hospitals are shown in Figure 5.2. For each man ms in I with a strictly ordered preference list
ws1 , ws2 , . . ., wsy , create three residents {rs, rsγ,1 , rsγ,2 } and two hospitals {hsγ,1 , hsγ,2 }. The
preference lists, sizes and capacities of these three residents and two hospitals are also shown in
Figure 5.2.
Finally, for each hospital ht created from a woman wt with preference list mt1 , . . . ,mtz , set the
preference list of ht to initially be equal to mt1 , . . . ,mtz , temporarily placing “men” on ht’s pref-
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2 : ri,1 : hi,1 hk hiα,1 2 : hi,1 : ri,4 ri,1 ri,3
2 : ri,2 : hi,2 hl hiβ,1 2 : hi,2 : ri,3 ri,2 ri,4
1 : ri,3 : hi,1 hi,2
1 : ri,4 : hi,2 hi,1
1 : riα,1 : hiα,2 hiα,1 2 : hiα,1 : riα,1 ri,1 riα,2
1 : riα,2 : hiα,1 hiα,2 1 : hiα,2 : riα,2 riα,1
1 : riβ,1 : hiβ,2 hiβ,1 2 : hiβ,1 : riβ,1 ri,2 riβ,2
1 : riβ,2 : hiβ,1 hiβ,2 1 : hiβ,2 : riβ,2 riβ,1
2 : rs : hs1 hs2 . . . hsy hsγ,1
1 : rsγ,1 : hsγ,2 hsγ,1 2 : hsγ,1 : rsγ,1 rs rsγ,2
1 : rsγ,2 : hsγ,1 hsγ,2 1 : hsγ,2 : rsγ,2 rsγ,1
Figure 5.2: Preference lists in the constructed instance of HRS
erence list. Now, suppose that wt finds some man mj acceptable. If mj’s preference list is strictly
ordered in I , replace mj on ht’s preference list with rj . If mj’s preference list is not strictly or-
dered, his preference list consists of a two-way tie, say, (wt, wk). If t < k, replace mj with rj,1 on
ht’s preference list, else, replace mj with rj,2 on ht’s preference list. Set the capacity of ht to be
two.
This ends the reduction. Clearly, it is computable in polynomial time. We now argue that it is correct
by the following sequence of lemmas, each of which states a property of any stable matching M ′ in
I ′.
Lemma 5.3.1 Let ms be a man with a strictly ordered preference list in I , and let mi be a man
with a preference list consisting of a two-way tie in I . Then, every resident in the set {rs, ri,1, ri,2}
is matched to some hospital in M ′, and that hospital is not the last entry on his preference list.
Proof Suppose that rs is unmatched inM ′. Then, rsγ,1 must be matched to hsγ,1 , to prevent rs from
forming a blocking pair with hsγ,1 . Resident rsγ,2 must be matched to hsγ,1 as well, for otherwise
he forms a blocking pair with hsγ,1 . But this implies (rsγ,1 , hsγ,2) is a blocking pair for M ′.
Suppose instead that rs is matched to hsγ,1 . Then, neither rsγ,1 nor rsγ,2 is matched to hsγ,1 , else
its capacity would be exceeded. So, if rsγ,1 is matched to hsγ,2 , rsγ,2 is unmatched, and forms a
blocking pair with hsγ,2 . If, instead, rsγ,2 is matched to hsγ,2 , then rsγ,1 is unmatched, and forms a
blocking pair with hsγ,1 . Clearly, if neither rsγ,1 nor rsγ,2 is matched to hsγ,2 , they form blocking
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pairs with hsγ,2 . This exhausts every possibility. It follows that if rs is unmatched in M ′ or is
matched to the last hospital on his preference list, a blocking pair cannot be avoided.
The same argument holds for ri,1 by substituting hiα,1 and hiα,2 for hsγ,1 and hsγ,2 , respectively,
and riα,1 and riα,2 for rsγ,1 and rsγ,2 , respectively. Similarly, the argument is analogous for ri,2, by
replacing rsγ,1 and rsγ,2 with riβ,1 and riβ,2 , respectively, and hsγ,1 and hsγ,2 with hiβ,1 and hiβ,2 ,
respectively. 2
Lemma 5.3.2 For all men mi ∈ I with a preference list consisting of a two-way tie, the residents
ri,3 and ri,4 are matched to some hospital in M ′. Moreover, ri,3 and ri,4 are matched to the same
hospital in M ′.
Proof If ri,3 is not matched in M ′, he clearly forms a blocking pair with hi,2, which has ri,3 first
on its preference list. Similarly, if ri,4 is not matched, he blocks with hi,1.
For the second claim, suppose (ri,3, hi,1) and (ri,4, hi,2) are in M ′. Then ri,1 cannot be matched to
hi,1 and ri,2 cannot be matched to hi,2 in M ′, for otherwise the capacities of hi,1 and hi,2 would
be exceeded. However, this implies (ri,1, hi,1) and (ri,2, hi,2) form blocking pairs for M ′. On the
other hand, if (ri,3, hi,2) and (ri,4, hi,1) are in M ′, then (ri,3, hi,1) forms a blocking pair in M ′, for
hi,1 has enough spare capacity to admit ri,3. 2
Lemma 5.3.3 For all men mi ∈ I with a preference list consisting of a two-way tie, exactly one
of the residents in the set {ri,1, ri,2} is matched to his first choice, and the other is matched to his
second choice in M ′.
Proof By Lemma 5.3.2, it is clear that ri,1 and ri,2 cannot both be matched to their first choice in
M ′, for this would result in ri,3 and ri,4 being unassigned in M ′, a contradiction.
On the other hand, if ri,1 and ri,2 are both matched to their second choice, then if ri,3 and ri,4
are both matched to hi,1, and ri,2 forms a blocking pair with hi,2. If instead ri,3 and ri,4 are both
matched to hi,2, then ri,1 forms a blocking pair with hi,1.
Finally, by Lemma 5.3.1, ri,1 and ri,2 cannot be unmatched or matched to the last hospitals on their
preference lists, so exactly one of {ri,1, ri,2} is matched to his first choice in M ′, and the other to
his second. 2
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Lemmas 5.3.1 – 5.3.3 lead us to the following corollary.
Corollary 5.3.1 Every resident is matched in any stable matching M ′ for I ′.
Proof The only residents not yet shown to be matched inM ′ are those residents riδ,k for δ ∈ {α, β}
and k ∈ {1, 2} created from a man mi with a preference list consisting of a tie of size two in I , and
the residents rsγ,k for k ∈ {1, 2} created from a man ms with a strictly ordered preference list in
I . Each of these residents must be matched in M ′, for otherwise they would form a blocking pair
with the last hospital on their preference list, which has the resident in question in first place on its
list 2
We are now in a position to prove the correctness of the reduction in one direction.
Lemma 5.3.4 If the derived HRS instance I ′ admits a stable matching M ′, then the given instance
I of (3,3)-COM-SMTI admits a complete stable matching M .
Proof Given a stable matching M ′ for I ′, we describe how to construct a complete stable matching
M in I ′ as follows. Consider the residents ri,k for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} that were created in correspon-
dence to a man mi in I with a preference list consisting of (wk, wl), a tie of size two, where k < l.
By Lemma 5.3.3, either ri,1 is matched to hk or ri,2 is matched to hl in M ′, and, since the capacity
of every hospital in I ′ is either two or one, no other resident is assigned to hk if ri,1 is, and similarly
for ri,2 and hl. Hence, we construct M by placing (mi, wk) into M if and only if (ri,1, hk) ∈ M ′,
and (mi, wl) into M if and only if (ri,2, hl) ∈ M ′. Again, Lemma 5.3.3 ensures that we always
place exactly one such pair into M . To complete the construction of M , for each resident ri corre-
sponding to a man mi with a strictly ordered preference list, place (mi, wj) into M if and only if
(ri, hj) ∈ M ′. Corollary 5.3.1 ensures every man in I is assigned to some woman in M ; in what
follows we will show that M is indeed a matching, and is also stable.
We have already argued by Lemma 5.3.3 that no two men with ties on their preference lists are
matched to the same woman in M . For any resident ri corresponding to a man mi in I with a
strictly ordered preference list, ri must have size two, and is matched in M to a hospital hj , which
is not his last choice by Lemma 5.3.1, and which therefore corresponds to woman wj in I . Hospital
hj has capacity two, and so is matched to only ri inM ′. This means that exactly one man is matched
to wj in M . Therefore, M is a matching.
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We will show that M ′ is stable by demonstrating that no man can be part of a blocking pair relative
to M . For any man mi with a preference list consisting of a tie of size two, this must be true, for
such a man is indifferent between the only two women on his preference list. Suppose instead that
mi has a strictly ordered preference list. Consider any woman wl whom mi prefers to his partner
in M . Then, in M ′, resident ri must also have preferred hospital hl to its assigned hospital. By
Lemma 5.3.1 and the construction of the hospitals of I ′, hl’s preference list contains residents of
size two only. Since M ′ is stable, hl is assigned a resident it strictly prefers to ri, and hence, in M ,
wl is assigned a man she strictly prefers to mi. It follows that M is a complete stable matching in
I . 2
We now prove that the reduction is correct in the other direction.
Lemma 5.3.5 If the given instance I of (3,3)-COM-SMTI admits a complete stable matching M ,
then, the derived HRS instance I ′ admits a stable matching M ′.
Proof Given a complete stable matching M for I , we describe how to construct a complete stable
matching M ′ in I . For each man mi with a strictly ordered preference list, place (ri, hj) into M ′ if
and only if (mi, wj) ∈M . For each man mi in M with a tie of size two consisting of, say, (wk, wl),
where k < l, place pairs in M ′ by the following two rules:
1. If (mi, wk) ∈ M , place (ri,1, hk), (ri,2, hi,2), (ri,3, hi,1), (ri,4, hi,1) into M ′ , and assign all
residents riδ,k ∀δ ∈ {α, β} and ∀k ∈ {1, 2} their first choice.
2. If (mi, wl) ∈ M , place (ri,1, hi,1), (ri,2, hl), (ri,3, hi,2), (ri,4, hi,2) into M ′, and assign all
residents riδ,k ∀δ ∈ {α, β} and ∀k ∈ {1, 2} their first choice.
It is easy to verify that the capacity of each hospital is not exceeded in M ′, and that M ′ is a
matching. We claim that M ′ is also stable.
For, suppose residents ri,t for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are matched by Rule 1 above. Immediately we notice
that ri,2 and ri,3 are matched to their first choices, and hence cannot form a blocking pair with any
hospital in I ′. Resident ri,1 prefers only hospital hi,1 to his assignment in M ′, but does not form a
blocking pair with it because ri,3 and ri,4 are matched to hi,1. The remaining resident, ri,4 prefers
only hi,2, who is matched to ri,2, and hence does not form a blocking pair with ri,4. All residents
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riδ,k ∀δ ∈ {α, β} and ∀k ∈ {1, 2} are matched to their first choice and cannot form a blocking pair
with any hospital.
Suppose residents ri,t for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are matched by Rule (2) above. In an argument analogous
to the previous case, ri,1 and ri,4 are matched to their first choices, and cannot be part of a blocking
pair. Resident ri,2 prefers only hospital hi,2 to his assignment in M ′, but does not form a blocking
pair with it because ri,3 and ri,4 are matched to hi,2. The remaining resident, ri,3 prefers only hi,1,
who is matched to ri,1, and hence cannot form a blocking pair with ri,3. Again, the residents riδ,k
∀δ ∈ {α, β} and ∀k ∈ {1, 2} are matched to their first choice and cannot form a blocking pair with
any hospital.
In the final case, a resident ri corresponding to a man mi with a strictly ordered preference list in
I ′ cannot block for the same reasons that mi did not block in M . If mi preferred a woman wj in
M , then ri must also prefer hj in M ′. However, hj must be matched to a resident that precedes
ri on its preference list, since wj is matched to a man preceding mi on her preference list. The
capacity of hj is two, and the size of ri is also two, so hj has insufficient capacity to accommodate
ri. Therefore, M ′ is a stable matching for I ′. 2
Lemmas 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 immediately imply the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.2 The problem of determining whether an HRS instance admits a stable matching
is NP-complete, even if the size of each resident and the capacity of each hospital is at most two,
and the lengths of the residents’ and hospitals’ preference lists are at most three (these conditions
holding simultaneously).
The following corollary follows immediately from Theorem 5.3.2 and Lemma 5.2.1.
Corollary 5.3.2 The problem of determining whether an HRCC instance admits a stable matching
is NP-complete, even if the individual preference list of each resident and the joint preference list
of each couple has at most three entries, and the capacity of each hospital is at most two (these
conditions holding simultaneously).
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5.4 HRCC under classical (Gale-Shapley) stability
In this section we introduce a variant of HRCC in which stability is defined in terms of the classical
(Gale-Shapley) stability. We provide a linear time algorithm for this problem, without any assump-
tions about the lengths of the preference lists or capacities of the hospitals. The problem is defined
in the same manner as HRCC, the difference, however, lies in the definition of a blocking pair. So,
as before, each hospital hj ∈ H provides a preference list of acceptable residents, denoted Lhj ,
and each resident ri ∈ R (whether they are a member of a couple or not) submits an individual
preference list Lri of acceptable hospitals. Each couple ck then constructs a joint preference list
Lck that is consistent as defined in Section 5.2. A blocking pair for a matching is defined to be
a (resident,hospital) pair (ri, hj) such that (i) ri is unmatched, or, according to Lri , ri prefers hj
to M(ri) and (ii) either hj is undersubscribed, or according to Lhj , hj prefers ri to at least one
member of M(hj). Notice the difference in the stability definition to that defined in Section 2 for
HRC is that blocking pairs are defined with respect to the individual preference lists, rather than the
couples’ joint preference lists. We partition the set of preference lists L of an instance of HRCC
into three sets L = LC∪LR∪LH where LR is the set of individual preference lists of the residents,
LH is the set of hospitals’ preference lists, and LC is the set of joint lists created by the couples.
The goal in this setting is to find a matching satisfying the following two criteria:
1. The matching contains no blocking pairs relative to LR and LH under the classical notion of
Gale-Shapley stability as defined above.
2. Each couple ck = (ri, rj) is assigned to a pair of hospitals (hp, hq) ∈ Lck or both ri and rj
are unassigned.
The instance induced by the preference lists LR and LH is a classical Hospitals / Residents in-
stance, so finding a matching satisfying (1) above simply involves using the extended Gale-Shapley
algorithm to compute a stable matching M . Of course, M may not satisfy (2), in which case we
need to determine if there is a different stable matching which does. Henceforth, let such a stable
matching be called a feasible stable matching.
Given an instance I of HRCC, let M denote the set of all stable matchings under classical stability
with respect to LR and LH . We shall obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for determining the
existence of a feasible stable matching by exploiting the known results on the rich structure of M,
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which we discussed in detail in Section 2.2.6. We briefly recall here the necessary structural results,
beginning with the Rural Hospitals theorem [88, 31] (see also [36, Section 1.6.5]).
Theorem 5.4.1 For any given HR instance, (i) each hospital is assigned the same number of res-
idents in all stable matchings; (ii) exactly the same set of residents are unassigned in all stable
matchings; (iii) any hospital which is undersubscribed in one stable matching is matched with
precisely the same set of residents in all stable matchings.
Part (ii) of Theorem 5.4.1 implies that if for some instance of the problem we have a stable match-
ing in which one member of a couple is assigned and the other is unassigned, no feasible stable
matching exists, for there is no stable matching in which they are either both assigned or both unas-
signed. By the same token, we cannot, in general, trivially obtain a feasible stable matching by
forcing every resident in a couple simply to be unassigned. We continue with the following known
relation which induces a partial order on M [36].
Definition 5.4.1 Let M and M ′ be stable matchings for an HR instance. We say that M dominates
M ′ (denoted M M ′) if, for each assigned resident r, M(r) =M ′(r), or r strictly prefers M(r)
to M ′(r). Intuitively, M dominates M ′ if each resident is at least as happy in M as in M ′ (The
case that M M ′ and M 6=M ′ is denoted by M M ′).
Notice that a stable matching dominates itself. As we mentioned in Section 2.2.6, the pair (M,)
actually forms a distributive lattice, with the maximum element being resident-optimal, in that every
resident is matched to the most-preferred hospital he can ever obtain in any stable matching. It is
this underlying structure of M that will allow us to develop the efficient algorithm presented in this
section. We end our review of the structural results for M with the following fact.
Fact 5.4.1 The resident-optimal stable matching MR dominates all stable matchings in M, and
the hospital-optimal stable matching MH is dominated by every stable matching.
5.4.1 Breakmarriage
The algorithm we develop will use as a subroutine a generalised version of an algorithm known
as Algorithm Breakmarriage, first defined by McVitie and Wilson [78] and used again by Gusfield
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[34]. Our modified version of Algorithm Breakmarriage takes as input any stable matching M 6=
MH , and takes as a second parameter any resident r who is matched in M such that M(r) 6=
MH(r), and always outputs a new stable matching dominated by M . Intuitively, M is the ‘most
dominant’ stable matching subject to the constraint that r must be matched to a hospital further
down his list. A description of this algorithm is as follows:
Breakmarriage(M, r)
Given the stable matching M and a matched resident r as input, let R′ ⊆ R denote the set of
residents r′ matched to M(r) = h in M such that r′ = r or r′ succeeds r on the preference list of
h. Restart the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm (described in Section 2.2.6 by unassigning all pairs
(r′, h) for r′ ∈ R′. All residents in R′ are now free and are pushed onto a stack S in arbitrary order.
Hospital h is defined to be “semi-free” in that it only accepts new proposals from residents it strictly
prefers to r. Algorithm Breakmarriage iteratively pops a resident r′′ from S with r′′ proposing to
the first hospital following M(r′′) on his preference list. This initiates a sequence of proposals,
rejections, and acceptances as given by the resident-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm [36, Section
1.6.3] in which free residents that have not been rejected by every hospital on their preference list
are pushed onto S. Algorithm Breakmarriage terminates when S becomes empty. The current set
of assignments M ′ is then output.
The following facts hold about Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r).
Lemma 5.4.1 Suppose M and M ′ are stable matchings such that M M ′, and that resident r is
matched inM and satisfies M(r) 6=M ′(r). Then, in the execution of Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r),
no resident r′ ∈ R ever proposes to a hospital succeeding M ′(r′) on his preference list (in the
case that M(r′) = M ′(r′), this implies that r′ remains matched to M(r′) in the execution of
Breakmarriage(M, r)).
Proof Let h =M(r), and let R′ ⊆ R denote the set of residents r′ ∈M(h) such that r′ = r or r′
succeeds r on the preference list of h. Since r /∈M ′(h) and M M ′, it follows that r prefers h to
M ′(r). Hence h is full in M ′ and prefers each of its assignees in M ′ to r. It follows that h prefers
each of its assignees in M ′ to each member of R′.
Now suppose that a resident r′ who is matched in M is the first resident in the execution of Algo-
rithm Breakmarriage(M, r) to be rejected by the hospital he is assigned to in M ′. Let h′ =M ′(r′).
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Clearly if h′ = h and r′ ∈R′ thenM(r′) =M ′(r′), which is impossible by the conclusion of the pre-
vious paragraph. Hence r′ was rejected by h′ during the phase of Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r)
that corresponds to the restart of the resident-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm. Let MA be the
matching at the point during the execution of the algorithm when h′ rejected r′. Then h′ is full in
MA and prefers each of its assignees in MA(h′) to r′. Since r′ ∈M ′(h′) \MA(h′) and h′ is full in
MA, it follows that there exists some rw ∈MA(h′) \M ′(h′).
If rw is matched in M ′, then rw cannot yet have proposed to M ′(rw) (as h′ 6=M ′(rw), and hence
this would contradict the fact that r′ is the first resident to be rejected by the hospital that he is
assigned to in M ′). Hence either rw is unmatched in M ′ and finds h′ acceptable, or rw prefers
h′ to M ′(rw). But this implies that (rw, h′) forms a blocking pair for M ′, as h′ prefers rw to r′.
Therefore, r′ is not rejected by h′ in the call to Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r). 2
Corollary 5.4.1 Let M 6= MH be a stable matching and r an arbitrary resident with M(r) 6=
MH(r). Then, no resident r′ ∈R is ever rejected byMH(r′) in a call to Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r).
Lemma 5.4.2 When Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r) terminates, the set of assignments M ′ output
by the algorithm is a stable matching.
Proof We first observe that M(r) is full in M , by Theorem 5.4.1, since M(r) 6= MH(r). We
proceed by showing that every hospital that is full in M is also full inM ′. Throughout the execution
of Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r), no hospital that was full in M can become undersubscribed
except for M(r), as no other hospital rejects a resident without gaining a better one. Therefore, the
hospitals that are undersubscribed at some point in the execution of the algorithm are those that are
undersubscribed in every stable matching (by Theorem 5.4.1) and M(r). Suppose that during the
algorithm’s execution a resident r′ were to propose to a hospital h′, such that h′ is undersubscribed
in M . By Theorem 5.4.1, h′ is undersubscribed in MH , and also (r′, h′) /∈MH , since (r′, h′) /∈M .
If r′ is unmatched in MH then (r′, h′) blocks MH , a contradiction. Hence r′ is matched in MH . As
h′ 6=MH(r′), by Corollary 5.4.1, h′ precedes MH(r′) on r′’s preference list, implying that (r′, h′)
blocks MH , a contradiction. Hence, no resident may propose to a hospital that is undersubscribed
in M at any point in the execution of the algorithm, implying that proposals are only made to those
hospitals that are full in M . It follows by a simple counting argument that M(r) is full in M ′.
The stability of M ′ follows from the fact that a resident r has proposed to, and been rejected by,
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any hospital h it prefers over M(r). Since hospitals continually improve throughout the course of
the algorithm, r cannot be a part of a blocking pair. 2
Lemma 5.4.3 Let M and M ′ be distinct stable matchings, and suppose that M dominates M ′.
Then, if r is a resident with M(r) 6= M ′(r), Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r) either returns M ′ or
a stable matching M ′′ that dominates M ′ (i.e., M M ′′ M ′).
Proof This is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. 2
Lemma 5.4.4 Any stable matching M can be obtained by a series of calls to Algorithm Break-
marriage from the resident-optimal stable matching MR in O(m) time, where m is the sum of the
lengths of the preference lists.
Proof The fact that an arbitrary stable matching M can be obtained from MR by a series of calls to
Algorithm Breakmarriage is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 5.4.3. A total of O(m) time
is spent, as any arbitrary series of calls to the algorithm constitutes at most one left to right traversal
of each resident’s preference list, and similar time is spent traversing the hospitals’ preference lists.
2
So, in light of Lemma 5.4.4, we can see that the computation of a feasible stable matching (if one
exists) can be achieved by first finding the resident-optimal stable matching MR (which, in general,
need not be feasible), and making a suitable selection of calls to Algorithm Breakmarriage. In the
next subsection, we will show that because the preference lists in Lck are consistent, we can always
compute an appropriate sequence of calls to Algorithm Breakmarriage in linear time.
We also note that repeated calls to Algorithm Breakmarriage ultimately yield the hospital-optimal
stable matching, in which every resident is, of course, assigned to MH(r). Thus this is the only
stable matching Algorithm Breakmarriage cannot take as input.
5.4.2 The algorithm
Before presenting the main algorithm of this section, we require some preliminary lemmas and
definitions. Let M be a stable matching. Recall Theorem 5.4.1, which states that precisely the
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Lr1 : h1 h2 h3 h5 1 : Lh1 : r8 r5 r1 r7 r6 r2
Lr2 : h1 h2 h3 2 : Lh2 : r3 r8 r2 r5 r7 r1
Lr3 : h4 h3 h2 2 : Lh3 : r7 r1 r2 r3 r6 r4
Lr4 : h3 h4 2 : Lh4 : r7 r8 r4 r5 r3
Lr5 : h4 h2 h1 1 : Lh5 : r6 r1
Lr6 : h3 h1 h5
Lr7 : h2 h3 h4 h1
Lr8 : h1 h2 h4
L(r2,r3) : (h1, h3) (h3, h2)
L(r4,r5) : (h4, h4) (h4, h2) (h4, h1)
L(r7,r8) : (h2, h2) (h4, h4)
Figure 5.3: An HRCC instance with a stable but not feasible matching
same set of residents are matched in every stable matching. With this in mind, we define a matched
couple ck = (ri, rj) to be a couple such that ri and rj are matched in M (and hence in every stable
matching). Similarly, we define an unmatched couple ck = (ri, rj) to be a couple such that one or
both of ri and rj are unmatched in M (and hence in every stable matching). Let ck = (ri, rj) be
a matched couple. We define the next acceptable pair on Lck (denoted nextM(ck)) to be the first
pair of hospitals (hp, hq) on Lck such that hp succeeds or is equal to M(ri) on Lri and hq succeeds
or is equal to M(rj) on Lrj . If no such pair exists, we say nextM (ck) = ∅ with slight abuse of
notation.
Example To illustrate the notion of the next acceptable pair for a couple, we refer the reader to Figure
5.3. This shows an HRCC instance with 8 residents r1, r2, . . . , r8 and 5 hospitals h1, h2, . . . , h5. There
are three couples, namely (r2, r3), (r4, r5), and (r7, r8). A stable (but not feasible) matching M for this
instance is denoted by underlining. In M , nextM (r2, r3) = (h3, h2), nextM (r4, r5) = (h4, h4), and
nextM (r7, r8) = (h2, h2).
The next two lemmas will help us to develop the algorithm to determine an appropriate sequence
of calls to Algorithm Breakmarriage to obtain a feasible stable matching, if one exists.
Lemma 5.4.5 Let M be a non-feasible stable matching that dominates a feasible stable matching
Mf . Let ck = (ri, rj) be any matched couple who are not matched to a pair of hospitals on Lck .
Then, in Mf , (ri, rj) is either assigned to nextM (ck) or a pair of hospitals succeeding nextM (ck)
on Lck .
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Proof Since M dominates Mf , for each resident r either M(r) = Mf (r) or Mf (r) succeeds
M(r) on Lr by Definition 5.4.1. So, for a couple ck = (ri, rj), their partners in Mf are either their
current hospitals or hospitals that appear further down their individual preference lists. It follows
that nextM(ck) is the first pair of hospitals on Lck that ck could be assigned to in Mf . So, in Mf ,
ck is either assigned to nextM (ck) or to a pair of hospitals that succeeds nextM(ck) on Lck . 2
Lemma 5.4.6 Let M be a non-feasible stable matching that dominates a feasible stable matching
Mf . Let ck = (ri, rj) be any matched couple who are not matched to a pair of hospitals on Lck .
Let (hp, hq) = nextM(ck). Then,
1. Either M(ri) 6= hp or M(rj) 6= hq (or both).
2. The stable matching obtained by calling Algorithm Breakmarriage with M and r∗ dominates
Mf , where r∗ is ri if M(ri) 6= hp and is otherwise rj .
Proof For the first claim, ri and rj cannot both be assigned to hp and hq , respectively in Mf , for
Mf is feasible, and this pair does not appear on Lck , by the assumption of the lemma.
For the second claim, since M is not feasible and M dominates Mf , the members of ck must be
assigned to nextM (ck) or to a pair of hospitals succeeding nextM (ck) by Lemma 5.4.5. By the
nature of the construction of the joint preference list Lck , and by the fact that M dominates Mf ,
this implies that r∗ is assigned to a hospital succeeding M(r∗) on Lr∗ in Mf . Hence by Lemma
5.4.3, calling Algorithm Breakmarriage on the current matching and r∗ yields a stable matching
that dominates Mf . 2
We are now ready to describe the algorithm for finding a feasible stable matching or reporting that
none exists. The algorithm begins by computing the resident-optimal stable matching MR and the
hospital-optimal stable matching MH . By Lemma 5.4.1, MR dominates all stable matchings in M
– hence it dominates every feasible stable matching (if any exist) as well. If MR is itself feasible,
the algorithm returns MR. Otherwise, if for any couple (ri, rj) it is the case that ri is assigned and
rj is unassigned, the algorithm halts, correctly reporting that no feasible stable matching exists by
Theorem 5.4.1.
Only if no such couple exists do we enter the while loop which maintains the loop condition that the
current matching M is not feasible – hence there is some couple ck = (ri, rj) who are not assigned
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Compute MR and MH
M ←MR
for each couple c ∈ C:
if one member of c is assigned in M and the other is unassigned in M :
report “no feasible stable matching exists”
HALT
while some couple ck = (ri, rj) is not assigned a pair from Lck in M :
if ck has nextM(ck) = ∅:
report “no feasible stable matching exists”
HALT
r∗ ← a resident in ck with different partners in M and nextM (ck)
if M(r∗) =MH(r∗):
report “no feasible stable matching exists”
HALT
else:
M ← Breakmarriage(M, r∗)
return M
Figure 5.4: Algorithm HRCC
to a hospital on Lck . If nextM (ck) = ∅, the algorithm reports failure. Otherwise the algorithm
identifies a resident r∗ ∈ {ri, rj} such that M(r∗) is not equal to r∗’s partner in nextM(ck). If r∗
has the same partner in M and in MH , the algorithm reports failure. Otherwise, we call Algorithm
Breakmarriage with M and r∗. The loop is exited only when the algorithm reports failure or when
the current matching M is feasible. The pseudocode for the algorithm is presented in Figure 5.4 as
Algorithm HRCC.
5.4.3 Correctness
Suppose that no feasible stable matching exists. Then, Algorithm HRCC will clearly correctly
output “no feasible stable matching exists” in one of three places. If, before entering the while
loop, there is a couple with one member assigned and the other unassigned, the algorithm correctly
halts. Otherwise, the algorithm enters the while loop, and since no feasible stable matching exists,
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the algorithm continues to make calls to Algorithm Breakmarriage. This process must eventually
halt, either when nextM (ck) = ∅ for some couple ck, or when the successive calls to Algorithm
Breakmarriage eventually yield MH , at either point Algorithm HRCC will correctly output the
failure message.
So, instead, let us suppose a feasible stable matching Mf does exist. We claim that Algorithm
HRCC maintains the invariant that at each iteration of the while loop the current matching M
dominates Mf . The claim is clearly true when M = MR, by Lemma 5.4.1, so let us assume the
invariant is true at the end of the ith iteration. Let Mi denote the stable matching at the end of
iteration i of the while loop and suppose that Mi is not feasible. Since Mi is not feasible, there is
some assigned couple ck = (rs, rt) that is not assigned a pair from Lck . By Lemma 5.4.6, there is
at least one resident r∗ ∈ {rs, rt} that is not assigned to a hospital in the ordered pair nextMi(ck),
and, further, calling Algorithm Breakmarriage on the current matching Mi and r∗ yields a stable
matching that dominates Mf . Thus the matching Mi+1 obtained by this process dominates Mf ,
and the claim follows.
Thus, at each iteration of the while loop of Algorithm HRCC, the current matching dominates Mf .
Hence, the algorithm eventually terminates having encountered Mf or a different feasible stable
matching that dominates Mf . Let M∗f denote the feasible stable matching that is returned by the
algorithm. Since Mf is an arbitrary feasible stable matching, we have argued that M∗f dominates
every feasible stable matching. Hence, M∗f is resident-optimal amongst the set of feasible stable
matchings.
We summarise this section with the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4.2 Algorithm HRCC finds the resident-optimal feasible stable matching M∗f if one
exists or reports “none exists” in O(m) time, where m is the sum of the lengths of the preference
lists of the input.
Proof We have shown that the algorithm finds the resident-optimal feasible stable matching if it
exists, or reports “none exists” correctly. To establish the claimed running time, we observe that
the algorithm constitutes essentially a “left to right” sweep of the residents’ preference lists. So, by
using appropriate data structures (extending those described in [36, Section 1.2.3] for the Extended
Gale-Shapley algorithm for SMI to the HR case), we can implement this algorithm to run in O(m)
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time. 2
We end this section with the remark that HRCC under classical stability is a variant of HR that
can be solved in polynomial time by a unified approach [19] since this problem exhibits the so-
called independence property (see [19] for the definition of this property and further details). For
completeness and for consistency with the notation and terminology adopted in the remainder of
this chapter, we have chosen to present the main result of this section as a standalone algorithm.
5.5 HRS with hospital preference lists of length ≤ 2
In light of the NP-completeness result for HRS presented in Section 5.3, it is natural to ask if, by
specialising the problem version, we can identify a “boundary” at which HRS becomes polynomial-
time solvable. One option for us to consider is to allow the sizes of the residents to be at most one,
rather than two. This restriction would, of course, yield an instance of the classical Hospitals /
Residents problem, which is polynomial-time solvable. A different option is to further restrict the
lengths of the preference lists for the residents and/or the hospitals. We show that by restricting the
length of the preference list of each hospital to be at most two, rather than three, a stable matching
always exists, and an extension of the Gale-Shapley algorithm finds a stable matching in polynomial
time, even if no restriction is placed on the sizes of the residents, the lengths of the preference lists
of the residents, or the capacities of the hospitals. Since NP-completeness for HRS holds even for
hospital preference lists of length at most three, the results of this section indicate such a boundary
for HRS. We describe the restricted version of HRS in which the lengths of the hospitals’ preference
lists are at most two and the residents’ lists are unbounded as (∞, 2)-HRS.
The procedure for solving (∞, 2)-HRS is as follows. The algorithm can be seen as a sequence of
“proposal” operations from the residents to the hospitals. A resident proposes sequentially to each
hospital on his list until he becomes assigned or his list becomes empty. When a resident ri proposes
to a hospital hj , ri becomes provisionally assigned to hj . If ri is that hospital’s first choice, and
hj’s preference list has another entry, we let rk denote hj’s second choice. If si + sk > cj , the pair
(rk, hj) is deleted, meaning that rk is removed from hj’s preference list, and hj is removed from
rk’s preference list. This is the only time a (resident,hospital) pair is deleted by the algorithm. The
algorithm continues this process until each resident is either assigned a hospital or has an empty
list. The details of the algorithm are shown in Figure 5.5.
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assign all residents to be free
while some resident ri is free and ri has a nonempty list:
hj ← first hospital on ri’s list
if ri is hj’s first choice and hj’s list is of length 2:
rk ← hj’s second choice
if si + sk > cj :
if rk is assigned to hj :
unassign rk
delete (rk, hj)
assign ri to hj
Figure 5.5: Algorithm (∞, 2)-HRS
Let us now establish the correctness and time complexity of the algorithm presented.
Theorem 5.5.1 Algorithm (∞, 2)-HRS finds the resident-optimal stable matching for an instance
of (∞, 2)-HRS in O(m) time, where m is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists.
Proof It is clear that the provisional assignments at the termination of Algorithm (∞, 2)-HRS
form a matching M . We claim that M is stable. To see this, consider an arbitrary resident ri who
is unassigned or prefers a hospital hj to his assignment in M . Then, since ri is not assigned to hj
in M and prefers hj to his current assignment, hj must have been deleted from ri’s preference list.
But this can only happen if ri is hj’s second choice and hj was assigned to its first choice at some
point in the algorithm and does not have enough spare capacity to accommodate ri. But hj’s first
choice can never become unassigned from hj at any subsequent step of the algorithm – so in fact ri
cannot block with hj in M . Since ri was chosen arbitrarily it follows that no resident is part of a
blocking pair in M .
Secondly, we claim that Algorithm (∞, 2)-HRS never deletes a stable pair (i.e., a (resident,hospital)
pair that belongs to some stable matching). For, suppose that (rk, hj) is the first such pair deleted
during an arbitrary execution of the algorithm, and let M ′ be a stable matching containing (rk, hj).
Then rk was deleted because the resident ri preceding rk on hj’s preference list became assigned
to hj and si + sk > cj . Now, since no stable pair has been deleted prior to this point, in M ′, ri is
either assigned to hj or to a hospital lower than hj , or is unassigned. Since ri and rk cannot both
be assigned to hj in M ′, it follows that (ri, hj) blocks M ′, a contradiction.
5.6 Conclusion and open problems 106
Thus we have shown that M is stable and that each resident is assigned to his optimal partner in
M . Let us now show that a O(m) implementation is easily achieved with the use of simple data
structures. If we maintain a stack S of free residents, then each iteration of the loop involves a
subset of the following operations: (i) pop a resident ri off of, S (ii) examining the first entry hj
of ri’s list, (iii) examining the length of hj’s list (it is either one or two), (iv) simple comparisons
and arithmetic, (v) assigning and/or unassigning at most two residents to hj , (vi) deleting the first
entry of a resident’s list, (vii) pushing a resident onto S. If each preference list is stored as a linked
list, each of these operations clearly can be performed in O(1) time, and thus a single iteration of
the loop takes O(1) time. Since each resident proposes to each hospital on his list at most once, the
number of iterations of the loop is O(m), and therefore the running time of the algorithm is O(m).
2
5.6 Conclusion and open problems
Our stability definition for HRS allows a resident ri to displace a group of inferior residents of
a given total size, so long as this frees up enough space for ri. This could, of course, include a
situation whereby a resident of size ten is displaced in order to make way for a resident of size one,
for example. Our definition assumes that the quality of the assignees takes precedence over the
size. However it may be the case that a hospital’s primary concern is to ensure that its occupancy
is as high as possible. Thus it would not participate in a blocking pair if its occupancy were to be
reduced as a result of rejecting the inferior residents and taking on the new resident. This gives rise
to an alternative stability definition which is obtained from the one given for HRS in Section 5.2 by
modifying Condition (2) as follows:
2. OMj + si ≤ cj , or hj prefers ri to residents rk1 , . . . rkt ∈M(hj) such that
si ≥
t∑
p=1
skp and OMj + si −
t∑
p=1
skp ≤ cj .
It remains open to investigate the algorithmic complexity of the problem of finding a matching that
satisfies this new version of stability, for a given HRS instance.
Chapter 6
Three dimensional stable matching
6.1 Introduction
Knuth [69] initiated the study of three dimensional stable matching problems by asking if the stable
marriage problem could be extended to three sets, so that we have not only men and women, but a
third set, which he called dogs. Knuth’s question is (perhaps intentionally) somewhat open-ended.
He did not suggest a new stability criterion or specify what the agent’s preference lists would be
like.
Over the years, a handful of researchers have explored three dimensional stable matching problems,
in an effort to answer Knuth’s question. In Section 2.2.8, we surveyed the relevant literature and
known results regarding three dimensional stable matchings. In this chapter we are particularly
interested in the study of the so-called cyclic three dimensional stable matching problem, in which
men care about only the women, women care about only the dogs, and the dogs care about only the
men. As an open question, Ng and Hirschberg [83] asked for a polynomial-time algorithm to find
stable matchings in this setting (we define cyclic stable matchings and stability formally in Section
6.2). Boros et al [11] showed that if there are at most three agents in each set of men, women and
dogs, then a stable matching always exists. Eriksson et al [26] proved that this also holds if there
are four agents in each set and conjectured that a stable matching exists for every instance of cyclic
3DSM.
In this chapter we continue the study of cyclic three dimensional stable matching problems under
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two natural definitions of stability given by Eriksson et al [26], called weak and strong stability,
respectively. We describe a special instance of the three dimensional stable matching problem with
incomplete lists called the 9-Sun, and show that it is particularly problematic. Specifically, we
show that the 9-Sun admits no weakly stable matching, and use this instance as an instrumental
gadget in showing that weakly stable matchings are NP-hard to find when agents are allowed to
have incomplete lists, and that strongly stable matchings are also NP-hard to find, regardless of the
length of the preference lists (complete or incomplete). For brevity we have chosen to omit the word
‘cyclic’ when referring to the cyclic three dimensional stable matching problem in this chapter.
6.2 Formal definitions
The three-dimensional stable matching problem (3DSM) consists of a set of n men, n women, and
n dogs. Associated with each agent is a preference list which strictly ranks all of the members of
one of the other sets. Specifically, each man has a strict preference list ranking all of the women,
each woman has a strict preference list over all of the dogs, and every dog has a strict preference
list over all of the men. When preference lists are allowed to be incomplete, so that an agent ranks
only a subset of the appropriate set of agents, we obtain an instance of the three-dimensional stable
matching problem with incomplete lists (3DSMI). In keeping with the common terminology of this
thesis, if agent b appears on agent a’s preference list, then a finds b acceptable. Notice that in the
3DSMI setting there is no analogous notion of mutually acceptable pair as there is in the stable
marriage or stable roommates setting. An acceptable triple is a triple (m,w, d) such that m finds
w acceptable, w finds d acceptable, and d finds m acceptable.
A matching M for a 3DSMI instance is a disjoint set of acceptable triples. If a triple (m,w, d) is
in M , then we let M(m) = w, M(w) = d, and M(d) = m. M(a) is undefined for an unmatched
agent a.
There are at least two natural definitions of stability which arise in the context of 3DSMI. A match-
ing M is said to be weakly stable if there is no strongly blocking triple, i.e. an acceptable triple
(m,w, d) /∈M such that (i) m is unmatched or prefers w to M(w), (ii) w is unmatched or prefers
d to M(d), and (iii) d is unmatched or prefers m to M(d). A matching is strongly stable if there
is no weakly blocking triple (m,w, d) /∈M such that (i) m is unmatched, M(m) = w or m strictly
prefers w to M(m) (ii) w is unmatched, M(w) = d, or w strictly prefers d to M(w), and (iii) d
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is unmatched, M(d) = m, or d strictly prefers m to M(d). Note that the definition of a weakly
blocking triple crucially depends on the fact that (m,w, d) /∈M . Hence at least one agent strictly
improves in a weakly blocking triple, while the other two agents are at least as happy. Observe that
every strongly stable matching is also weakly stable, hence if no weakly stable matching exists for
an instance I , then no strongly stable matching can exist for I either.
The underlying directed graph DI = (V,A) of an instance I of 3DSMI consists of a vertex for
each agent of I , and a directed arc (a, b) for each pair of agents (a, b) such that a finds b acceptable.
Clearly, a matching for I corresponds to a disjoint subset of directed 3-cycles in DI . It is sometimes
convenient for us to think of matchings in this graph-theoretic context, so we sometimes refer to a
matching as a set of disjoint cycles (rather than triples). We also occasionally refer to an entry on
a preference list as an edge, or refer to an agent as a vertex. The meaning should always be clear
from the context.
We use the notation La to denote the preference list of an agent a, and Lia to denote the ith entry of
agent a’s preference list.
6.3 The 9-Sun: a problematic subgraph
At the core of all the results in this chapter is a particular 3DSMI instance that admits no weakly
stable matching (and thus no strongly stable matching). The preference lists and underlying directed
graph of this instance are given in Figure 6.1. The thickness of the arcs of the directed graph
illustrate the preference of a given vertex in that thicker arcs represent higher preferences. For
obvious reasons, we refer to this 3DSMI instance as the 9-Sun (denoted S9) . Note that, rather
paradoxically, the 9-Sun has six agents of each kind, hence 18 agents in total.
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m1 : w1w
′
1 w1 : d1d
′
1 d1 : m2m
′
2
m2 : w2w
′
2 w2 : d2d
′
2 d2 : m3m
′
3
m3 : w3w
′
3 w3 : d3d
′
3 d3 : m1m
′
1
m′1 : w3 w
′
1 : d3 d
′
1 : m1
m′2 : w1 w
′
2 : d1 d
′
2 : m2
m′3 : w2 w
′
3 : d2 d
′
3 : m3
w’1
m’1
d’1
m’2m1
w 1
d 1
m2
w 2
d 2
m3
w 3
d 3
w’2
d’2
m’3
w’3
d’3
Figure 6.1: The 9-Sun
We refer to the agents {mi, wi, di : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3} as the inner agents of S9 and the agents {m′i, w′i,
d′i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3} as the outer agents of S9. In what follows we will show that the 9-Sun admits
no weakly stable matching, and, moreover, that the preference lists of the 9-Sun can be completed
to a 3DSM instance which admits no strongly stable matching. These observations are crucially
important in the NP-hardness results of the subsequent sections of this chapter, as 9-Suns play a
vital role in the reductions.
Lemma 6.3.1 The 9-Sun admits no weakly stable matching.
Proof By inspection of the underlying graph of the 9-Sun, we can observe that the only acceptable
triples are of the form (mi, w′i, di−1), (mi, wi, d′i) and (m′i, wi−1, di−1), so that any acceptable
triple contains exactly two inner agents. In any matching M , at least one inner agent is unmatched.
By the symmetry of the instance we may suppose, without loss of generality, that this unmatched
inner agent is m1. Then, the triple (m1, w′1, d3) is a blocking triple for M . 2
For an inner agent ai, we let S9 \ ai denote the 3DSMI instance obtained by removing ai (and
all incident edges). In the following lemma, we show that the instance obtained by removing an
arbitrary inner agent from the 9-Sun does, in fact, admit a (unique) weakly stable matching.
Lemma 6.3.2 Let ai be an inner agent of the 9-Sun. Then, the instance obtained by removing ai
(S9 \ ai) admits a unique weakly stable matching Mu. Moreover, Mu is strongly stable.
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Proof Suppose without loss of generality that the inner agent m1 is removed. Then, Mu = {(m′2,
w1, d1), (m2, w2, d
′
2), (m3, w
′
3, d2), (m
′
1, w3, d3)} is a weakly stable matching. To see that
Mu is the unique weakly stable matching, notice that the triple (m′1, w3, d3) must be in any stable
matching M ′, otherwise d3 andm′1 are unmatched, and form a blocking triple withw3. This implies
that the triple (m3, w′3, d2) must be in M ′ as well, for otherwise m3 and w′3 are unmatched, and will
form a blocking triple with d2. This argument continues in such a way that M ′ must necessarily
contain (m2, w2, d′2) and (m′2, w1, d1). Hence M ′ = Mu.
Verifying that Mu is also strongly stable is a trivial task achieved by inspecting the preference lists.
2
For a given agent ai in the 9-Sun, we denote the unique weakly stable matching made possible by
removing ai by MS9\ai .
Corollary 6.3.1 MS9\ai is the only weakly or strongly stable matching for S9 \ ai.
We next show that by completing the preference lists of the 9-Sun in an arbitrary way (so that
each man ranks every woman, every woman ranks every dog, etc), the resulting instance of 3DSM,
denoted by S9, does not admit any strongly stable matching. For ease of exposition, we call the
triples of S9 original triples.
Lemma 6.3.3 The instance S9 of cyclic 3DSM admits no strongly stable matching.
Proof Suppose, for a contradiction, that M is a strongly stable matching. As the nine inner agents
form a 9-cycle in the underlying directed graph, the nine original triples have a natural cyclic order.
We show that if an arbitrary original triple, say (m1, w1, d′1), is not in M , then the “successor”
original triple (m′2, w1, d1) must be in M , which would imply a contradiction given that the number
of these original triples is odd. To this end, suppose without loss of generality that (m1, w1, d′1) /∈
M . Then, M(w1) = d1, for otherwise (m1, w1, d′1) would be weakly blocking. Similarly, (m′2, w1,
d1) /∈M implies M(d1) =m2. But this means that (m2, w1, d1) ∈M , so (m2, w′2, d1) is weakly
blocking. 2
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Let S9 \ai denote the instance created by removing an inner agent ai from S9. Consider the unique
strongly stable matching MS9\ai for S9 \ ai. The next fact we wish to establish is that MS9\ai is in
fact the only strongly stable matching for S9 \ ai.
Lemma 6.3.4 Let M be a matching for S9 \ ai such that M 6= MS9\ai . Then, M is not strongly
stable.
Proof Suppose that M is a matching of S9 \ ai. As in the proof of Lemma 6.3.3, we use the fact
that if an arbitrary original triple is not in M , then the successor original triple is either in M , or is
weakly blocking. Therefore, if we do not include four of the seven original triples of S9 \ ai in a
matching then one of them would be weakly blocking. There is only one way to select four of the
seven original triples of S9 \ ai, hence the lemma. 2
6.4 NP-completeness of 3DSMI under weak-stability
6.4.1 The reduction
This section describes the polynomial-time reduction that establishes NP-completeness for the prob-
lem of deciding whether a weakly stable matching exists for an arbitrary 3DSMI instance. The
reduction is from a restricted variant of MAX-SMTI (see Section 2.2.5 and Chapter 3 for back-
ground and definitions) called (3, 3)-COM-SMTI. We used this same starting point for a reduction
presented in Section 5.3. To make this chapter self-contained, define (3, 3)-COM-SMTI to be the
problem of deciding whether a complete stable matching exists (i.e., a stable matching that matches
every agent), given an instance of SMTI in which each preference list is of length at most three,
every woman’s preference list is strictly ordered, and each man’s preference list is either strictly
ordered or is a tie of length two (all of these conditions holding simultaneously). In the Appendix
we prove that (3, 3)-COM-SMTI is NP-complete. Of course, this hardness result holds if the roles
of the men and women are reversed, which, for convenience, we assume in the following reduction.
The remainder of this section is devoted to describing a polynomial-time reduction from (3, 3)-
COM-SMTI to cyclic 3DSMI.
Given an arbitrary (3, 3)-COM-SMTI instance I , the underlying graph G = (A ∪ B,E) of I
consists of the set A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} of men ai, all of whom have strictly ordered preference
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lists, and the set B of women which is partitioned into two sets B1 ∪B2 = {b1,. . ., bn1 } ∪ {bT1 ,. . .,
bTn2} where n1 + n2 = n. Each woman bj ∈ B1 has a strictly ordered preference list, and each
woman bTj ∈ B2 has a preference list consisting solely of a tie of length two. We denote a woman
who may be a member of either B1 or B2 by b(T )i .
Let I be an instance of (3, 3)-COM-SMTI with the underlying graphG= (A∪B,E). We construct
an instance I ′ of cyclic 3DSMI which initially consists of the sets Q, R, and S of men, women, and
dogs, respectively, as follows.
Step 1: the proper part
The sets of men and women of I ′ we create in this step are in direct correspondence to the men and
women in I . The dogs of I ′ are created to capture the preference lists of the women of I .
Create men Q = {m1,. . . , mn} and women R = W1 ∪ W2 = {w1,. . . , wn1} ∪ {wT1 ,. . . , wTn2}.
The set of dogs of I ′ consists of two parts S1 ∪ S2 = S, defined by creating a dog dj,i in S1 for
each i such that ai ∈ Lbj (1 ≤ j ≤ n1), and creating dogs dTj (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) in S2.
Recall that Lia denotes the ith entry on agent a’s preference list. A tie in the preference list of an
agent (in the given instance I) is indicated by parentheses. The (strictly ordered) preference lists of
the agents in Q, R, and S are constructed by the following cases:
1. If Llai = b
(T )
j then let Llmi = w
(T )
j (1 ≤ l ≤ r, where r is the length of ai’s list).
2. If Llbj = ai then let Llwj = dj,i and Ldj,i =mi (1 ≤ l ≤ r, where r is the length of bj’s list).
3. If LbTj = (ap, aq) then let LwTj = d
T
j and LdTj =mp mq (in arbitrary order).
The collection of agents and preferences created in this step of the reduction is the proper part of
the instance.
Step 2: the additional part (add 9-Suns)
We construct the additional part of I ′ by creating n (|Q|) copies of S9. The tth copy of S9 (denoted
St9 consists of the inner agents {mti , wti , dti : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3} and outer agents {m′ti , w′ti , d′ti : 1 ≤
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i ≤ 3} with preference lists as described in Figure 6.1. We add these n copies of S9 to I ′ in the
following way. Replace the inner agent mt1 in St9 with man mt ∈ Q by replacing each occurrence
of mt1 in the preference lists of each agent in St9 with mt. Also, let mt1’s acceptable partners in
St9, namely wt1 and w′t1 be appended in this order to the end of mt’s list. The final preference list
of man mt along with St9 is shown below. The portion of mt’s preference list consisting of women
from the proper part of the instance is denoted by Pt.
mt : Pt wt1 w
′
t1
mt2 : wt2 w
′
t2
mt3 : wt3 w
′
t3
m′t1 : wt3
m′t2 : wt1
m′t3 : wt2
wt1 : dt1 d
′
t1
wt2 : dt2 d
′
t2
wt3 : dt3 d
′
t3
w′t1 : dt3
w′t2 : dt1
w′t3 : dt2
dt1 : mt2 m
′
t2
dt2 : mt3 m
′
t3
dt3 : mt m
′
t1
d′t1 : mt
d′t2 : mt2
d′t3 : mt3
This ends the reduction, which can be computed in polynomial time. Now, we prove that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the complete stable matchings in I and the stable matchings in
I ′.
First we show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the matchings of I and the match-
ings in the proper part of I ′. This comes from the natural one-to-one correspondence between the
edges of I and the triples in the proper part of I ′. More precisely, if M is a matching in I , then
a corresponding matching Mp in the proper part of I is created as follows: (ai, bj) ∈ M ⇐⇒
(mi, wj , dj,i) ∈Mp and (ai, bTj ) ∈M ⇐⇒ (mi, wTj , dTj ) ∈Mp. Next, we show that stability is
preserved by this correspondence.
Lemma 6.4.1 A matching M of I is weakly stable if and only if the corresponding matching Mp
in the proper part of I ′ is weakly stable.
Proof It is enough to show that an edge (ai, bj) is blocking in I if and only if the corresponding
triple (mi, wj , dj,i) is also (strongly) blocking in I ′; and similarly, an edge (ai, bTj ) is blocking in I
if and only if the corresponding triple (mi, wTj , dTj ) is also blocking in I ′.
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Suppose first that (ai, bj) is blocking in I , which means that ai is either unmatched or prefers bj
to M(ai) and bj is either unmatched or prefers ai to M(bj). This implies that mi prefers wj to
Mp(mi), wj prefers dj,i to M(wj), and dj,i is unmatched in Mp, i.e. (mi, wj , dj,i) is blocking in
I ′. Similarly, if (ai, bTj ) is blocking then ai is either unmatched or prefers bTj to M(ai) and bTj is
unmatched in M . This implies that mi prefers wTj to Mp(mi), wTj and dTj are both unmatched in
Mp, and hence (mi, wTj , dTj ) is blocking in I ′.
In the other direction, if (mi, wj , dj,i) is blocking in I ′, then mi prefers wj to Mp(mi), wj prefers
dj,i to Mp(wj), and dj,i is unmatched in Mp. This implies that ai is either unmatched or prefers bj
to M(ai) and bj is either unmatched or prefers ai to M(bj), so (ai, bj) is blocking in I . Similarly,
if (mi, wTj , dTj ) is blocking in I ′, then wTj and dTj are both unmatched in Mp and mi prefers wTj to
Mp(mi). This implies that ai is either unmatched or prefers bTj to M(ai) and bTj is unmatched in
M , so (ai, b
T
j ) is blocking in I . 2
Furthermore, if the matching M is complete, then we can enlarge the corresponding matching to the
additional part of I ′ by matching every St9\mt in the unique stable way. So by adding this matching
MSt9\mt to Mp for every t, this leads to the one-to-one correspondence between the complete stable
matchings of I and the stable matching of I ′.
Lemma 6.4.2 The instance I admits a complete stable matching M if and only if the reduced
instance I ′ admits a stable matching Mp, where Mp is the corresponding matching of M .
Proof The stability of M implies that Mp is stable in the proper part of I ′ by Lemma 6.4.1. The
completeness of M and Lemma 6.3.2 implies that Mp is also stable in the additional part of I ′.
In the other direction, if Mp is stable then every man in Mp must be matched in a proper triple. For,
if a proper man mt does not have a proper partner in M then St9 would contain a blocking triple,
by Lemma 6.3.1. This implies that the corresponding matching M , defined in Lemma 6.4.1, is
complete. The stability of M is a consequence of Lemma 6.4.1. Finally, we note that the additional
part has a unique stable matching, since every St9 \ at must be matched in the unique stable way
indicated by Lemma 6.3.2, which implies the one-to-one correspondence. 2
The following theorem is a direct consequence of Lemma 6.4.2, and by observing that no agent’s
preference list in I ′ exceeds the length of five.
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Theorem 6.4.1 Determining the existence of a stable matching in a given instance of cyclic 3DSMI
is NP-complete, even if the preference list of each agent is of length at most five.
6.5 NP-completeness of 3DSM under strong stability
In this section we prove that 3DSM is NP-hard under strong stability. As in Section 6.4, our 9-Sun
gadgets play an instrumental role. The reduction in this section is somewhat more complex than the
other reductions in this thesis. We have therefore provided an example in Section 6.7 to illustrate
some of the more involved steps of the transformation.
6.5.1 The reduction
The reduction we describe in this section again begins with an instance of (3, 3)-COM-SMTI, only
this time we assume that ties are allowed on the men’s, rather than the women’s preference lists.
To be precise, we assume the underlying graph of a (3, 3)-COM-SMTI instance I to have a vertex
set ((A1 ∪ A2) ∪ B) that consists of a set A1 = {a1, a2,. . ., an1} of men with strictly ordered
preference lists, and a set with A2 = {aT1 , aT2 ,. . ., aTn2} of men with preference lists consisting of
a single tie of length two, and n1 + n2 = n. We let A = A1 ∪ A2. The set B = {b1, b2, . . ., bn}
consists entirely of women with strictly ordered preference lists. As previously stated, all agents of
I have a preference list of length at most three.
Given an instance I of (3, 3)-COM-SMTI as defined above, we create an instance I ′ of 3DSM as
follows.
Step 1: the proper instance
The proper instance Ip of cyclic 3DSMI is a subinstance of I ′ with agents Qp, Rp, and Sp of men,
women, and dogs, respectively, with each set being of size n.
The preference list of woman wj ∈ Rp is the single entry dj ∈ Sp. The preference list of dj ∈ Sp
is such that if Llbj = ai, then Lldj = mi. Otherwise, if Llbj = aTi , then Lldj = m′i,j for 1 ≤ l ≤ r,
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where r is the length of bj’s list. So the preference list of dog dj is essentially the “same” as that of
woman bj , only with men in Qp rather than A.
The preference list of a man mi ∈Qp created in correspondence to man ai ∈A1 is given as follows.
If Llai = bj , then Llmi = wj for 1 ≤ l ≤ r, where r is the length of ai’s list. So the preference list of
man mi is essentially the “same” as that of man ai. For each man mi created in correspondence to
man aTi ∈ A2, with a preference list consisting of a single tie of length two, say (br, bs), we create
five men mTi , m′i,r, m′′i,r, m′i,s, m′′i,s, four women w′i,r, w′′i,r, w′i,s, w′′i,s and four dogs d′i,r, d′′i,r, d′i,s,
d′′i,s. The preference list of mTi contains w′i,r and w′i,s in an arbitrary order, and the other preference
lists are as shown below.
m′i,r : w
′
i,r wr
m′′i,r : w
′′
i,r
m′i,s : w
′
i,s ws
m′′i,s : w
′′
i,s
w′i,r : d
′
i,r d
′′
i,r
w′′i,r : d
′′
i,r d
′
i,r
w′i,s : d
′
i,s d
′′
i,s
w′′i,s : d
′′
i,s d
′
i,s
d′i,r : m
′′
i,r m
T
i
d′′i,r : m
′
i,r m
′′
i,r
d′i,s : m
′′
i,s m
T
i
d′′i,s : m
′
i,s m
′′
i,s
These agents are added to the sets Qp, Rp and Sp, respectively. Note that in Ip, every set of agents
has the same cardinality: np = |Qp|= |Rp|= |Sp|= n + 4n2. The notions of proper agent, proper
partner and proper triple are defined in the obvious way, i.e., they all belong to the proper instance.
Step 2: the additional part (add 9-Suns)
The additional part of I ′ is the disjoint union of 3np copies of S9, such that the ith copy of S9,
denoted Si9, incorporates the ith agent of Ip, as described in Step 2 of the previous reduction for
the proof of Theorem 6.4.1 (we omit the full description of this process again). The new agents are
referred to as additional agents.
Let Ms = ∪i∈{1,...,3np} MSi9\ai be the unique strongly stable matching of the additional part, as
described in Section 6.3 and Lemma 6.3.2, where ai is the proper agent of Si9. We sometimes call
Ms the additional matching.
We call C = ∪i∈{1,...,3np} CSi9\ai the set of covered additional agents, as these additional agents
are covered by Ms, and we call U = ∪i∈{1,...,3np} USi9\ai the set of uncovered additional agents, as
these additional agents are not covered by Ms.
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Step 3: pad the instance
Note that U has equal numbers of men, women and dogs. The fitting part of I ′ is constructed on
U by creating disjoint triples that cover U . This is done in such a way that every agent has exactly
one agent in his/her/its list, i.e. the fitting part is a complete matching of U , denoted by Mf . There
is a certain amount of nondeterminism in this step, as there are a number of ways this step can be
accomplished.
Finally, the dummy part is obtained by an arbitrary extension of the preference lists to ensure that
all preference lists are complete. Note that this does not involve adding any additional agents. By
putting together the three subinstances – the proper, additional, and fitting parts – we have con-
structed the complete instance I ′. The preferences of the agents over partners in different parts
respect the order in which we defined these parts: the list of a proper agent contains the proper
partners first, then the additional partners, and finally the dummy partners; the list of a covered
additional agent contains the additional partners first, then the dummy partners; the list of an un-
covered additional agent contains the additional partners first, then the fitting partner, and finally
the dummy partners.
Thus we have reduced an instance I of (3, 3)-COM-SMTI to an instance I ′ of 3DSM in polynomial
time.
We show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the complete stable matchings of I and
the complete strongly stable matchings of Ip. The stability is preserved via the following one-to-one
correspondence between the complete matchings of I and complete matchings of I ′:
(ai, bj) ∈M ⇐⇒ (mi, wj , dj) ∈Mp
(aTi , bs) ∈M ⇐⇒ (mTi , w′i,s, d′i,s), (m′′i,s, w′′i,s, d′′i,s), (m′i,s, ws, ds) ∈Mp
(aTi , bs) /∈M ⇐⇒ (m′i,s, w′i,s, d′′i,s), (m′′i,s, w′′i,s, d′i,s) ∈Mp
Lemma 6.5.1 A complete matching M of I is stable if and only if the corresponding complete
matching Mp of Ip is strongly stable.
Proof As a man aTi cannot belong to a blocking pair in I , it may be verified that his corresponding
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copy mTi cannot belong to a weakly blocking triple in Ip either. Therefore, it is enough to show that
a pair (ai, bj) is blocking for M if and only if the corresponding triple (mi, wj , dj) is blocking for
Mp. But this is obvious, because the preference lists of ai and mi are essentially the same, and the
preference lists of bj and dj are also essentially the same. 2
Now, given a matching M of I let us create the corresponding matching M of I ′ by adding Ms and
Mf to Mp, so M =Mp ∪Ms ∪Mf .
Lemma 6.5.2 The instance I admits a complete stable matching M if and only if the reduced
instance I ′ admits a strongly stable matching M ′, where M ′ is the corresponding matching of M .
Proof Suppose that we have a complete stable matching M of I , and M ′ is the corresponding
matching in I ′. Lemma 6.5.1 implies that every proper agent has a proper partner in M ′ and no
proper triple is weakly blocking. Therefore, no proper agent can be involved in any weakly blocking
triple either. Recall that Ms is the union of the unique strongly stable matchings of the suitable part.
By construction of Ms, every covered additional agent has an additional partner in M ′ and by
Lemma 6.3.4, no additional triple is weakly blocking. Therefore, no such agent can be part of
any weakly blocking triple. Finally, every uncovered additional agent has a fitting partner in M ′,
so these agents cannot form a weakly blocking triple either, since an uncovered additional agent
prefers only additional partners to fitting partners, which cannot be involved in a weakly blocking
triple. Hence M ′ is strongly stable.
In the other direction, suppose that M ′ is a strongly stable matching of I ′. Every proper agent must
have a proper partner, since otherwise if at had no proper partner in M ′, then St9 would contain
an additional weakly blocking triple, by Lemma 6.3.3. So the corresponding matching M in I is
complete. The stability of M is a consequence of Lemma 6.5.1. Finally, we note that the additional
agents must be matched in the unique strongly stable way in M ′, namely, the covered additional
agents must be covered by matching Ms, by Lemma 6.3.4, and the uncovered additional agents
must be covered by Mf (recall this is the matching created during the fitting part), since otherwise
a fitting triple would weakly block M ′. Therefore, we have a one-to-one correspondence as was
claimed. 2
Theorem 6.5.1 Determining the existence of a strongly stable matching in a given instance of
3DSM is NP-complete.
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6.6 Conclusion and open questions
The 9-Sun described in Section 6.3 is the smallest example that we can find of a 3DSMI instance
with no weakly stable matching. Is there a smaller example? In the case of strong stability, one can
construct smaller examples (with n = 4) that admit no strongly stable matching. However, we have
not found a use for such instances as gadgets for NP-hardness proofs.
It is an intriguing question to determine if there exists an instance of 3DSM that admits no weakly
stable matching. A natural place to start would be to try to complete the preference lists of the
9-Sun in a way that does not introduce a weakly stable matching. However, we conjecture that this
is not possible. A larger question is whether there is a polynomial-time algorithm to find a weakly
stable matching or report that none exists, given an instance of 3DSM.
It is very uncommon to find a matching problem with preferences for which there is no clear way to
extend a hardness result to complete preference lists (in fact, we know of no other such problem).
Could it really be the case that when one attempts to complete the preference lists of a 3DSMI
instance, one cannot avoid introducing a weakly stable matching?
6.7 Example
We consider an example reduction from a simple (3, 3)-COM-SMTI instance I with five men {a1,
a2, a3, a4, a5} and five women {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5}. The instance is given in Figure 6.2. The men
a4 and a5 have preference lists consisting of a single tie of size two, and all the other agents of the
instance have strictly ordered preference lists. This instance is a “yes” instance, for M = {(a1, b1),
(a2, b2), (a3, b5), (a4, b4), (a5, b3)} is a complete stable matching for I .
Even for this small instance, the derived instance I ′ has a total of 663 agents (221 of each set), and
the sum of the lengths of the preference lists of I ′ exceeds 100,000. Ideally, we would present all
the details, but constructing a complete example seems a bit daunting. We will instead illustrate the
second step of the reduction, which involves creating a large number of agents, from the perspective
of just a single agent. For the first step, however, we give a complete construction.
The result of Step 1 of the reduction is given in Figure 6.3. Each man ai with a strictly ordered
preference list has been transformed into a man mi, whereas a man aj whose preference list is a
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a1 : b1
a2 : b2 b1 b4
a3 : b5 b1
a4 : (b4 b5)
a5 : (b3 b4)
b1 : a2 a3 a1
b2 : a5 a2
b3 : a5
b4 : a4 a5 a2
b5 : a4 a3
Figure 6.2: The given instance I of (3, 3)-COM-SMTI
m1 : w1
m2 : w2 w1 w4
m3 : w5 w1
mT4 : w
′
4,4 w
′
4,5
mT5 : w
′
5,3 w
′
5,4
w1 : d1
w2 : d2
w3 : d3
w4 : d4
w5 : d5
d1 : m2 m3 m1
d2 : m5 m2
d3 : m5
d4 : m4 m5 m2
d5 : m4 m3
m′4,4 : w
′
4,4 w4
m′′4,4 : w
′′
4,4
m′4,5 : w
′
4,5 w5
m′′4,5 : w
′′
4,5
w′4,4 : d
′
4,4 d
′′
4,4
w′′4,4 : d
′′
4,4 d
′
4,4
w′4,5 : d
′
4,5 d
′′
4,5
w′′4,5 : d
′′
4,5 d
′
4,5
d′4,4 : m
′′
4,4 m
T
4
d′′4,4 : m
′
4,4 m
′′
4,4
d′4,5 : m
′′
4,5 m
T
4
d′′4,5 : m
′
4,5 m
′′
4,5
m′5,3 : w
′
5,3 w3
m′′5,3 : w
′′
5,3
m′5,4 : w
′
5,4 w4
m′′5,4 : w
′′
5,4
w′5,3 : d
′
5,3 d
′′
5,3
w′′5,3 : d
′′
5,3 d
′
5,3
w′5,4 : d
′
5,4 d
′′
5,4
w′′5,4 : d
′′
5,4 d
′
5,4
d′5,3 : m
′′
5,3 m
T
5
d′′5,3 : m
′
5,3 m
′′
5,3
d′5,4 : m
′′
5,4 m
T
5
d′′5,4 : m
′
5,4 m
′′
5,4
Figure 6.3: The proper instance of I ′ resulting from Step 1 of the reduction
tie has been transformed into a man mTj . Each dog di of the proper instance has been created in
correspondence to the woman bi, and the women of the proper instance are created with a preference
list containing a single dog. The block of agents beginning withm′4,4 was created in correspondence
to a4, and the block of agents beginning with m′5,3 was created from a5.
The numbers of agents created in Step 2, in which we add 9-Suns, is quite large. We illustrate this
step on a single agent, man m3, chosen arbitrarily. Recall that the preference list of m3 after the
end of Step 1 consists of the woman w5 followed by w1.
m3 : w5 w1 w31 w
′
31
m32 : w32 w
′
32
m33 : w33 w
′
33
m′31 : w33
m′32 : w31
m′33 : w32
w31 : d31 d
′
31
w32 : d32 d
′
32
w33 : d33 d
′
33
w′31 : d33
w′32 : d31
w′33 : d32
d31 : m32 m
′
32
d32 : m33 m
′
33
d33 : mt m
′
31
d′31 : m3
d′32 : m32
d′33 : m33
Figure 6.4: Step 2 illustrated on man m3.
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We now illustrate the notion of the covered and uncovered agents, as described in Step 2 in Section
6.5.1. If we consider man m3 to be the “third” agent of I ′, then this 9-Sun is the third copy of S9 to
be added to I ′, and is therefore denoted S39 . The covered agents CS39\m3 are denoted by underlining
in Figure 6.4. The uncovered agents US39\m3 are those in the set {m′33 , w′31 , w′32 , d′31 , d′33}.
Notice that this particular set of uncovered agents consists of one man, two women, and two dogs.
When we apply this process to, say, w1 and d1, where w1 and d1 are the sixth and eleventh agents of
the proper instance, respectively, we would add the sixth and eleventh copies of the 9-Sun, denoted
S69 and S119 , respectively, to I ′. The uncovered agents US69\w1 consist of one woman, two men, and
two dogs. The uncovered agents US119 \d1 consist of one dog, two men, and two women. Thus it is
easy to see that the numbers of men, women, and dogs of the uncovered agents are equal.
In Step 3, when the fitting part is constructed, we could, for example, create three arbitrary triples
from the sets US39\m3 , US69\w1 , and US119 \d1 , as these sets contain a total of six men, six women, and
six dogs. Clearly there are a number of ways in which this can be accomplished. Any of these ways
will do.
Finally, in Step 4, the dummy part completes the preference lists of the existing agents by arbitrarily
completing each agent’s preference list in any way that adheres to the rule that the list of a proper
agent contains the proper partners first, then the additional partners, and finally everyone else; the
list of a covered additional agent contains the additional partners first, then everyone else; and the
list of an uncovered additional agent contains the additional partners first, then the unique fitting
partner, then everyone else.
We illustrate this process on the proper agent m3, the covered additional agent m32 , and the uncov-
ered additional agent m′33 in Figure 6.5. Notice the woman w
∗ in the list of m′33 – this is the fitting
partner found in Step 3.
m3 : w5 w1 w31 w
′
31 . . . other proper women . . . other women in S
3
9 . . . all others . . .
m32 : w32 w
′
32 . . . other women in S
3
9 . . . all others . . .
m′33 : w32 w
∗
. . . other women in S39 . . . all others . . .
Figure 6.5: The completion of the preference lists in Step 4
Chapter 7
Popular matchings: structure and
algorithms
7.1 Introduction
We consider the popular matching problem (POP-M) in the setting of the post allocation problem
(PA). All the relevant concepts and terminology for PA and POP-M were introduced in Section
2.3.3. Our goal in this chapter is to characterize the structure of the set of popular matchings for
an instance of POP-M. This characterization is in terms of a novel data structure which we call a
switching graph. We will show that this structure can be exploited to enable the design of efficient
algorithms for a range of extensions of the basic popular matching problem, such as counting and
enumerating popular matchings, generating a popular matching uniformly at random, and finding
popular matchings that satisfy various additional optimality criteria. In particular, we improve on
the algorithm of Kavitha and Nasre [60] by showing how minimum-cost popular matchings can be
found in O(n +m) time, and rank-maximal and generous popular matchings in O(n log n + m)
time (these terms are defined in Section 7.3.5).
7.1.1 Preliminaries
For convenience, a unique last-resort post, denoted by l(a), is created for each applicant a, and
placed last on a’s preference list. As a consequence, in any popular matching, every applicant is
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matched, although some may be matched to their last-resort post. Note that this technique was also
used by Abraham et al [5]. Let f(a) denote the first-ranked post on a’s preference list; any post that
is ranked first by at least one applicant is called an f -post. Let s(a) denote the first non-f -post on
a’s preference list. (Note that s(a) must exist, for l(a) is always a candidate for s(a)). Any such
post is called an s-post. By definition, the sets of f -posts and s-posts are disjoint.
The following fundamental result, proved in [5], completely characterizes popular matchings, and
is key in establishing the structural results that follow.
Theorem 7.1.1 (Abraham et al [5]) A matching M for an instance of POP-M is popular if and
only if (i) every f -post is matched in M , and (ii) for each applicant a, M(a) ∈ {f(a), s(a)}.
In light of Theorem 7.1.1, given a POP-M instance I we define the reduced instance of I to be the
instance obtained by removing from each applicant a’s preference list every post except f(a) and
s(a). It is immediate that the reduced instance of I can be derived from I in O(n +m) time, i.e.,
in time that is linear in the size of the input. Henceforth, unless explicitly stated, it is assumed that
a given instance of POP-M is a reduced instance. For a (reduced) instance I of POP-M, let M be a
popular matching, and let a be an applicant. Denote by OM (a) the post on a’s (reduced) preference
list to which a is not assigned in M . Note that since I is a reduced instance, OM (a) is well defined.
So, if a is matched to f(a) in M , then OM (a) = s(a), whereas if a is matched to s(a) in M , then
OM (a) = f(a).
Throughout this chapter, we refer to a working example found in Section 7.5, which illustrates
many of the important concepts surrounding popular matchings and their structure.
Example As an illustration of the reduced instance of a POP-M instance, consider the full POP-M
instance I of Figure 7.2 in Section 7.5 with applicants a1 . . . a16 and posts p1 . . . p18. The reduced
instance of I is shown in Figure 7.3. It may be inferred that the matching shown in Figure 7.3
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7.1.1, and is thus a popular matching for this instance.
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7.2 The structure of popular matchings – the switching graph
The key concept that underlies the characterization of the structure of popular matchings is the
switching graph, a directed graph which captures all the ways in which applicants may form differ-
ent popular matchings by switching between the two posts on their reduced preference lists. Given a
popular matching M for an instance I of POP-M, the switching graph GM of M is a directed graph
with a vertex for each post, and a directed edge (pi, pj) for each applicant a, where pi = M(a)
and pj = OM (a). A vertex v is called an f-post vertex (respectively s-post vertex) if the post it
represents is an f -post (respectively s-post). Each vertex (respectively edge) is labelled with the
post (respectively applicant) that it represents. In fact, we refer to posts and vertices of GM in-
terchangeably, and likewise to applicants and edges of GM . A component of GM is any maximal
weakly connected subgraph of GM . An applicant (respectively post) is said to be in a component,
or path, or cycle of GM if the edge (respectively vertex) representing it is in that component, path
or cycle.
A very similar graph was defined by Mahdian [Lemma 2][71]. However, Mahdian used this struc-
ture solely to investigate the existence of popular matchings in random instances of POP-M.
Some simple properties of switching graphs are spelled out in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2.1 Let M be a popular matching for an instance I of POP-M, and let GM be the
switching graph of M . Then
(i) Each vertex in GM has outdegree at most 1.
(ii) The sink vertices of GM are those vertices corresponding to posts that are unmatched in M ,
and are all s-post vertices.
(iii) Each component of GM contains either a single sink vertex or a single cycle.
Proof (i) A vertex v in GM has an outgoing edge for each applicant who is matched in M to the
post represented by v, and there can be at most one such applicant because M is a matching.
(ii) A vertex has no outgoing edge if and only if it represents an unmatched post, and by Theorem
7.1.1 (i) any such post is an s-post.
(iii) This is an easy consequence of (i). 2
Every component of the switching graph is therefore either a tree or a “tree plus one edge”, and
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is called a tree component or a cycle component according as it contains a sink or a cycle. Each
cycle in GM is called a switching cycle, and must have even length, as the posts of such a cycle are
alternately f - and s-posts. If T is a tree component in GM with sink p, and if q is another s-post
vertex in T , the (unique) path from q to p is called a switching path. So each cycle component of
GM has a unique switching cycle, but each tree component may have zero or more switching paths;
to be precise it has one switching path for each s-post vertex that it contains, other than the sink
vertex. It is immediate that the cycle components and tree components of GM can be identified, say
using depth-first search, in linear time.
Example Figure 7.4 of Section 7.5 provides an illustrative example of the switching graph of a
popular matching M in the POP-M instance described in Figures 7.2 and 7.3. The switching graph
of this instance contains one cycle component and two tree components.
Let C be a switching cycle of GM . To apply C to M is to assign each applicant a in C to OM (a),
while leaving all other applicants assigned as in M . We denote by M ·C the matching obtained by
applying the switching cycle C to M .
Similarly, let P be a switching path of GM . To apply P to M is to assign each applicant a in P
to OM (a), while leaving all other applicants assigned as in M . We denote by M · P the matching
obtained by applying the switching path P to M . Note that, if p is the sink vertex in GM and the
path P begins at vertex q, then in M ·P , the post p is matched but the post q is unmatched (whereas
in M , q is matched and p is unmatched). In general, if we apply a switching cycle or switching
path that contains the edge representing applicant a, and this edge connects post q to post p, then
applicant a is switched from post q to post p as a result.
Note that the switching graph is uniquely determined by a particular popular matching M , but
different popular matchings for the same instance yield different switching graphs. However, all
switching graphs for an instance of POP-M have the same number of vertices (one for each post),
and the same number of edges (one for each applicant).
The significance of switching paths and switching cycles begins to emerge in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2.1 Let M be a popular matching for an instance I of POP-M, and let GM be the
switching graph of M .
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(i) If C is a switching cycle in GM then M · C is a popular matching for I .
(ii) If P is a switching path in GM then M · P is a popular matching for I .
Proof (i) Let M ′ = M · C . By Theorem 7.1.1, it is sufficient to argue that (a) every f -post is
matched in M ′ and (b) for each applicant a, M ′(a) ∈ {f(a), s(a)}. It is clear, from the cyclic
nature of the reassignments that take place on applying C , that each post that is matched in M
is also matched in M ′. Hence all f -posts are matched in M ′, and condition (a) is established.
Furthermore, each applicant ai /∈ C is assigned to the same post in M ′ as in M , and each applicant
ai ∈ C is assigned to OM (ai) in M ′, which is clearly either f(ai) or s(ai), establishing (b).
(ii) Condition (b) follows by a similar argument to that of (i), since every applicant a is still assigned
to either f(a) or s(a) in M · P . Also, the only post that is “vacated” by applying P is the s-post
corresponding to the initial vertex of P . Each f -post in P is filled by a different applicant, and all
f -posts not in P are filled by the same applicant as in M , so that condition (a) is satisfied. 2
Theorem 7.2.1 shows that, given a popular matching M for an instance I of POP-M, and the switch-
ing graph of M , we can potentially find other popular matchings. Our next step is to establish that
this is essentially the only way to find other popular matchings. More precisely, we show that if M ′
is an arbitrary popular matching for I , then M ′ can be obtained from M by applying a sequence of
switching cycles and switching paths, at most one per component of GM . First we state a simple
technical lemma, the proof of which is an easy consequence of the definition of the switching graph.
Lemma 7.2.2 Let M be a popular matching for an instance I of POP-M, let GM be the switching
graph of M , and let M ′ be an arbitrary popular matching for I . If the edge representing applicant
a in GM connects the vertex p to the vertex q, then
(i) a is assigned to p in M ;
(ii) if M ′(a) 6=M(a) then a is assigned to q in M ′.
Lemmas 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 deal with switching cycles and switching paths respectively.
Lemma 7.2.3 Let M be a popular matching for an instance I of POP-M, let T be a cycle compo-
nent with cycle C in the switching graph GM of M , and let M ′ be an arbitrary popular matching
for I .
(i) Either every applicant a in C has M ′(a) = M(a), or every such applicant a has M ′(a) =
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OM (a).
(ii) Every applicant a in T that is not in C has M ′(a) =M(a).
Proof (i) Let ai0 , . . . , air−1 be the sequence of applicants in C , and suppose that M ′(aij ) 6=
M(aij ) for some aij in C . Then, by Lemma 7.2.2, aij must be assigned in M ′ to OM (aij ) =
M(aij+1) (where j + 1 is taken mod r). It follows that aij+1 must also be assigned to a different
post in M ′ as compared to M , and that this post must be OM (aij+1) = M(aij+2) (where j + 2 is
taken mod r). Inductively, this implies that every applicant in C is assigned different posts in M
and M ′ if any one of them is.
(ii) Suppose, for a contradiction, that an applicant a who is in T but not in C has M ′(a) 6=
M(a). Let the sequence of distinct edges on the path in T that begins with edge a be (a =
)aj1 , . . . , ajt , . . . , ajs where ajt is the last edge in this path that is not in the cycle C . Then, by
an argument similar to that in (i) above, we must have M ′(ajt) =M(ajt+1). But, by the same rea-
soning, we must have M ′(ajs) = M(ajt+1), since the edge ajt+1 follows the edge ajs in the cycle.
This implies that a particular post, namely M(ajt+1), has two applicants, ajt and ajs , assigned to it
in M ′, a contradiction. 2
Lemma 7.2.4 LetM be a popular matching for an instance I of POP-M, let T be a tree component
in the switching graph GM of M , and let M ′ be an arbitrary popular matching for I . Then either
every applicant a in T has M ′(a) = M(a), or there is a switching path P in T such that every
applicant a in P has M ′(a) = OM (a) and every applicant a in T that is not in P has M ′(a) =
M(a).
Proof Suppose that M ′(a) 6= M(a) for some applicant a in T . By an argument similar to that of
part (i) of Lemma 7.2.3, the same must be true of every applicant on the path from a to the sink
vertex of GM . Suppose that two applicants in T whose edges have a common end point, say p, are
both matched to different posts in M ′ as compared to M . Then, by Lemma 7.2.2, both would have
to be assigned in M ′ to p, a contradiction. Hence the applicants in T who are assigned different
posts in M and M ′ form a path ending at the sink vertex. Moreover, this path must begin at an
s-post vertex, otherwise the f -post at the start of the path would be unfilled in M ′, contradicting
Theorem 7.1.1, so the path is a switching path. 2
Suppose that M is a popular matching for an instance I of POP-M, and that T and T ′ are distinct
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components of the switching graph GM of M . If we apply the switching cycle in T (if T is a
cycle component) or a switching path in T (if T is a tree component) to obtain a different popular
matching, then the assignments of the applicants in T ′ are unaffected. Hence, the component T ′ is
present in the switching graph corresponding to the new matching. Intuitively, this means that the
application of switching cycles and paths are independent processes when in different components
of the switching graph. This notion of independence is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2.5 Let T and T ′ be components of a switching graph GM for a popular matching M ,
and let Q be either the switching cycle (if T is a cycle component) or a switching path (if T is a tree
component) in T . Then, T ′ is a component in the switching graph GM ·Q.
We can now characterize fully the relationship between any two popular matchings for an instance
of POP-M.
Theorem 7.2.2 Let M and M ′ be two popular matchings for an instance I of POP-M. Then M ′
may be obtained fromM by successively applying the switching cycle in each of a subset of the cycle
components of GM together with one switching path in each of a subset of the tree components of
GM .
Proof We describe a procedure for obtaining M ′ from M in a way that will establish the claim.
By Lemma 7.2.5, we can describe this procedure in terms of its separate effect on each component
of the switching graph.
For each cycle component T of GM , we know by Lemma 7.2.3 that either the applicants a in T all
have M(a) = M ′(a), or those applicants in the unique cycle of T have M ′(a) = OM (a). In the
former case, we leave T unchanged, and in the latter case, we apply the switching cycle in T , so
that every applicant a in T becomes matched to M ′(a).
For each tree component T ′ of GM , we know by Lemma 7.2.4 that either every applicant a in T ′
has M(a) = M ′(a), or there is a single switching path P in T ′ such that every applicant aj in
P has M ′(aj) = OM (aj), and all applicants ak in T ′ but not in P must have M(ak) = M ′(ak).
Hence, by applying P , every applicant a in T ′ is matched to M ′(a). Thus we obtain M ′ from M
by successively applying at most one switching cycle per cycle component of GM , and at most one
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switching path per tree component of GM . Moreover, the order in which these switching cycles
and paths are applied is arbitrary. 2
An immediate corollary of this theorem is a characterization of the set of popular matchings for a
POP-M instance.
Corollary 7.2.1 Let I be a POP-M instance, and letM be an arbitrary popular matching for I with
switching graph GM . Let the tree components of GM be X1, . . . ,Xk, and the cycle components
of GM be Y1, . . . , Yl. Then, the set of popular matchings for I consists of exactly those matchings
obtained by applying at most one switching path in Xi for each i (1≤ i≤ k) and by either applying
or not applying the switching cycle in Yi for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ l).
Example Taken all together, the figures and textual description of the example in Section 7.5 contain
a POP-M instance, its reduced instance, the switching graph of a particular popular matching M ,
and an indication of how the application of switching paths and cycles leads to different popular
matchings with different, but closely related, switching graphs.
7.3 Algorithms that exploit the structure
In this section we show how the characterization of the structure of the set of popular matchings
for an instance of POP-M allows the construction of efficient algorithms to solve a number of
extensions of the basic problem, namely to compute the number of popular matchings, to generate
a popular matching uniformly at random, to enumerate the set of all popular matchings, to find all
applicant-post pairs that can occur in a popular matching, and to find popular matchings that are
optimal in one of a number of natural ways.
Each of these algorithms begins in the same way – by constructing the reduced instance, finding an
arbitrary popular matching M (if one exists) with the O(n+m) time algorithm given by Abraham et
al [5], building the switching graph GM , and identifying the cycle components and tree components
of this graph using, say, depth-first search. Clearly all of this can be achieved in O(n +m) time,
where n is the number of applicants and posts and m is the sum of the lengths of the original
preference lists, in other words in time that is linear in the input size. This sequence of steps is
referred to as the preprocessing phase.
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7.3.1 Counting popular matchings
Recall that a tree component having q s-posts has exactly q − 1 switching paths. For a tree com-
ponent Xi, denote by S(Xi) the number of s-posts in Xi. The following theorem is an immediate
consequence of Corollary 7.2.1.
Theorem 7.3.1 Let I be a POP-M instance, and let M be an arbitrary popular matching for I with
switching graph GM . Let the tree components of GM be X1, . . . ,Xk, and the cycle components of
GM be Y1, . . . , Yl. Then, the number of popular matchings for I is 2l ∗
∏k
i=1 S(Xi).
Thus, in light of Theorem 7.3.1, it is easy to see that an algorithm for counting the number of popular
matchings for an instance I of POP-M first carries out the preprocessing phase, during which the
number l of cycle components and S(Xi) for each tree component Xi in GM are determined. Once
these values are known, the algorithm then returns the product 2l ∗∏S(Xi).
Theorem 7.3.2 The number of popular matchings for an arbitrary instance of POP-M can be com-
puted in linear time.
7.3.2 Random popular matchings
Let I be an arbitrary POP-M instance, and let M denote the set of popular matchings for I . Corol-
lary 7.2.1 facilitates the generation of a popular matching from M uniformly at random in linear
time. The procedure again begins with the preprocessing phase, during which the cycle components
Y1, . . . , Yl and the tree components X1, . . . ,Xk of GM are identified. Next, for each cycle com-
ponent Yi a bit b is generated uniformly at random (fair coin). The unique switching cycle in Yi is
applied if and only if b = 1. Likewise, for each tree component Xi, the s-posts other than the sink
are numbered 1, 2, . . . , q − 1 where q = S(Xi), and a value r is chosen uniformly at random from
the set {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. If r = 0, no switching path from this component is applied, otherwise,
the switching path beginning at the s-post numbered r in Xi is applied. The algorithm returns the
popular matching obtained by applying this choice of switching cycles and switching paths.
Theorem 7.3.3 Let I be an instance of POP-M, and let M denote the set of popular matchings for
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I . There is an algorithm to generate a popular matching from M uniformly at random in linear
time.
Proof It is immediate that any one of the popular matchings for the instance is equally likely to be
returned by the algorithm. To establish the complexity, it suffices to observe that the preprocessing
phase is linear, and the total time spent applying the switching paths and cycles is also linear. 2
7.3.3 Enumerating popular matchings
An algorithm for enumerating the set of popular matchings can be obtained by first computing an
arbitrary popular matching M along with the switching graph GM and then generating all possible
popular matchings by applying switching paths and switching cycles as described in Corollary
7.2.1.
The algorithm begins with the preprocessing phase. During this phase, for each tree component Xi,
S(Xi) is computed, and the s-posts of this component other than the sink are numbered 1, . . . , q−1,
where q = S(Xi). Let j = l + k. Next, a vector V = (v1, . . . vj) is defined, where vi ∈ {0, 1}
(1 ≤ i ≤ l) and vl+i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,S(Xi)− 1} (1 ≤ i ≤ k).
At this point the matching M is output, and V is initialized to be (0, 0, . . . , 0). The algorithm then
loops through all possible values of the vector V . At each iteration, the switching cycle in Yi is
applied to M if and only if vi = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ l). For each k (l < k ≤ j), if vk 6= 0, the switching
path beginning with the s-post numbered vk in component Xk is applied to M . Otherwise, if
vk = 0, no switching path in Xk is applied. The popular matching so generated is then output and
control passes to the next loop iteration.
Theorem 7.3.4 Let I be a POP-M instance, and let M denote the set of popular matchings for I .
There is an algorithm that enumerates M in O(n+m+ n|M|) time.
Proof The preprocessing phase occupies O(n+m) time. The generation of each popular matching
requires the identification and application of a set of switching paths and switching cycles. Within
each component this can be done in time linear in the size of the component, so overall in time
linear in the size of the switching graph, namely O(n). 2
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7.3.4 Popular pairs
A popular pair for an instance I of POP-M, is an applicant-post pair (ai, pj) such that there exists
a popular matching M with (ai, pj) ∈ M . We show that the popular pairs can be determined in
linear time. The following lemma is the key.
Lemma 7.3.1 Let M be a popular matching for an instance I of POP-M, and let GM be the
switching graph of M . Then, (ai, pj) is a popular pair if and only if (i) (ai, pj) is in M , or (ii) ai is
an incoming edge to pj in GM , and ai and pj are in a switching cycle or switching path in GM .
Proof The proof of sufficiency is easy, for if (ai, pj) is in M , it is by definition a popular pair.
If instead, ai is an incoming edge to pj in GM and ai is in a switching cycle or path in GM , we
know by Theorem 7.2.1 that applying this switching cycle or path matches ai and pj in a popular
matching.
On the other hand, suppose that (ai, pj) 6∈ M . If ai is not an incoming edge to pj , then OM (ai) 6=
pj , implying pj is not on ai’s reduced preference list, so ai can never be matched to pj in a popular
matching. Suppose that ai is an incoming edge to pj in GM , but ai is not in a switching cycle
or path in GM . If we suppose that (ai, pj) is in a popular matching M ′, then, by Theorem 7.2.2,
there is a sequence of switching cycles and paths that can be applied to transform M to M ′. But
clearly for ai to become matched to pj , ai must be in one of these switching cycles or paths, giving
a contradiction. 2
Theorem 7.3.5 There is a linear time algorithm to generate all of the popular pairs for a POP-M
instance.
Proof After the preprocessing phase, all pairs in the resulting popular matching (if any) are output.
The switching graph GM is then traversed to find all applicants ai in a switching path or switching
cycle, and for each such ai the pair (ai, pj) is output, where pj is the end vertex of edge ai. Lemma
7.3.1 guarantees that the correct set of pairs has been generated. The preprocessing phase and
traversal of the switching graph can both be accomplished in linear time. 2
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7.3.5 Optimal popular matchings
Kavitha and Nasre [60] recently studied the following problem: suppose we wish to compute a
matching that is not only popular, but is also optimal with respect to some additional well-defined
criterion. They defined a natural optimality criterion and described an augmenting path-based algo-
rithm for computing an optimal popular matching. In this section we will describe faster algorithms
that exploit the switching graph of the instance to find an optimal popular matching with respect to
certain optimality criteria. We first define two particular optimality criteria, in terms of the profile
of the matching, which we discussed in detail in Section 2.3.1. We briefly recall here the necessary
definitions regarding profiles.
For a POP-M instance with n1 applicants and n2 posts, we define the profile ofM to be the (n2+1)-
tuple (x1, . . . , x(n2+1)) where, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + 1), xi is the number of applicants who
are matched in M with their ith-choice post. An applicant who is matched to his last-resort post is
considered to be matched to his (n2 + 1)th-choice post, regardless of the length of his preference
lists.
Total orders L and ≺G on profiles are defined as follows. Suppose that x = (x1, . . . , xn2+1) and
y = (y1, . . . , yn2+1) are profiles. Then
• x L y if, for some j, xi = yi for 1 ≤ i < j and xj > yj;
• x ≺G y if, for some j, xi = yi for j < i ≤ n2 + 1 and xj < yj .
A rank-maximal popular matching is a popular matching whose profile is maximal with respect to
L. A generous popular matching is a popular matching whose profile is minimal with respect to
≺G. Note that, since the number of (n2 + 1)th choices is minimised, a generous popular matching
is inevitably a maximum cardinality popular matching.
If a weight w(ai, pj) is defined for each applicant-post pair with pj acceptable to ai, then the weight
w(M) of a popular matching M is
∑
(ai,pj)∈M w(ai, pj). We call a popular matching optimal if it
is of maximum or minimum weight depending on the context.
Some examples of optimal popular matchings include, but are not limited to:
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• Maximum cardinality popular matchings: assign a weight of 0 to each pair involving a last
resort post, and a weight of 1 to all other pairs, and find a maximum weight popular matching.
(A linear time algorithm to find a maximum cardinality popular matching was already given
by Abraham et al [5].)
• Minimum cost maximum cardinality popular matchings: assign a large weight, say n2, to
each pair involving a last resort post, and a weight of k to each pair (ai, pj) such that pj is
ai’s k
th choice in the original instance, and find a minimum weight popular matching.
• Rank-maximal popular matchings: assign a weight of 0 to each pair involving a last resort
post, and a weight of nn−k+1 to each pair (ai, pj) where pj is the kth choice of ai, and find a
maximum weight popular matching.
• Generous popular matchings : assign a weight of nn−k+1 to each pair (ai, pj) where pj is the
(n− k)th choice of ai, and find a minimum weight maximum cardinality popular matching.
Kavitha and Nasre [60] described an O(n2 + m)-time algorithm for finding minimum cost, gen-
erous (which they called fair), and rank-maximal popular matchings. In what follows, we give an
O(n +m)-time algorithm for finding minimum cost maximum cardinality popular matchings and
O(n log n+m)-time algorithms for finding generous and rank-maximal popular matchings.
From the above description of generous and rank-maximal popular matchings, it is apparent that we
may wish to assign very large weights to the applicant-post pairs, so we cannot assume that weights
can be compared or added in O(1) time. We assume that these weights occupy O(f(n)) space for
some function f , so that this is also the time for comparison or addition of such values.
Given an instance of POP-M and a particular allocation of weights, let M be a popular matching,
and Mopt an optimal popular matching (maximum or minimum weight, as appropriate). By The-
orem 7.2.2, Mopt can be obtained from M by applying a choice of at most one switching cycle
or switching path per component of the switching graph GM . The algorithm for computing Mopt
will compute an arbitrary popular matching M , and make an appropriate choice of switching paths
and switching cycles to apply in order to obtain an optimal popular matching. The next step is to
show how to decide exactly which switching cycles and paths need be applied. In the following, for
simplicity of presentation, we assume that “optimal” means “maximum”. Analogous results hold
in the “minimum” case.
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If T is a cycle component of GM , an orientation of T is either the set of pairs {(a,M(a)) : a ∈ T},
or the set {(a,M · C(a)) : a ∈ T}, where C is the switching cycle in T . Likewise, if T is a tree
component of GM , an orientation of T is either the set of pairs {(a,M(a)) : a ∈ T}, or the set
{(a,M · P (a)) : a ∈ T}, for some switching path P in T . The weight of an orientation is the sum
of the weights of the pairs in it, and an orientation of a component is optimal if its weight is at least
as great as that of any other orientation. Intuitively, an optimal orientation of a component T of GM
assigns the applicants in T so that T contributes its optimal weight to the popular matching.
The following lemma establishes the relationship between M , Mopt, and optimal orientations of
components of GM .
Lemma 7.3.2 If M is an arbitrary popular matching, T is a component of GM , and Mopt is an
optimal popular matching, then the set of pairs {(a,Mopt(a)) : a ∈ T} is an optimal orientation of
T .
Proof Recall that Mopt may be generated from M by applying at most one switching cycle in each
cycle component of GM and at most one switching path in each tree component of GM . Suppose
that the set {(a,Mopt(a)) : a ∈ T} is not an optimal orientation of T . Then if we were to generate
a matching M ′ from M in exactly the same way as Mopt, except that we deal with the component
T according to an optimal orientation, matching M ′ would have a weight greater than Mopt, a
contradiction. 2
In light of Lemma 7.3.2, an algorithm for computing an optimal popular matching can be con-
structed as follows. The algorithm begins, as always, with the preprocessing phase. The next
step is to find an optimal orientation for each component in GM . An optimal orientation of each
cycle component T with switching cycle C can be found by comparing
∑
a∈C w(a,M(a)) with∑
a∈C w(a,M · C(a)). This is easily done in O(f(n)|T |) time, and the outcome tells us whether
or not the switching cycle C should be applied to give an optimal popular matching.
In the case of a tree component T , we would like to find an optimal orientation also in O(f(n)|T |)
time. This cannot necessarily be achieved by independent evaluation of each switching path in T .
Instead, a depth-first traversal of T can be carried out, starting from the sink, and traversing edges
in reverse direction. For an s-post vertex v, let Pv be the switching path beginning at v. To find the
weight of the orientation of T resulting from the application of Pv , suppose that the switching path
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starting at v has a and b as its first two edges. This evaluation involves subtracting the weightw(a, v)
from, and adding the weight w(b, u) to, the weight of the orientation resulting from application of
Pu, where u is the nearest s-post ancestor of v in the depth-first spanning tree. So the weight of
each orientation can be computed in O(f(n)) time. By this means we can determine an optimal
orientation of each tree component T in O(f(n)|T |) time.
These considerations establish the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 7.3.6 There is an algorithm to compute an optimal popular matching in O(m+ nf(n))
time, where n is the number of posts, m is the sum of the lengths of the original preference lists,
and f(n) is the maximum time needed for a single comparison of two given weights.
We make the not unreasonable assumption that an arithmetic or comparison operation on numbers
of size O(n) can be carried out in constant time, but that the complexity of such an operation on
numbers of size O(nn) is no better than O(n). In the case of a mincost popular matching, all
weights are O(n2), so that we can take f(n) = O(1). However, for rank-maximal or generous
matchings, we can only assume that the weights are O(nn), so that f(n) = O(n). Hence we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 7.3.1 (i) A mincost popular matching can be found in linear time. (ii) A rank-maximal
popular matching and a generous popular matching can be found in O(m+ n2) time.
Improving the running time
When computing a rank-maximal or generous popular matching, the complexity of our algorithm
is dominated by the time required to compute an optimal orientation of a component of GM . To
improve the complexity for these specific problems, we discard the weights and work directly
with matching profiles. This enables us to compute the optimal orientation of a tree component
in O(t log t) time, where t is the number of edges in the given tree component. For simplicity
of presentation, this improved algorithm is described in terms of computing rank-maximal popu-
lar matchings, then we indicate the changes that need to be made to compute a generous popular
matching.
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Let Z be a tree component of the switching graph with sink z, let u 6= z be an s-post vertex in Z ,
and let v 6= u be a vertex such that there is a path P (u, v) in Z from u to v (hence v lies on the path
P (u, z)). Any such path P (u, v) is the initial part of the switching path P (u, z) starting at u.
The concept of profile change C(u, v) along a path P (u, v) quantifies the effect on the profile of
applying the switching path from u, but only as far as v – we call this a partial switching path.
(It is a genuine switching path if and only if v = z). Note that, unless v = z, applying such a
partial switching path does not yield a matching, since two applicants would be matched to the post
represented by v. More precisely, C(u, v) is the sequence of ordered pairs 〈(i1, j1), . . . , (ir, jr)〉,
where j1 < j2 < . . . < jr , ik 6= 0 for all k, and, for each k, there is a net change of ik in the
number of applicants assigned to their jthk choice post when the partial switching path P (u, v) is
applied.
Example As an illustration of the notion of profile change, consider the switching graph given in
Figure 7.5 in Section 7.5. Applying the path P (l16, p11) causes a15 to move from his nineteenth
(last resort) choice to his first choice, a14 from his first to his second choice, and a12 from his fifth
to his first choice, so the resulting profile change is 〈(1, 1), (1, 2), (−1, 5), (−1, 19)〉.
We define a total order  on profile changes (to reflect rank-maximality) in the following way.
If x = 〈(p1, q1), (p2, q2), . . . , (pk, qk)〉 and y = 〈(r1, s1), (r2, s2), . . . , (rl, sl)〉 are profile changes
(x 6= y), and j is the maximum index for which (pj , qj) = (rj, sj), we write x  y if and only if
• k > l, j = l, and pj+1 > 0; or
• k < l, j = k and rj+1 < 0; or
• j < min(k, l), qj+1 < sj+1 and pj+1 > 0; or
• j < min(k, l), qj+1 > sj+1 and rj+1 < 0; or
• j < min(k, l), qj+1 = sj+1 and pj+1 > rj+1.
An improving profile change (with respect to L) is a profile change 〈(i1, j1), . . . , (ir, jr)〉 with
i1 > 0. So an improving profile change leads to a better profile with respect to L. Moreover, if x
and y are profile changes with x  y, and if applying x and y to the same profile ρ yields profiles
ρx and ρy respectively, then ρx L ρy. The converse is also true: if x and y are profile changes,
and if applying x and y to the same profile ρ yields profiles ρx L ρy , then x  y.
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As a next step, we define the following arithmetic operation, which captures the notion of adding
an ordered pair to a profile change. For a profile change C = 〈(i1, j1), . . . , (ir, jr)〉 and ordered pair
(i, j) (i 6= 0, j > 0), define C + (i, j) as follows:
• If j = jk and ik + i 6= 0, then
C + (i, j) = 〈(i1, j1), . . . , (ik + i, jk), . . . , (ir, jr)〉.
• If j = jk and ik + i = 0, then
C + (i, j) = 〈(i1, j1), . . . , (ik−1, jk−1), (ik+1, jk+1) . . . , (ir, jr)〉.
• If jk−1 < j < jk, then
C + (i, j) = 〈(i1, j1), . . . , (ik−1, jk−1), (i, j), (ik , jk) . . . , (ir, jr)〉.
The algorithm computes an optimal orientation of a tree-component Z by means of a post-order
traversal, viewing Z as a tree rooted at the sink. During this traversal, processing a vertex v means
determining the best improving profile change Cv obtainable by applying a partial switching path
that ends at v, together with the starting vertex uv of a path P (uv, v) corresponding to Cv. If no
path ending at v has an improving profile change then Cv is null and uv is undefined.
For a leaf vertex v, Cv is trivially null. For a branch node v, Cv and uv are computed using the
best improving profile change Cw for each child w of v in the tree (excluding any such w that is an
f -post leaf, since no switching path can begin in such a subtree of v). Let w be a child of v, and
let a be the applicant represented by the edge (w, v) of Z . Let posts v and w be the jthw and lthw
choices, respectively, of applicant a, so that if a were to be re-assigned from post w to post v the
profile would gain a jthw choice and lose an lthw choice. It follows at once that Cv is determined by
the formula
Cv = max
w∈Vc
{(Cw + (1, jw)) + (−1, lw)}
where the maximum is with respect to , and Vc is the set of children of v.
A pseudocode version of the algorithm appears in Figure 7.1.
On termination of the traversal, we have determined Cz , the best improving profile change, if any, of
a switching path in Z , together with the starting point of such a path. Application of this switching
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/* Traverse(v) returns the optimum profile change Cv and corresponding
starting vertex uv of a partial switching path ending at vertex v */
Traverse(v):
if v is a leaf:
return null
else:
best = null
start = null
for (each child w of v that is not an f -post leaf):
(Cw, uw) = Traverse(w)
C = Cw + (1, jw)) + (−1, lw) (1)
if (C  best): (2)
best = Cw
start = uw
return (best, start)
Figure 7.1: The postorder traversal of a tree component
path yields an optimum orientation of Z , or, in case null is returned, we know that Z is already
optimally oriented.
From the pseudocode in Figure 7.1, we see that the complexity of the algorithm is determined by
the total number of operations involved in steps (1) and (2).
To deal with step (1), we represent a profile change by a balanced binary tree B whose nodes
contain the pairs (i, j), ordered by the second member of the pair. The + operation on profile
changes involves amendment, insertion, or deletion of a node in B, which can be accomplished
in time logarithmic in the size of B. Since the number of pairs in a profile change cannot exceed
the number of edges in Z , this is O(log t), and since step (1) is executed at most t times, the total
number of operations carried out by step (1), summed over all iterations, is O(t log t).
As far as step (2) is concerned, we first note that two profile changes, involving c1 and c2 pairs,
with c1 < c2, can be compared in O(c1) time. So the cost of a comparison is linear in the size of
each of the balanced trees involved. Once a profile change is the ‘loser’ in such a comparison, the
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balanced tree representing it is never used again. Hence the cost of all such comparisons is linear
in s, the sum of the sizes of all of the balanced trees constructed by the algorithm. But each node in
a balanced tree originates from one or more edges in Z , and each edge in Z contributes to at most
one node in one balanced tree. So s is bounded by the number of edges in Z , and hence the total
number of operations in step (2), summed over all iterations, is O(t).
It follows that the postorder traversal of a tree component Z with t edges can be completed in
O(t log t) time, and once the optimal switching path is found it can be applied in O(t) time. Hence,
since the total number of edges in all tree components is O(n), this process can be applied to all
tree components in O(n log n) time.
Finally, we observe that the optimal orientation of each cycle component can be computed effi-
ciently. For a cycle component Y with switching cycle C , we need only check if the profile change
obtained by applying C is an improving profile change, and, if so, C is applied, otherwise, Y is
already optimally oriented. Hence, the optimal orientation of a cycle component Y with y edges
can be computed in O(y) time. This process can therefore be applied to each cycle component in
O(n) time. Bearing in mind that the preprocessing phase of the algorithm requires O(n+m) time,
we conclude that a rank-maximal popular matching can be found in O(n log n+m) time.
The algorithm can be amended to find a generous popular matching by making appropriate changes
to the definition of the order relation on profile changes, as follows.
We define a total order ≺ on profile changes (to reflect generosity) in the following way. If x =
〈(p1, q1), (p2, q2), . . . , (pk, qk)〉 and y = 〈(r1, s1), (r2, s2), . . . , (rl, sl)〉 are profile changes (x 6= y),
we write x ≺ y if and only if
• qk > sk and pk < 0; or
• qk < sl and rl > 0; or
• j is the maximum value such that (pk−j, qk−j) = (rl−j , sl−j), and
– qk−j−1 > sl−j−1 and pk−j−1 < 0; or
– qk−j−1 < sl−j−1 and rl−j−1 > 0; or
– qk−j−1 = sl−j−1 and pk−j−1 < rl−j−1.
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An improving profile change (with respect to ≺G) is a profile change 〈(i1, j1), . . . , (ir , jr)〉 with
ir < 0. So an improving profile change leads to a better profile with respect to ≺G. Moreover, if x
and y are profile changes with x ≺ y, and if applying x and y to the same profile ρ yields profiles
ρx and ρy respectively, then ρx ≺G ρy .
It is now straightforward to verify that an amended version of the postorder traversal algorithm
that uses ≺ rather than  to compare profile changes will determine a switching path in a tree
component of the switching graph that is optimal with respect to generosity. All other aspects of
the algorithm, and its analysis, are identical to the rank-maximal case. It follows that a generous
popular matching can be computed in O(n log n+m) time.
7.4 Conclusions and open problems
This chapter has characterized the structure of the set of popular matchings for a POP-M instance
in terms of the so-called switching graph. This characterization leads to efficient algorithms for a
range of extensions of the basic problem.
We have assumed throughout that the applicants’ preference lists are strictly ordered. Abraham et
al [5] considered also the case where the preference lists may contain ties, and gave a O(√nm)
time algorithm to determine a popular matching in that case. It is an open question to provide a neat
characterization of the structure for this more general problem, and to exploit any such structure
to give an analogous set of efficient algorithms. Note, however, that algorithms for, say, counting
or enumerating all popular matchings would necessarily subsume such algorithms for arbitrary
bipartite graphs. Consider, for example, a POP-M instance in which every applicant’s preference
list is a single tie – the set of popular matchings is exactly the set of maximum matchings. Therefore,
this is likely to be considerably more involved than in the no-ties case.
7.5 Example
To illustrate the notion of the switching graph and the implications of applying switching paths
and cycles, we provide a detailed example. Figure 7.2 shows the full preference lists (without last
resorts) for a POP-M instance I . The instance consists of 16 applicants a1, a2, . . . , a16 and 18 posts
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p1, p2, . . . , p18. The set of f -posts of the instance is {p1, p4, p5, p6, p10, p11, p15, p17} and, after
the inclusion of the last-resort posts, the set of s-posts is {p2, p3, p7, p8, p9, p12, p13, p14, l15, p18}.
Note that post l15 is a15’s last resort post. This is the only last resort post that is also an s-post for
this instance.
Figure 7.3 shows the reduced instance of I , obtained by removing all posts from an applicant a’s
preference list except for f(a) and s(a). This instance admits several popular matchings; one such
popular matching M is denoted by underlining.
The switching graph GM for M is given in Figure 7.4. The graph consists of three components, one
cycle component and two tree components containing posts p18 and p9 as sinks, respectively. The
cycle component has a switching cycle containing posts p1, p2, p4, p3. The switching graph has a
total of 4 switching paths, all of which are contained in the larger tree component. These switching
paths can easily be identified by recalling that the path to the sink from any other s-post vertex is a
switching path. Hence, the paths to p9 starting at p12, p14, p13, and l15 are the switching paths for
this instance. The other tree component has no switching path; it represents a fixed pair – applicant
a16 must be matched to post p17 (and post p18 is unfilled) in every popular matching. Note that
the (applicant,post) pairs in the “tails” of the cycle component, namely the pairs (a7, p7), (a6, p6),
(a8, p8), and (a5, p5), are also fixed pairs.
If the switching cycle is applied, then a1 becomes matched to p2, a2 to p4, a3 to p3, and a4 to p1,
giving a second popular matching M ′. All other applicants are matched to the same posts in M ′ as
in M . Figure 7.5 shows the change in the switching graph when the switching cycle is applied; the
direction of each arc in the cycle is reversed while all other arcs in GM are unchanged.
If, instead of applying the switching cycle, we apply a switching path, say the path beginning at
post p13, applicant a12 becomes matched to p11, and applicant a10 to post p9 (which was previously
unoccupied in M ), giving a third popular matching M ′′. All other applicants remain matched to the
same posts in M ′′ as in M . Figure 7.6 shows the change in the switching graph resulting from the
application of this switching path; the direction of each arc on the path from p13 to p9 is reversed,
so that p13 becomes the new sink vertex in this tree component.
As an illustration of Theorem 7.3.1, this problem instance has a total of ten popular matchings,
resulting from the five possible orientations of the larger tree component and the two possible
orientations of the cycle component.
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a1 : p1 p4 p10 p11 p2 p6 p8
a2 : p4 p6 p11 p17 p2 p5 p12 p13 p10
a3 : p4 p1 p3 p15 p8 p16
a4 : p1 p11 p6 p3 p15
a5 : p5 p1 p11 p4 p2 p6 p14
a6 : p6 p10 p11 p3 p1 p6
a7 : p6 p7
a8 : p6 p5 p8 p16
a9 : p10 p11 p4 p9 p2 p1 p18
a10 : p11 p9 p7 p1 p7 p12
a11 : p10 p4 p17 p6 p12 p7 p13
a12 : p11 p5 p6 p15 p13 p1 p9 p18
a13 : p11 p15 p4 p14 p3
a14 : p15 p13 p1 p4 p9 p8
a15 : p15 p6
a16 : p17 p15 p5 p4 p18 p8 p9 p13
Figure 7.2: A popular matching instance I
a1 : p1 p2
a2 : p4 p2
a3 : p4 p3
a4 : p1 p3
a5 : p5 p2
a6 : p6 p3
a7 : p6 p7
a8 : p6 p8
a9 : p10 p9
a10 : p11 p9
a11 : p10 p12
a12 : p11 p13
a13 : p11 p14
a14 : p15 p13
a15 : p15 l15
a16 : p17 p18
Figure 7.3: The reduced instance of I with popular matching M denoted by underlining
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Figure 7.4: The switching graph GM for popular matching M
Figure 7.5: The switching graph for the popular matching M ′ obtained by applying the switching
cycle in GM
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Figure 7.6: The switching graph for the popular matching M ′′ obtained by applying the switching
path beginning at p13 in GM
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Introduction
This thesis has presented a number of new algorithmic results for five specific problem domains
from the realm of both full and partial preference information. We emphasized a structural approach
to each individual problem in the sense that each new algorithmic result presented relied crucially
on some structural property implicitly embedded in the problem.
This final chapter is a summary of the results presented in this thesis, along with a collection of
open problems and ideas of future work arising from the problems we have studied.
8.2 Approximation algorithms for MAX-SMTI
In Chapter 3, we considered the well-studied NP-hard variant of the stable marriage problem with
ties and incomplete lists in which we seek to find stable matchings that are as large as possible
(MAX-SMTI).
Roughly speaking, our performance guarantee is based on the following argument: if Mopt is a
maximum cardinality stable matching, and M the stable matching returned by our algorithm, then
the symmetric difference Mopt ⊕ M can have no augmenting paths of length at most three with
the two end edges belonging to Mopt. We then conclude that the ratio of Mopt edges to M edges
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is therefore at most 3/2 in every component of Mopt ⊕ M . The performance guarantee of 3/2
follows.
A next step, therefore, could be to devise an approximation algorithm that somehow also elminates
the presence of at least ‘some’ augmenting paths of length at most five. For example, perhaps there
is an algorithm for which it can be argued that Mopt ⊕M can have no augmenting paths of length
at most three with the two end edges belonging to Mopt, as in our algorithm in Chapter 3, but also
has the property that at most, say, 1/10 of the components cannot be augmenting paths of length at
most five. This would yield a constant performance strictly better than 3/2.
On the practical side, it would be interesting to see the performance of this algorithm in practice.
There has been some work done in the comparison of such approximation algorithms in practice
[50] – how does this algorithm measure up? We conjecture that our algorithm performs very well
when each of the men’s preference lists consist of a few large ties. The following is some intuition
as to why this may be the case. Notice that for an SMTI instance in which every man’s preference
list consists of a single tie, an arbitrary maximum matching is a maximum cardinality stable match-
ing. Given such an input, our algorithm will go immediately to Phase 2 (assuming every man’s
preference list has length at least two). The algorithm will return a maximum cardinality matching,
which is the optimal solution. It would also be interesting to know if there is a formal argument to
show that the algorithm does indeed perform well when the men’s ties have this property.
8.3 Sex-equal stable matchings
In Chapter 4, we studied the strongly NP-hard problem of finding a sex-equal stable matching
(SESM). We gave a complete characterisation of the parameterized complexity of (α, β)-SESM
(defined in Chapter 4). When the preference lists on one side are of length at most two, the problem
is solvable in polynomial time, but, if the preference lists on either side are allowed instead to be
of length three or greater, then the problem is W [1]-hard. Additionally, we presented an exact
low-order exponential-time algorithm for SESM in which the men’s preference lists are bounded in
length by a constant l, and the lengths of the women’s preference lists are unrestricted.
As far as we know, our exponential-time algorithm is the first ‘moderately’ exponential-time al-
gorithm for any computationally hard stable marriage variant. Since the stable matching literature
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is rife with hard stable matching problems, we believe that this opens the door to the exploration
of the existence of other exponential-time algorithms with ‘good’ theoretical running times for a
whole host of stable marriage problems. As an obvious next step, one could consider searching for
an exact algorithm for SESM with no bound on the lengths of the preference lists.
A similar problem to SESM is a problem described in the PhD thesis of Feder [27], called the
balanced stable matching problem, the goal of which is to find a stable matching M that minimizes
max
{ ∑
(m,w)∈M
pm(w),
∑
(m,w)∈M
pw(m)
}
over all M ∈ M. Intuitively, a balanced stable matching minimizes the unhappiness of the most
unhappy group of people (the men or the women). Feder [27] proved that this problem is NP-hard.
Is the balanced stable matching problem solvable by similar techniques to that presented in Chapter
4?
A corollary to the dynamic programming algorithm given in Section 4.9 is that SESM is solvable
in polynomial-time whenever the underlying graph of the rotation posed is series-parallel. A next
step could be to ask if it is the case that SESM can be solved in polynomial-time whenever the
underlying graph has bounded treewidth (see, for example, one of the many surveys by Bodlaender
[10] for the relevant background on treewidth).
This leads to an even larger question: what stable matching problems can be solved efficiently (or
more efficiently) when the underlying graph of the rotation poset has bounded treewidth? One
particularly interesting problem could be the median stable matching problem (discussed in Section
2.2.4). This problem is not even known to be in NP. Does the bounded treewidth property make this
problem easier?
Finally, we remark that very recently an improvement in the Edwards and Farr theorem has been
made [24]. This probably implies an improvement in the upper bound of the running time described
in Theorem 4.10.1. In fact, any further improvement upon the bound given in Theorem 4.10.1 will
likely imply an improved result for the exponential-time algorithm given in Chapter 4.
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8.4 Keeping couples together
Chapter 5 studies the hospitals / residents problem with couples (HRC) in which pairs of residents
are allowed to form couples, with some form of joint preference lists that express the couples’
preference for where the members of the couple should both be matched. We considered a natural
restriction of HRC in which the members of a couple have individual preference lists over hospi-
tals, and the couples form joint preference lists that are, in a formal sense, consistent with these
individual preference lists. We gave an appropriate stability definition and showed that the problem
of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if each resident’s preference list
has length at most three and each hospital has capacity at most two. In contrast to this result, we
gave a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching (or report that none exists) when stability
is defined in terms of the classical Gale-Shapley concept. This algorithm makes no assumptions
about the preference lists or capacities of the hospitals. Finally, for an alternative formulation of
our restriction of HRC, which we call the hospitals / residents problem with sizes (HRS), we gave a
linear-time algorithm that always finds a stable matching for the case that hospital preference lists
are of length at most two, and where hospital capacities can be arbitrary.
There are a couple of immediate open questions that arise from our results. Firstly, what is the
complexity of (2,∞)-HRS? We conjecture that this problem is solvable in polynomial-time, but
the solution appears to be non-trivial.
Another area of approach could be to reconsider our definition of HRS. As it stands, our definition
favors ‘quality over quantity’ in that a single resident could displace a large group of inferior resi-
dents. An alternative defintion of HRS would be to instead allow for ‘quantity over quality’, so that
a hospital’s primary concern is to ensure that its occupancy is as high as possible. This gives rise
to an alternative stability definition which is obtained from the one given for HRS in Section 5.2 by
modifying Condition (2) as follows:
2. OMj + si ≤ cj , or hj prefers ri to residents rk1 , . . . rkt ∈M(hj) such that
si ≥
t∑
p=1
skp and OMj + si −
t∑
p=1
skp ≤ cj .
Is this problem solvable in polynomial-time?
8.5 3D-stable matchings 151
Lastly, in the spirit of‘keeping couples together’, we could consider a different definition of a block-
ing pair where a resident r and a hospital h do not form a blocking pair if moving r to h would
force the couple involving r to break apart. Intuitively, this means that r makes keeping his couple
together a priority over his own personal benefit of moving to hospital h. We leave it as an open
question to give a proper formalization of this problem, and to determine its complexity 1.
8.5 3D-stable matchings
In Chapter 6, we explored the generalisation of the stable marriage problem to three sets, so that
we attempt to match men, women, and dogs into triples (3DSM). We examined 3DSMI under so-
called weak- and strong-stability, and show that, in general, finding a strongly stable matching is
NP-hard in the 3DSM setting (and hence is also NP-hard for 3DSMI), and that finding a weakly
stable matching is NP-hard in the 3DSMI setting.
The key ingredient in our constructions was a specially constructed instance of 3DSM that we call a
9-Sun. When we view this instance in terms of its underlying graph, it is easy to see that the special
structural nature of this instance makes the creation of a stable matching impossible.
The 9-Sun is the smallest example that we can find of a 3DSMI instance with no weakly stable
matching. Is there a smaller example? In the case of strong stability, one can construct smaller
examples (with n = 4) that admit no strongly stable matching.
There is, in fact, no known instance of 3DSM (i.e. complete preference lists) that does not admit
at least one weakly stable matching. A natural place to try to construct a counterexample would be
to try to complete the preference lists of the 9-Sun in a way that does not introduce a weakly stable
matching. However, we conjecture that this is not possible for this particular example. Is there a
3DSM instance with no weakly stable matching? A larger question is to determine whether there is
a polynomial-time algorithm to find a weakly stable matching or report that none exists, given an
instance of 3DSM.
It is very uncommon to find a matching problem with preferences for which there is no clear way to
extend a hardness result to complete preference lists (in fact, we know of no other such problem).
1We thank Paul Goldberg for suggesting this problem.
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Could it really be the case that when one attempts to complete the preference lists of a 3DSMI
instance, one cannot avoid introducing a weakly stable matching?
8.6 Popular matchings
Finally, Chapter 7 considers the popular matching problem (POP-M) in the context of matching a
set of applicants with preference lists to a set of posts without preferences. Our contribution was to
provide a characterization of the set of popular matchings for an arbitrary POP-M instance in terms
of a new structure called the switching graph, a directed graph computable in linear time from the
preference lists. We showed that this structure can be exploited to yield efficient algorithms for a
range of associated problems, including the counting and enumeration of the set of popular match-
ings, generation of a popular matching uniformly at random, finding all applicant-post pairs that
can occur in a popular matching, and computing popular matchings that satisfy various additional
optimality criteria.
An obvious open question would be to consider the case in which the preference lists of the ap-
plicants may be allowed to have ties. Is there a generalization of the switching graph (or a similar
structure) to characterize the set of popular matchings in the presence of ties? We suspect that this
is a particularly difficult problem, as such a structure would subsume a structure for the set of all
maximum matchings of an arbitrary bipartite graph. Consider: when each applicant’s list is a single
tie, then the set of popular matchings is exactly the set of maximum matchings. Therefore, we
suspect that this problem is considerably more difficult than that of the no-ties case.
A different approach could be to consider the structure of the set of popular matchings without ties,
but with capacities (associated with the posts) and/or weights (associated with the applicants). Is
there a neat structural characterization of the set of popular matchings in this case?
On a different note, it would be interesting to know if there are faster algorithm than ourO(n log n+
m)-time method for finding rank-maximal or generous popular matchings. One possible approach
from the negative side could be to attempt a reduction from a problem such as Element Uniqueness,
with a known time complexity lower bound of Ω(n log n).
Appendix A
NP-completeness of (3,3)-COM-SMTI
We prove that MAX-SMTI (defined in Section 2.2.5) remains NP-complete in a particularly re-
stricted setting. We are interested in this result is because it is particularly useful to us in some of
the NP-hardness reductions we present in Chapters 5 6. Define (3, 3)-COM-SMTI to be the prob-
lem of deciding whether a complete weakly stable matching exists (i.e., a weakly stable matching
that matches every agent), given an instance of SMTI in which each preference list is of length at
most three, every woman’s preference list is strictly ordered, and each man’s preference list is either
strictly ordered or is a tie of length two (all of these conditions holding simultaneously). Our proof
of this theorem is largely based on a reduction of Irving et al [51] with some small but non-trivial
modifications.
Theorem A.0.1 (3, 3)-COM-SMTI is NP-complete
Proof We reduce from a a restricted version of SAT. Let (2,2)-E3-SAT denote the problem of
deciding, given a Boolean formula B in CNF in which each clause contains exactly 3 literals and,
for each variable vi, each of literals vi and v¯i appears exactly twice in B, whether B is satisfiable.
Berman et al. [8] showed that (2,2)-E3-SAT is NP-complete.
Hence let B be an instance of (2,2)-E3-SAT. Let V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1} and C = {c1, c2, . . . ,
cm} be the set of variables and clauses respectively in B. Then for each vi ∈ V , each of literals
vi and v¯i appears exactly twice in B. (Hence m = 4n3 .) Also |cj | = 3 for each cj ∈ C . We
form an instance I of (3,3)-COM-SMTI as follows. The set of men in I is X ∪ P ∪ U ∪Q, where
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x4i : y4i c(x4i) y4i+1 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
x4i+1 : y4i+1 c(x4i+1) y4i+2 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
x4i+2 : y4i+3 c(x4i+2) y4i+2 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
x4i+3 : y4i c(x4i+3) y4i+3 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
psj : z
s
j c
s
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 3)
usj : z
s
j wj (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 3)
qj : c
1
j c
2
j c
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
y4i : (x4i x4i+3) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y4i+1 : (x4i x4i+1) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y4i+2 : (x4i+1 x4i+2) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y4i+3 : (x4i+2 x4i+3) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
csj : p
s
j x(c
s
j) qj (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 3)
wj : u
1
j u
2
j u
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
zsj : (p
s
j u
s
j) (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 3)
Figure A.1: Preference lists in the constructed instance of (3,3)-COM-SMTI
X = ∪n−1i=0 Xi, Xi = {x4i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), P = ∪mj=1Pj , Pj = {p1j , p2j , p3j}
(1 ≤ j ≤ m), U = ∪mj=1Uj , Uj = {u1j , u2j , u3j} (1 ≤ j ≤ m), and Q = {qj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}. The set
of women in I is Y ∪C ′∪W ∪Z , where Y = ∪n−1i=0 Yi, Yi = {y4i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1),
C ′ = {csj : cj ∈ C ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 3}, W = {wj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, Z = ∪mj=1Zj and Zj = {z1j , z2j , z3j }
(1 ≤ j ≤ m).
The preference lists of the men and women in I are shown in Figure A.1. In a given preference list,
entries within round brackets are tied. In the preference list of an agent x4i+r ∈ X (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
and r ∈ {0, 1}), the symbol c(x4i+r) denotes the woman csj ∈ C ′ such that the (r+1)th occurrence
of literal vi appears at position s of cj . Similarly if r ∈ {2, 3} then the symbol c(x4i+r) denotes the
woman csj ∈ C ′ such that the (r−1)th occurrence of literal v¯i appears at position s of cj . Also in the
preference list of an agent csj ∈ C ′, if literal vi appears at position s of clause cj ∈ C , the symbol
x(csj) denotes the man x4i+r−1, where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence
of literal vi in B. Otherwise if literal v¯i appears at position s of clause cj ∈ C , the symbol x(csj)
denotes the man x4i+r+1, where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence of literal
v¯i in B. Clearly each preference list is of length at most 3, the men’s lists are strictly ordered, and
each woman’s list is either strictly ordered or is a tie of length 2.
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), let Ti = {(x4i+r, y4i+r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} and Fi = {(x4i+r, y4i+r+1)} :
0 ≤ r ≤ 3}, where addition is taken modulo 4.
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We claim that B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a complete stable matching.
For, let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a complete matching M in I as follows.
For each variable vi ∈ V , if vi is true under f , add the pairs in Ti to M , otherwise add the pairs
in Fi to M . Now let cj ∈ C . As cj contains a literal that is true under f , let s ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote
the position of cj in which this literal occurs. Add the pairs (pkj , ckj ) and (ukj , zkj ) (1 ≤ k 6= s ≤ 3),
(psj , z
s
j ), (qj , c
s
j) and (usj , wj) to M .
As M is a complete matching in I , clearly no woman in Y ∪ Z can be involved in a blocking pair
of M in I . Nor can a man in P ∪ U (since he can only potentially prefer a woman in Z), nor a
man in Q (since he can only potentially prefer a woman in C , who ranks him last), nor a woman
in W (since she can only potentially prefer a man in U , who ranks him last). Now suppose that
(x4i+r, c(x4i+r)) blocks M , where 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and 0 ≤ r ≤ 3. Let csj = c(x4i+r), where
1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ s ≤ 3. Then (qj, csj) ∈M . If r ∈ {0, 1} then (x4i+r, y4i+r+1) ∈M , so that vi
is false under f . But literal vi occurs in cj , a contradiction, since literal vi was supposed to be true
under f by construction of M . Hence r ∈ {2, 3} and (x4i+r, y4i+r) ∈ M , so that vi is true under
f . But literal v¯i occurs in cj , a contradiction, since literal v¯i was supposed to be true under f by
construction of M . Hence M is stable in I .
Conversely suppose that M is a complete stable matching in I . We form a truth assignment f in B
as follows. For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), if M ∩ (Xi× Yi) = Ti, set vi to be true under f . Otherwise
M ∩ (Xi × Yi) = Fi, in which case we set vi to be false under f .
Now let cj be a clause in C (1 ≤ j ≤ m). There exists some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) such that (qj , csj) ∈M .
Let x4i+r = x(csj) for some i (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1) and r (0 ≤ r ≤ 3). If r ∈ {0, 1} then (x4i+r, y4i+r) ∈
M by the stability of M . Thus variable vi is true under f , and hence clause cj is true under f , since
literal vi occurs in this clause. If r ∈ {2, 3} then (x4i+r, y4i+r+1) ∈ M (where addition is taken
modulo 4) by the stability of M . Thus variable vi is false under f , and hence clause cj is true under
f , since literal v¯i occurs in this clause. Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B.
2
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